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THE PLACE OF THE LABORATORY THEATRE IN THE LIBERAL ARTS

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THE symposium on Drama and the Liberal Arts which appeared in the November issue of the JOURNAL must have been far from satisfying to teachers of dramatics. Questions were raised that were left unanswered, and answers were made that were left unquestioned. Mr. Blanshard's paper opposing dramatics must have been particularly disquieting. Because of its length and the acumen displayed by its author in the analysis of the problem, it gives a preponderance of weight to arguments of the opposition in spite of the fact that the two papers which round out the symposium support the *status quo*. In the absence of arguments to the contrary,—and the two papers favoring the laboratory theatre fail to meet squarely the issues raised by Mr. Blanshard—, his criticisms of dramatics seem serious and incontrovertible. There is a disarming plausibility about his reasoning that throws the unwary reader off his guard and makes him inclined to accept the conclusion that dramatics is greatly over-rated and deserves at best but a small place in the Liberal Arts program. It is with such a conclusion that I wish to take direct issue. I have taken it upon myself to accept the challenges implied in the position taken by Mr. Blanshard and his school of thought and to pay my respects to his arguments, inferences and conclusions.

The attention of "guardians of the curriculum" has been directed to dramatics in recent years chiefly for two reasons. First

of all because dramatics is extremely popular. What was until very recently an extra-curricular activity is now a recognized, if not always respected, member of the official body of instruction. The growth of interest among students in everything that pertains to the theatre has given laboratory methods of drama study a tremendous impetus. The time-honored literary method has had to give place to this more direct approach to drama in the theatre. The enthusiasm with which students have availed themselves of opportunities to work in laboratory theatres and the expansion in personnel and means that has been the inevitable result, all have combined to produce an amazing new phenomenon in education. It was inevitable that some of the "old guard" should shake their heads dubiously. It is still more inevitable that the alarm should be sounded against dramatics from time to time. We have inherited a troublesome moral intuition from our Puritan forebears that tells us that there must of necessity be something wrong with that which so many students find pleasure in. There still survive in our midst those who believe that an education consists in doing the things that you don't want to do. To many people, it is the pleasure that students get out of dramatics that opens the laboratory theatre to grave suspicion.

The second reason for alarm is the great amount of time that the laboratory theatre requires. In the old days, when dramatics was merely a student activity, the faculty was continually concerned because students were spending too much time on dramatics and not enough on their "studies." And now with dramatics in the curriculum, the same concern continues to be felt by many. I do not mean to suggest that there is not a real danger of over-emphasis. But it is true, I think, that many of our fears for dramatics are resurrections of the old "bug-a-boo" that dramatics is not after all a "study." It is on this point that opponents of dramatics need really to be convinced. Therefore, the question raised by Mr. Blanshard is the all-important one. Is the cultural value of courses in dramatics great enough to warrant "the great expenditure of student time which a dramatic laboratory requires"?

To answer this question we must concern ourselves with the conditions which determine the usefulness of drama study in general. We can choose no better starting point than that pro-

posed by our worthy opponent. "What is the end which, in asking students to study the drama, we desire them to gain?" In brief, is it not to enable the student to find in the drama and to take for himself those illuminations of human experience that only the drama can give, which make it precious to civilization and universal culture? All else is subordinate to that. Drama may be used as any other subject as a means for intellectual discipline, but the important reason for stirring a student's mental energies in a course in drama is to furnish him with the means for gaining from the drama itself all that it may hold of valuable experience for him.

What is there in drama that makes it worth our while to study it? What does drama seek to do and how does it operate to produce its effects? Its greatest service intellectually, according to Mr. Blanshard, is to reveal the laws by which human nature acts in its environment. However, he hastens to add that this is not the sole, nor even the chief, purpose of drama because a psychological treatise could do the same thing with greater economy of space and time. What that chief purpose is he does not venture to hazard even a guess. But he is sure that the presentation of truth about human nature is what makes drama "worthy of prolonged study."

What is it that drama does for us that a treatise does not and cannot do? A treatise can be written about a drama, but the drama is much more than the treatise that might be written about it. After the experience of the drama has been lived, what is left in the way of idea and impression can be reduced to a treatise or critical review. But this is not the drama. True, one may recapture moments of the experience in this way, but no amount of talking or writing about the drama is the thing itself or its equivalent. Drama is alive, and like all living things, try as we may, the vital principle eludes us when we examine it too closely.

If drama may be said to have a purpose, it is most certainly to reveal life in its larger connections and its more complete unfoldings. But that again is the result rather than the thing itself. Drama serves us in its own way in the revelation of vital truths struck from the storm and stress of clashes of vital human personalities with ideas, forces, circumstances, and in the midst

of almost primitive emotional excitement. It was once said that listening to Edmund Kean was like having Shakespeare read by flashes of lightning. Nothing could better describe the method of drama. There is the illumination of fundamental truths in flashes of emotional outburst. Drama is emotionalized logic. Coming to us as it does in great surges of emotion, it leaves us thoughtful and thinking. The beginning and the end of a great play is an idea but an idea made vivid and transcendent by the travail through which it has come to us. We are swept along on a tide of primitive, instinctive responses, helpless almost to resist until at last we find ourselves cast high up on the shore, and out of the storm of passion is left to us a vision of truth. The student is caught by this irresistible appeal. He is aware that he has gained something vital and is surprised and delighted that it has come to him with so little of a sense of studying. He feels the envigoration of his experience in his quickened and deepened perceptions, in the enlarging reaches of his imagination, in the expansion of his sympathies.

This is the essence of drama. Based on fundamental instinctive impulses, it rises to heights than which no art carries us further. There is something deep down in our instinctive life that compels us to live for ourselves the experiences of the characters in the play. The psychological process by which we do this has been called "empathy." But to explain that is another question. We are concerned here only with the fact. With an appeal so primitive, so deeply imbedded in the instinctive life of the individual as to be almost beyond his power to resist, drama exerts a tremendous influence over the individual. Its worth must be judged by its effects. Why should we want students to have the experience of participating in the major emotions of a drama? Because we recognize that the ultimate effect of drama is the arousal of a conviction about life and an attitude toward it. If it is a sound conviction and a constructive attitude, the experience of the drama has been a cultural gain for the student. In fact these are the epitome of culture, the reason for all the elaborate educational processes to be found in the Liberal Arts college.

Drama is peculiarly self-revealing. Our mental horizon is extended at the same time that our emotions are plumbed. We are made aware of ourselves, of our potentialities in living. We

live with the characters in the play the lives we might have lived in reality and contemplate ourselves making the adjustments required by the novel situations. We see our own emotive impulses in a larger perspective than that permitted by the pettinesses of every-day life. Trivial things fall away into insignificance. We begin to see things in their true proportions. Nobility is engendered because we find life better than we had thought it and we discern in human striving a faith that is exhilarating and satisfying. Thus, drama is a rigorous discipline of the intellect through the emotions.

In ordinary reasoning, our intelligence may find no difficulty in giving assent, our instincts and emotions, however, are often by no means unanimous in the opinion. But the logic of great drama is irresistible. It is the law of inevitability perfectly demonstrated by the dramatist by the skillful motivation of the auditor's impulses. Drama is not life. It is not even a representation of life; that is, it need not be. It is a selection from life, a careful weaving together of qualities, conditions, characters; a concentration, an elimination of the diffuse and irrelevant, a narrowing down of the possibilities of human action until there is left but one *right* solution and we are content with nothing but that, no matter what suffering it entails. In this way drama disciplines our desires so that we find ourselves ready to wish more and more, not for the romantic, the fantastic, the impossible, but, paradoxically, for things as they are. We find ourselves reconciled to the ultimate rightness of life and destiny no matter how stern and forbidding that destiny or how bitterly man is thwarted and defeated in his aims. Through drama our whole beings are persuaded so that we are truly set free, which is the ideal of culture.

II

It is evident that a student, in order to realize to the full the experience and discipline that gives drama its preeminent place in our culture, must acquire a susceptibility to its medium. At first thought it may seem that an art form with so universal an appeal as drama, that sweeps us along on a tide of instinctive responses, as it were in spite of ourselves, lies ready to the hand of the passer-by, all he has to do is to reach out and grasp it. A little careful reflection, however, will make it apparent that while

drama is based on the most primitive emotional appeal, it calls for the highest order of intelligence and sensitiveness of nervous coordination to attain the utmost of the æsthetic experience it offers. Somehow the student must be prepared to live the experience of the drama most completely. How shall the drama be presented to him? Shall he talk about it in the conventional manner of the classroom, or what is more frequently the case, merely listen to the professor talk about it? The aim should rather be to make it possible for the drama to speak to him directly with its most potent influence. A purely intellectual grasp, whether it be that of the scholar or the philosopher, may not provide the experience which gives drama its chief cultural value. The classroom may fail utterly to give the conviction of emotional realization.

Undoubtedly many men have attained an almost perfect grasp of the implicit philosophy of drama and a highly discriminative appreciation of its imaginative and emotional qualities as well without ever having acted at all. All that need be said concerning such statements as proof against the value of courses in acting and play production is that they are undeniably true and equally insignificant. Mr. Blanshard makes the usual mistake of assuming that the average, immature, liberal arts student possesses a susceptibility to such things equal to his own, which is either belittling his own power of perception or unduly flattering that of the student. He seems to have forgotten, for the moment, the processes in his own life by which he has come into possession of that sensitiveness to the appeal and the thought of drama. These processes, I suspect, are not so different in the cases of Coleridge and Hazlitt or himself from those which are utilized in a more systematic fashion by the teacher of dramatics.

This is the crux of the whole matter. It all comes back, I suspect to the question of the importance of the teacher, or at least of the one who fulfills that function. The great and inspiring teacher will find means, whether in the classroom or the laboratory theatre, for revealing to the student the hidden beauties in a piece of dramatic literature and for releasing the student's imaginative powers until they become articulate. But an unbiased comparison of drama taught by the professor of literature, who may or may not be a good reader himself, with drama taught by

the play-director, who has the background of the scholar and philosopher, but who also has at hand the means for making the drama live in the speech experience of his students must reveal an advantage in the latter.

III

Now let us examine the shortcomings of courses in acting as Mr. Blanshard sees them. His first conclusion that "to our intellectual grasp of a drama acting contributes not at all" is on the face of it an extreme if not an absurd declaration. At first thought, it may appear that an actor confronted with the problem of mastering a rôle and presenting it on the stage must have a rather narrow view of the play as a whole. It is undoubtedly true that the actor sometimes sees the play only with reference to the part that he plays in it. This narrowed vision may be due either to deficiencies in the actor himself or to evils in the system in which he finds himself. But to say that active participation in a play on the part of a student denies to him the intellectual grasp that is the boon of the scholar, the philosopher, or the critic is deliberately to close one's eyes to the facts. Such an argument is based upon two assumptions that become almost ridiculous when put into words. The first is the assumption that scholarly knowledge is of no use to the actor either as mental discipline or as a means for understanding a play with a view to accuracy of detail in its production. The second is that the actor cannot be expected to be aware of the philosophical truth of the drama which it is his supreme task to reveal.

Let us look a little more closely at these premises. In regard to the first, it is undoubtedly true that a scholarly knowledge of the play may be of little immediate use to the actor. One may be pardoned for asking Mr. Blanshard of what use is it to the philosopher? And he has obligingly answered that it is ordinarily useful merely as an exercising machine for developing intellectual muscle. But granted that such intellectual discipline is valuable and the means for realizing it above reproach and that in some rare instances the information may be put to some practical use, is it not true that the actor has more reason to dig it out than one who is quite content to read about a play rather than to exert himself to participate in its production?

Aside from the details of social setting, all of which are fundamental to an actor's preparation, is he not likely to have a more active curiosity concerning devices for securing interest, methods of weaving plot, stylistic mannerisms, textual sources and variations, all that is dear to the heart of the scholar? Most certainly; because these things become linked in his mind with a specific interest in a definite problem.

If drama is actually emotionalized logic, if it begins in the mind of the dramatist as an idea, and if it is that idea that is the gain of the layman, certainly the actor is in need of equal if not superior mental powers to those of the average student. As a matter of fact those students who make the best actors are not mediocre either in intelligence or talent. They have not attained their excellence as actors in any occult way either by reason of natural gift or gratuitous endowment. They stand superior because of naturally vigorous minds that have been subjected to rigorous discipline. That discipline has come as often as not in courses in dramatics although other studies contribute their full share in a completely rounded intellectual culture. The student actor is quick to recognize this fact. Since he, like the playwright, must begin with an idea, a comprehensive conception of the life background of the character he is to portray, he is made aware of the cultural values in these fields that seldom comes to one who is not put to a real test among his fellows.

Acting is, indeed, a real test of all the student's powers. Just the burden of the lines alone in the major part in a full-length play is a challenge to the intelligence and mental alertness of the student. Add to that the demands for poise and self-control, for precision and accuracy that the audience lays upon him, together with the necessity of concentrating upon the thought and action of the play, and one can scarcely think of a like process for proving the mental and moral supremacy of the student. If the inner rewards were not sufficiently great I doubt whether the average person would voluntarily subject himself to the arduous discipline and mental anguish that is the actor's for the glory of a few brief hours upon the stage.

In the second instance, it is difficult to believe that one who sets for himself the task of creating a drama in living forms of his own genius so that through him others may be brought into

the innermost circle of the drama and have revealed to them its essential truth, should himself remain sublimely oblivious to its meaning. Undoubtedly the reader in the leisure of his study can comprehend more of the playwright's idea than the actor or the auditor might be able to catch in the inexorable march of events upon the stage, where this idea must of necessity be caught in hurried and fleeting glimpses. But if this is advanced as an argument in favor of the *study* as opposed to the *laboratory theatre*, we must pause to make a few observations.

In the comparison just made, the student was assumed to be either a reader with the text of the play before him or a spectator in the theatre witnessing the action of the play before him on the stage. In the laboratory theatre, the student is both the reader in his study and the spectator in the theatre. Not only that, but he is the actor as well, and sometimes even the playwright. And when he is not actually the playwright, he represents him in a very real and intimate way in carrying his idea into a unity of effect upon the stage. It would seem from the many more vital contacts which the student in the laboratory theatre has with the drama in question that he would acquire an insight into the thought of the play commonly unknown to the classroom literateur.

If we wish to be careful in our thinking, then, we must envisage the same student as a member of the audience, a recipient of the play, and as a participant in the drama, an actor or producer of the play. And even when we are considering the study of drama from the single point of view of the actor or interpreter, we must recognize two processes more or less distinct from each other although closely related: one, the preparation; the other, the performance.

The fundamental theory of all education and human culture is involved in these two processes. It is that the culture of one depends upon the cooperation of all. The individual gets most for himself of intellectual and emotional enjoyment by the giving out, the sharing, the interchange of ideas with others. At its simplest it is the fundamental law of learning. To express one's thought is essential to understanding. But its æsthetic and moral implications are of far greater consequence. Appreciation of an art is perhaps not dependent upon a perfect mastery of its tech-

nique, but an intelligent appreciation of its function and value as art will grow with a more complete understanding of the creative processes by which it has come into being.

These processes, of course, are not all technical. They are the common heritage of the imaginative instincts of human kind. But they attain form by being related to a specific technique of expression which gives them their peculiar quality and effect. Until our own disordered and heterogeneous impulses are directed in channels of purposeful creation, we stand on the threshold of art willing but unable to enter.

It is my contention that the traditional critical study of drama in the classroom, valuable as it may be in itself, when compared with the vital contacts which the student in the laboratory theatre makes with the drama, becomes a childish toying with the wrappings while the real value of the thing contained remains of secondary interest. In the laboratory, each time the play is studied it is created anew with the primary emphasis always on the meaning. Others may prefer to read what has been written about Shakespeare but the student actor goes first of all to the plays themselves to make them his own.

Even the text of the play is no more than a meagre record. The drama is something more than language printed on a page. That something eludes the one who tries to set it down. That something was in the mind of the dramatist when he wrote and that something needs to be supplied by the interpreter before the drama comes to life again in all its completeness. Drama implies the presence of an audience in a theatre and the effect of the vitalized speech and action of the characters in the play upon that audience. The drama does not begin to be until it has been created in the minds of the audience. It is the sum of all the impressions given off, whether of action or of dialogue, whether of passion or of thought. Such a thing as "closet drama" is an anomaly. Drama belongs to the theatre and without the theatre it is like an eagle with clipped wings. Only in its vivid presentation on the stage is it permitted to exercise its full power toward the liberation of thought and feeling.

The student in the laboratory theatre is in the presence of the materials, the methods, and the effects of dramatic creation. He learns by his attempts to create and his eyes are opened to the

supreme excellence of great drama because he knows first hand the stuff of which it is made. He learns to appreciate its value because he has learned to appreciate its influence in his own life. He finds in it the inspiration to achievement and the satisfaction that endures from having done a thing worth while.

But Mr. Blanshard would object that however plausible this may seem in theory, in the actual practice of the laboratory theatre there are serious obstacles and limitations which make one doubt that the value of this method of drama study is as great as claimed. He contends, in the first place, that all except a few students are concerned with small parts that are often not worth the "reliving." It is true that the common practice is to assign rôles according to the natural ability of the student and that as a consequence the most training is given to those who least need it. However, we must use care to avoid a common error lurking in such a conclusion. The gifted student is assumed to need such training "least" only in comparison with students less gifted. He may need the training nevertheless. It is my belief that the teacher's obligation to the talented student is not less but greater because of his superior qualities.

There is an advantage also for the less gifted student in such a plan as now exists in the laboratory theatre. He does not suffer from neglect in the well-ordered program. Seldom is a so-called small part in a good drama insignificant. It cannot be considered by the one who is to portray it except in relation to the other characters and the play as a whole. With the leading rôles in the hands of the more capable actors, it is possible to achieve the essential spirit and value of a play as it could never be achieved if the situation were reversed. Usually more time *is* spent with the "leads" in rehearsal, not because they are more important to the effect of the play as a whole but because they have a greater burden of lines and action and a more elaborate unfolding of character to be mastered.

While the instructor is busy with the "leads" with whom he may be chiefly concerned at the moment, the one who has a "minor" rôle is standing by listening and watching as the instructor strives to create the play in the experience of his players. His interest is two-fold. He has his own rôle as a special end toward which to bend his creative energies. In proportion to his ability, even the "minor" rôle which becomes his personal responsibility

may be a considerable challenge. He has, too, though without the external compulsions of a part to be played, the challenge to his imagination of the play as a whole. He is free to avail himself of all the revealing comments made by the instructor for the benefit of the "leads." Almost unconsciously he creates these characters for himself. Hence it is that he frequently is heard to aver that he could do a certain part better than the one who is struggling with it. Being free from the necessities of voice and action which claim the attention of the student on the stage, he catches the experience with all its vital force. At the moment its portrayal seems a simple thing and he views with contempt the stupid efforts of the one who is struggling to portray what he but imperfectly conceives. Yet, if he were called to the proof, he would likely fail even more miserably than the one whom he commiserates.

If the appreciation of the play as a whole is the end most to be desired, it is evident that the "minor character" is not in the position of least vantage. With each association with the play and the rest of the cast in rehearsal, he, like all the rest, gains some new insight into the leading character of the play or the dramatic situation in which he is involved, some new illumination of the emotions radiating from the play. The long association with the play gives him time for the play to work itself out in his experience. The experience is repeated, each time with a little more added, until it has touched the rim of his capacity. All the while he is discovering, a little at a time, the rhythmic expressiveness of words to convey thought and feeling. What he may lose in purely literary appreciation is more than made up in appreciation of auditory and visual form, the living symbols of drama. He sees others grow in their interpretations and he thrills at the approach to a common ideal. Encouraged by the successful striving of others, he is impelled to achieve for himself.

The status of the student in the laboratory theatre at its worst is to be preferred to his status in many a literary classroom. There he sits passively in his seat while the instructor pours out his intellectual enthusiasms and æsthetic appreciations. It is often like casting pearls before swine. For the popular student attitude is frequently one of mild contempt, courteous condescension, or tolerant complacency. Too often he goes his way without a thought of the infinite pains that have gone into the

background of culture out of which the instructor speaks. And the pathetic thing is that the student consoles himself with the thought that he has acquired an education when as a matter of fact he has merely collected a few superficial impressions.

On the other hand, the one who elects to study drama by an active participation in its presentation finds the whole situation reversed. He, instead of the instructor, is the active member in the educational partnership. He is thrown upon his own resources. Education does not come to him on the sonorous wings of oratory; he must go after it for himself. He is not permitted to sit as an idle spectator. He is not one of an indifferent audience waiting for the magic of the dramatist to stir the sluggish waters of his imagination. He is the creator of his own drama. The "show will not go on" without him. He is caught in the excitment of tremendously vital activity and almost before he is aware he is entertaining and sometimes teaching his instructor, which is as it should be. The reason for his self-propelling interest is precisely because it is the interest found in an activity and this activity is of inestimable value because it leads the student to the discovery of life's most essential truth, that the individual gains for himself by cooperating with others, and that sharing with others what he cherishes for himself makes the thing cherished the more precious. There is no higher culture.

IV.

The other difficulties with dramatics which appear so perplexing to Mr. Blanshard belong properly to another question. So far in this discussion we have been considering acting merely as a means for appreciation of drama by the actor. We have still to consider the appreciation of drama by the student audience. As soon as this aspect of the situation presents itself acting may no longer be conceived purely as a means afforded the student actor of engaging in the major emotions of the drama for the sake of his own appreciation but now it must be viewed as a means for communicating the experience of the drama to an audience in the theatre. And when the process of communication becomes the important one, the technical aspects of acting and dramatic production must come in for careful consideration.

How far should we go in courses in dramatics to perfect the technique of acting and production? Should we be content with

amateurish standards, as Mr. Spiller advocates in his paper in the symposium, and leave finished art to the professional schools of drama and to the professional theatre? Or is there something in the study of acting and the more technical phases of production of sufficient value to warrant the time and the energy that the laboratory theatre devotes to them?

When we seek an answer to these questions we are at once confronted with a dilemma. Mr. Blanshard has not failed to point it out for us. He contends that acting must be well done if a "truer and finer grasp of a character" is to be gained by this means than is possible in private study. And the time required to do justice on the stage to those greater parts that are worth the studying, according to Mr. Blanshard, is so excessive as to make the end of good acting impracticable if not impossible. It is to be admitted that here is a difficult alternative. Certainly no one who wants drama brought to life upon the stage could reconcile himself to mediocre acting. Such a slovenly aim is intolerable to think of. Fortunately, it is not necessary.

Participation in a play by students involves two aims, that of appreciation of the drama by the actor and that of appreciaion of the drama by the audience. There are always two classes of students, those who seem to have a natural talent for acting and those who have little if any ability or inspiration. For the former, a considerable degree of technical excellence is possible. Whether in acting or stagecraft, they can master the technique of communication sufficiently to share the experience with the audience.

The latter class, which is of course the more numerous, will never be able to communicate effectively the essential spirit and quality of a play, even though they may have as keen an appreciation of it as their more gifted classmates. No amount of time spent by them on the technical aspects of acting and production will enrich the experience of the drama for the audience.

But what of their own appreciation? Is some knowledge of technique valuable? How much time should be spent by the *average* student on the more technical aspects of drama?

Mr. Blanshard argues that unless a student's acting is "well done" he will be so disturbed and distracted by his own awkward renderings as to ruin the more delicate feeling associated with the play. But what does he mean by "well done"? Who is to deter-

mine it, the auditor or the actor? It is apparent that "well done" means different things to different people. Different degrees of perfection are required by different actors before they are able to satisfy themselves. Likewise, what may seem to the student actor to be a complete and effective rendering of a part may fail to meet the degree of technical perfection required by the student in the audience.

The fact that Mr. Blanshard is disturbed when he tries to give voice to his imagination is evidence that his appreciation has gone beyond his ability to give objective expression to it. But there was a time probably when he was not disturbed. He perhaps was not aware of any discrepancy. Then, as he became more familiar with the technical symbols of dramatic expression, his discernment of the aesthetic qualities of drama became more highly discriminative. His appreciation of the vital content of drama, having likewise grown apace with the widening circles of his experience, the time came when he required, as one of the audience, "acting qualities" perhaps far beyond the skill to which his own expression had attained. Now he finds it impossible for Blanshard, the actor, to satisfy Blanshard, the auditor. He falls short of his meaning. The drama can no longer speak to him in his own voice and action. Overt responses which were indispensable to him in his earlier imagings have long since dropped out and incipient responses have become adequate and infinitely more flexible and satisfactory substitutions. For him now to utilize a speech process that has been permitted to fall into disuse is to introduce innumerable distractions and irrelevancies.

Undoubtedly, the student is made self-conscious when he first tries to act a part. This is inevitable, for it is impossible for him at the beginning to seize the experience itself and the means for its communication in one act of attention. Two cycles of experience are involved. More or less independent at first, they must be brought into close coordination. At the moment he is most intent on the "feeling" of his part, he has least awareness and control of his acting. Likewise, when he is most bent on the technical qualities of his acting, the "feeling" escapes him. His "feeling" for his part and his technique are so poorly related that one is bound to disturb the other. With repeated association, however, one contributes more readily to the other until at last he is able

to give attention to his acting while he is intent on the "feeling" and likewise he is able to revive the "feeling" while he is intent on the technique of his acting. Thus, even the student actor learns after a while to hold his feelings poised under the control of his technique and his technique poised and ready to respond to the impulse of his feelings.

It should be understood that the student who has made this cultural advance does not thereby become a good actor from the audience point of view. Because of personal mannerisms and rigidities, his technique may fail to express meaning in universal terms. But he does possess a mental equipment for the appreciation of drama.

If it is true that appreciation requires participation in the drama first by overt responses, and that it is only at a much later stage of development that overt responses can be dispensed with for the more subtle, swift, and sure adaptations of the mature imagination, the attempt to express the drama must somehow be made.

Though the "delicate feeling" which a student may have for the drama is disturbed at the time of performance, it is not lost. And instead of the presence of the audience in the theatre being the evil that Mr. Blanshard makes it, it is on the whole a great good. To strive to create the drama for others is the most effective means of creating the drama for himself. It is the effort rather than the effect on the audience that is of the greatest educational importance. And it is the anticipation of the presence of the audience in the theatre that urges him to do his best.

While there is danger of a student actor becoming stage-struck and more interested in his personal success and the favor and acclaim of his friends, this is usually no more than a temporary distraction as the time of performance grows near. Throughout the long period of painstaking preparation, his interest is predominantly in making his character live for his audience. He subjects himself to the severest tests. He scrutinizes every act and thought and word. It is precisely because his "feeling" for the play is not lost that he is made so painfully aware of his own inadequacy. Each time his failure in test performance sends him back to the play for deeper insight, for more perfect understanding, for renewed inspiration. He realizes that the more he steeps

himself in the essence of the play, the less likely is his "feeling" to desert him in the next test. His imaginative "feeling" becomes to him a kind of lode star to guide him through the difficulties he is bound to encounter with his own unresponsiveness. It may be obscured for a brief moment but it always reappears with increased brilliance to guide his voyage of exploration and discovery in the drama.

So much for the student's study of the play in his preparation. Now comes the actual performance of the play before the audience. The actor is no longer concerned with his own good but that of the audience. If he is a true artist he will efface himself. The more he is aware of the audience and their demands upon him, the more he will strive to control the technical means by which he only can communicate his experience to them. To live his character may not be enough to make his character live for another. To feel his part is not half so important as to make his audience feel it. The time for his own aesthetic enjoyment is past. He must now hold his conception poised while the first flash of emotional insight is tempered by his effort to give it its essential dramatic form.

This is the professional, the artist's point of view. Drama is art only when the imaginative grasp of human experience that was in the mind of the playwright is richly understood and made real in the experience of his audience. And acting becomes art when the actor takes the dramatist's idea and transfuses it with the vitality of his own thought and feeling, then gives to the enlarged idea an expression in terms of his own personality and by means of his own choosing, that carries the idea beyond the original conception of the dramatist and even outside the actor's own experience. In other words, the actor who is also an artist creates outside of himself in materials of universal thought and feeling in such a way that the meaning of the experience is not narrowed to the range of his own personal contacts with life, but reaches out toward the ultimate, and carries the thought of the beholder along by the vitality of his conception and the sheer power of his revelation.

The actor must experience richly for himself if he is to impart to others, but that in itself is not enough to insure a perfect rendition. If he is to succeed with an audience he must know how he

attains his effects. We should think it ridiculous to expect one merely because he has a fine appreciation of music to take up a violin and play a sonata solely from inspiration and without previous experience with the instrument. We realize that a familiarity with musical composition and musical scoring and, more than that, a technical skill in translating the musical theme into terms of the instrument are necessary.

Yet, in unprofessional circles, it is commonly thought that there is no *technique of acting*, at least none that can or need be taught. Our ideas on this whole subject are in a curious muddle from the distinguished Dean of a Liberal Arts college who naïvely inquired, "What can possibly be taught in a course in acting?" to the well-meaning but unskilled teacher of dramatics whose only resource in teaching is the rather vague and mystic invocation of the "feeling of the character." Is it any wonder that Mr. Blanshard has taken the last bold leap in the dark to the conclusion that this whole business of acting is futile anyway, because the actor is incapable of giving bodily expression to those depths of human experience that give drama its chief value for us?

The reasons for this low estimate of acting on the part of educators may be found partly in the history of our theatre and partly in the nature of the art itself. Acting has fallen heir to a thousand prejudices of a former day. In cutting himself off from the professional theatre for conscience sake, the amateur has come to look upon the aims and methods of the professional theatre with a self-conscious distrust. Although the "Torch-bearer" stage of amateur dramatics is happily well on its way to extinction, this characteristic amateur attitude still persists. To charge courses in dramatics with the surreptitious aim of training actors for the stage is still a most effective alarm against them. If to aspire to technical knowledge and perfection in the art of acting is to be professional, then I hold that we should be professional. For the only difference between the amateur and the professional, as far as their art is concerned, is a difference of environment and practical necessity rather than any essential difference in technique or quality of the art product.

Acting suffers, too, from a universal assumption of competence to pronounce upon it. Only baseball rivals it in the number of unprofessional expert opinions called forth. Because as an art it is so like life it is difficult for the untutored to realize that

there is a highly specialized technique behind that which appears so natural and so simple on the stage. Consequently, the most casual observer finds no incongruity in his dogmatic reliance upon his own likes and dislikes or his intolerant refusal to believe that there is more to the art of acting than he can see and appraise for himself.

Moreover, it is difficult to think of acting as an art because it tends to be lost sight of in the larger art of the drama itself. The actor is not an artist in his own right as the dramatist is. The drama is more important than he is. However indispensable and unequalled he may be, he is after all but an interpreter, an intermediary of a larger art. Furthermore, he is but *one* in an art which requires the participation and cooperation of a group to create its effect. But the actor is an artist nevertheless. The play cannot go on without him. He is as much the artist as the singer or the musician. The glow and sweep of great drama can no more be realized without the actor than the charm and allurement of great music without the musician.

And the technical demands of his art are no less. There is a *technique of acting* entirely adequate for the dramatist and for the audience, whatever Mr. Blanshard and others may say to the contrary. For appreciation of drama is basicly acting; that is, it is no more nor less than the empathic responses of the individual to the stimuli thrown out by the media through which the drama comes to us. So how in the world can a reader appreciate what it is impossible for the actor to convey? True, the deeper the emotional experience, the less obvious is its manifestation, but an emotion will always find a means for expressing itself. How otherwise could it have any meaning for us?

As a matter of fact the experience of actors proves that there is such a technique and that it is capable of surcharging a drama with meanings that escape the most vigilant reader of the printed page. This technique is founded upon certain principles, not very well understood as yet one must admit, but nevertheless upon a body of knowledge that is becoming more and more systematized. It is of course not to be thought that actors can be turned out according to a pattern. There is no single mould to which every artist can be made to conform. But there are guiding principles which will lead the student to the discovery of the right use of

his powers to attain the ends he seeks. These principles have been recognized by great artists among actors; their experience has provided a practice which is made available to the student and suggested to him ways and means for embodying character and realizing dramatic effects. This constitutes the technique of acting.

And, from the point of view of the audience, which is also the point of view of art, acting and production should be as technically perfect as possible. As a member of the theatre audience, the student should be privileged to see drama presented by his fellows in such a way that it approaches art at least. If he is to realize the full force of the drama, he must sit before a rather perfect interpretation, an interpretation which involves both the more obvious appeals to the eye and the ear and those more intangible appeals to more subtle sense perceptions. The same student whose technical limitations prevent him from taking part in the finished stage presentation of the drama, will, because of his training in the laboratory theatre, require of others a more perfect interpretation than he is capable of himself. For all his contacts with the technique of acting and production will have made him sensible of their value. In other words, he has acquired a taste in dramatics, an appreciation of the technique as a means for unfolding to him the finest qualities that enter into his experience with the drama in the theatre. In real appreciation the content cannot be separated from the form—the two are one. Instead of the care given to technical detail being "attention to the irrelevant," nothing could be more essential to dramatic creation.

It is perhaps true that the mere "knowledge of how to mix paints" does not in itself add much to one's appreciation of drama. But as technical knowledge of the theatre does enhance one's appreciation of the theatrical medium through which the drama may speak with all its force, it has its place even in non-professional schools of the drama.

Furthermore, it we are to have plays well produced, some students must be trained in the technique of the theatre. Technical study always emphasizes the means to the end. If it is an evil, then it is a necessary one. No art is possible without the sacrifice, if you care to call it that, of the individual to the routine necessary to produce it. The student pianist may with as much point be said to be wasting his time on finger exercises as the stu-

dent of dramatics may be said to be wasting his, wielding a paint brush. For this fact is unalterable, if we wish to have drama in the theatre and not merely in the library, we must devote ourselves to the technique of its production. There must be those who can and will stage plays. Otherwise, the community will be without the drama in its most potent form. For the average community, even the average university community, would see little real drama were it not for those who are devoting the great amount of time which Mr. Blanshard so much deplores.

It can be argued, of course, that a professional company could better give students the contact with drama which the theatre affords without the sacrifice that amateur production entails. Granted for the moment that it is really a sacrifice and that the maintainance of a professional company were feasible, I doubt that such a solution is desirable. The same reasons might be advanced for favoring a professional football team. Without disparagement to that great college sport, I think that it may be said that the time spent on dramatics is worth more culturally to those who take part.

It is true that the time spent in the dramatic workshop should be economized to the greatest possible extent. The actual labor of stagecraft, for example, might very well be left to a professional stage crew. Yet, it is possible that the developing of skill in these mechanical crafts is educationally valuable in the same way that a mastery of laboratory technique in the natural sciences is held to be valuable. I am sure that the time spent is no greater. And there is no more reason for supposing that the aims are more professional in the one case than in the other.

To conclude, anything that is worth while requires time. In the "cash and carry" system which seems to prevail in modern higher education, where a student gets a little of this and a little of that and not much of anything, the student is left with plenty of time, apparently, for idleness and social dissipation. In view of this fact, it seems one of the most hopeful aspects of all our modern higher education that we are able to hold the students' interest in such an activity as dramatics.

GESTALT, BEHAVIOR, AND SPEECH

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IN a recent article appearing in the QUARTERLY JOURNAL, Professor Parrish has presented a very interesting discussion[1] of the part which the so-called new *Gestalt* psychology may play in our theories of speech, and in the teaching of that discipline. We shall, I am quite sure, welcome any contributions which will assist in the clarification of our problems and in the understanding of the intricacies of this particular form of human activity. But perhaps it will not be taken amiss if an attempt is made to analyze some of the points brought out in the article cited, in an effort to determine whether this new "school" of psychological thought, as presented by Professor Parrish really will give us that assistance.

Gestalttheorie has been offered as an "escape from the limitations" of mechanistic psychology, that is, to be specific, of that mode of thought known as Behaviorism. It has been presented as "the key to all behavior including the highest and most intellectual types" (p. 12); and we are given in a single statement "a universal formula, underlying all instincts, all perceptions, all habit, all thought, pervading both logic and bio-logic" (p. 27). Chiefly *Gestalttheorie* has been entered in the lists as champion against the imposter Behavorism, which not being descended on both sides from the royal line (with Aristotlian philosophy as its ultimate progenitor), but having some morganatic blood in its veins, should have no place on the royal seat.

There have been some interesting things about the acceptance of *Gestalttheorie* in America. This has come as the result of a wide swing away from the excessively analytical methods of the old structural psychology, which was so engrossed in the process of taking "the mind" apart that it could never quite get it together again. It was as if one, seeing a number of gears and wheels and pinions and springs and jewels lying about, were to say, "What a fine watch!" Perhaps so, but it wouldn't tell time. Of course by

[1] PARRISH, W. M. *Implications of Gestalt Psychology*, This Journal, 14, February, 1928. 8-29.

such minute analysis, without synthesis, one arrived nowhere at all, so far as an understanding of human mind was concerned.

With the collapse of structuralism—for one may say that since the passing of Titchener his edifice is at least tottering—a new refuge became necessary. In his three articles appearing in *"Psychologis of 1925,"** Bentley himself tolls the requiem for this particular "school." Behaviorism was for the former structuralists distinctly out; they had so ridiculed it, had so definitely gone on record against it, that some other resort must be had. And, as Professor Parrish says, *Gestalttheorie* offered an "escape." (I may be mistaken, but I suspect that *Gestalt* may somewhat more easily be traced back to Aristotle and Plato!)

Since Professor Parrish has raised the question of *Gestalttheorie versus* Behaviorism, it might be well to examine some of the implications of both schools of psychological thought. We may find that possibly there are points of agreement, as well as of difference. If there be truth in both, there ought to be some way of harmonizing them, since any one truth must always harmonize with any other. If there be differences, as there seem to be, a frank discussion ought to put us in the way of at least understanding just what each maintains, and what these tenets may hold for us in our theories and pedagogy of speech.

One of the fundamental points of agreement, it seems to me, between *Gestalttheorie* and Behaviorism, is that both are talking about *behavior*. It is quite unnecessary to point out that the Behaviorist stresses this point; his insistence that all the various forms of "mental" activity may be defined in terms of what the organism is doing, has become quite well-known. But it may not be quite so evident that the Gestaltist in describing these processes, really takes the same point of view. On several occasions Professor Parrish in his article alludes to this principle; on no less than four occasions he speaks of "patterns of *behavior*."[2] He quotes Professor Ogden as using the term, "pattern of total *organic response*."[3] He says, "According to the Gestaltists all the aspects of *behavior* —instinct, perception, affection, memory, are to be understood and

* Clark University, 1925.

[2] Italics mine. In subsequent quotations, Italics marked with an asterisk (*) are in the original.

[3] Page 20, Reference 39.

treated as integral wholes—because biologically they *are** wholes. . . . The organism acts as a whole to a unified situation. Says Professor Ogden, '*Behavior* is not a response to a situation but a *situation-response**. . . this "emergence" involves a corresponding pattern of *behavior*. . . . General as it is, this statement is intended to serve as a key to all *behavior,* including the highest and most intellectual types" (p.12f). Incidentally one might inquire why, if perception is included as one of the aspects of behavior, as suggested here, he speaks of "a perception *or* an act of behavior" (p. 14). It may be that the two terms are used, in the latter case, in apposition. In speaking of the process of learning, Ogden is again quoted as saying, ". . . all learning depends, in the first place, upon particularization, or the emergence of a pattern of *behavior* having some degree of cohesion" (p. 27).

It is not difficult to understand, from the behavioristic viewpoint this insistence by the Gestaltists upon these patterns *of behavior.* If there are patterns at all, and if these patterns are to be unified, so that the whole personality itself forms a configuration, then there must be patterns *of something.* And the only unified aspect of human activity, whether it be the "purely" physical or the so-called "mental," is that through it all the organism is doing something—it is behaving in certain ways. Its activities, therefore, constitute patterns of *behavior.*

But the term "pattern" itself did not await the coming of *Gestalttheorie.* Observe Watson's definition of an emotion: *"An emotion is an hereditary 'pattern-reaction'. . . . ."*[4] And his definition of an instinct: "We should define instinct as an hereditary *pattern reaction.* . . . It might otherwise be expressed as a combination of explicit congenital responses. . . . "[5] While "pattern" might not always be translated as *"Gestalt,"* nor *"Gestalt"* as *"pattern,"* the connotations of the two terms as they are used in the two schools of psychological thought are identical.

Not only do the Gestaltists and the Behaviorists agree in that fundamentally they are talking about the same thing, namely, behavior; they are likewise agreed in that both insist upon the principle of integration. Just as "Behaviorism" gets the name from its

[4] WATSON, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist,* 1919 Edition, p. 195.

[5] *Idem,* p. 231.

insistence upon the tenets it maintains, so *Gestalttheorie* takes its name from its insistence upon the principle that "all the aspects of behavior . . . are to be understood and treated *as integrated wholes* . . ." (p. 12), as patterns, as *Gestalten*. It may not always have been evident, but it is none the less true, that the *Gestalten* of the Gestaltists and the integrations of the Behaviorists are essentially one and the same thing. In fact, *Gestalttheorie* seems to be nothing more than an elaboration, almost to the point of obfuscation, of this well-known behavioristic principle. And if there is any one principle that the Behaviorist has held to more than to any other it is that our responses to situations, or what Ogden calls our "situation-responses," are wholes, integrated, unified. It is far from accurate, then, to charge that the Behaviorist considers "a complex instinctive process like nursing" as "an aggregate of separate reflexes" (p. 11f). Watson points out that "When we are interested in analyzing an instinct into its lowest terms, it is simplest to look upon each such element of activity *in the pattern as a whole* as a reflex. Loeb states, for example, that an instinct is a system of chained reflexes. *As a mere schematic outline of the instinct* we have no objection to such a definition."[6] Watson certainly does not analyze the instincts or instinctive activities into separate reflexes. On the contrary, he explains quite at length the distinction between the reflex and the instinct.

Watson points out that ". . . a good many psychologists have misunderstood the behaviorist's position. They insist that he is only observing the individual movements of the muscles and glands; that he is interested in the muscles and glands in exactly the same way the physiologist is interested in them. This is not the whole statement. *"The behaviorist is interested in integrations and total activities of the individual."*[7]

Holt points out that the essential fact in behavior is that it consists of *organization,* integration of responses. It may be analyzed into reflexes, but these are not "behavior" in its totality. The essential question is, "What is the organism doing?" He says: ". . . the phenomena evinced by the integrated organism are no longer merely the excitation of nerve or the twitching of muscles, nor yet

[6] *Op. cit.* p. 233f.
[7] *Op. cit.* p. 39f. See also *"Psychologies of 1925,"* p. 2.

the play of reflexes touched off by stimuli. These are all present and essential to the phenomena in question but they are merely components now, for they have been integrated. And this integration of reflex-arcs, with all that they involve, into a state of systematic interdependence has produced something that is not merely reflex action. The biological sciences have long recognized this new and further thing, and called it "behavior."[8]

Professor Parrish says, "The *Gestalt* explanation of the fact that emotion or feeling follows a simulation of feeling, would probably be that if one member of a patterned whole is present, nature tends to complete the pattern or close the circuit, so that going through the motions that properly belong to an emotion tends to bring on the appropriate feeling" (p. 22). This, it seems, is nothing more than a restatement of the fact that if one assumes the attitude of an emotion, or feeling, the emotion or feeling ensues because of the tendency of the organism to act as a whole. You may take your choice between saying that "nature tends to close the circuit," and that "the organism tends to act as a whole." The former is reminiscent of the old explanation of the principle of suction: "Nature abhors a vacuum." It assumes a teleology that no scientist of today accepts. Nature no longer "tends."

Professor Woolbert bases his entire theory and pedagogical practise upon certain psychological principles, the first of which is that "The human body tends to operate as a whole, and it is at its best as a whole."[9] One cannot read through either his text or that of O'Neill and Weaver without being impressed by the stress put upon integration, on the principle that, in speaking, it is the coordination of the entire body, that makes for effectiveness. Nowhere can one find the suggestion that the activities of the human organism, or of any other, for that matter, constitute a mosaic. Nor have I found such a suggestion in the writings of any Behaviorist that I have ever read. It is in direct opposition to the fundamental tenets of the behavioristic viewpoint.

Sherrington's treatise on "The Integrative Action of the Nervous System" has been generally accepted as standard by Behaviorists, because it gives physiological and biological support to

[8] HOLT, E. B. "Response and Cognition." *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, 12, 1915, 365-373; 393-409.

[9] *Fundamentals of Speech*, Preface to Revised Edition, p. vii.

their contention that human activities are integrated—to use Professor Parrish's own words, that "all aspects of behavior . . . are to be understood and treated as integrated wholes . . . because biologically they *are** wholes."[10] So fundamentally, we have a second point of agreement.

These two concepts are basic to the doctrine of both Behaviorist and Gestaltist. The Behaviorist talks about pattern-reactions and pattern-responses and integrations; while the Gestaltist speaks of patterns of behavior and aspects of behavior. They mean exactly the same thing. The Gestaltist elaborates upon the theme of wholes, of configurations that are wholes; the Behaviorist expatiates upon the principles that bodily activities are integrated, that the organism tends to act as a whole. I for one can see no difference in the essence. But I can understand the language of Behaviorism, while the verbiage of *Gestalttheorie* is often like the trees that hide the woods.

On still another point are Behaviorism and *Gestalttheorie* in essential agreement, although Professor Parrish seems not to believe it. That point is with regard to analysis. *Gestalttheorie* advances the "new" principle that when a configuration is analyzed, "each part loses its identity when removed from membership in the whole" (p. 12). Yet this is quite in harmony with the contention of Behaviorism, except that the latter uses a somewhat different phraseology. As Holt points out, "Describing the wheels of a watch is not showing where the time is."[11] In other words, while the Behavorist does analyze a process into its elements or its constituents, he is fully aware of the fact that to see how the thing works, it must be considered as a whole. Watson points out that ". . . one should strive to get the beginner to view *the organism as a whole* as rapidly as possible and to see in the performance of each and all its acts the working of an *integrated personality*."[12] Using the analogy of a gas engine, he says, "This hint from mechanics should give us a clearer notion of (1) the reaction of the whole and of parts (2) the possibility of inferring from our data on parts and our records of performance of the apparatus *as a whole* how the apparatus will work under other conditions and the necessary

[10] *Loc. Cit.*

[11] HOLT, E. B. *Op. Cit.*

[12] *Op. cit.* Preface to 1919 edition, p. viii.

changes to make in the parts and their inter-connections in order to get it to take on a new function."[13]

Gestalttheorie insists that when the analysis does take place, the constituents must be considered as smaller "wholes." "Large wholes can be broken up into smaller ones, and small wholes can be combined to make larger ones" (p. 15). This, it seems, is going a bit further toward atomism even than the Behaviorist is willing to go. For when such an analysis is made, the resulting smaller "wholes" have an identity all their own, and one that is quite different from their identity within the larger configuration. The Behavorist would admit freely that such identity is lost, *if* the element is considered as a segregate entity; but the segregation is only a temporary, even a schematic one; and the element must, in fact, be considered in its relation to the total pattern. In this respect the Behaviorist is even more of a Gestaltist than the Gestaltist himself!

Wheeler says: "We are constantly hearing about 'parts,' 'members,' 'factors,' in a configuration, 'membership character' and the like in *Gestalt* literature. Descriptive units (not elements) are evidently necessary. To substitute 'member' for sensation does not conceal the fact that we have details integrated into complexes, patterns, or wholes. Are we to envisage these details as having no relation to one another and as dependent exclusively for their existence upon the whole of which they are the members or parts? Are we to assume that the members depend for their existence upon the 'whole' character of the stimulus pattern excluding any efficacy whatever of the detailed features of the stimulus? Obviously not. This gives no value at all to membership. Parts are superfluous. If parts are superfluous so are wholes, for the latter have no meaning without reference to parts. In short, 'membership' introduces the problem of relationship between members, together with the problem of relationship of these members to details of the stimulus pattern."[14]

Here arises one perplexity: If the larger wholes are to be broken up into smaller wholes, each having identities quite different from those possessed by virtue of membership in the larger whole, then what is the process by which those original identities

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 394.

[14] WHEELER, R. H. "Persistent problems in Systematic Psychology: Attention and Association." *Psychological Review*, 35, 1928, 1-18.

of the larger or the smaller wholes are regained through synthesis? Will not such a synthesis result in just as much of a mosaic as caused difficulty to the old Structuralism? This sort of analysis and synthesis seems to make *Gestalttheorie* even more "atomistic" than Behaviorism itself; although, as a matter of fact, Behaviorism is not in fairness to be considered "atomistic" at all.

One of the chief values of analysis, which as a logical device must be accepted by both Behaviorism and *Gestalttheorie,* is that it is undoubtedly helpful in correction or repair. So long as one's automobile is performing well and giving him no trouble, the driver is only incidentally interested in the details of ignition, gas supply, or compression. But when the thing stops, or knocks, or refuses to start, the sensible motorist will not be satisfied by saying that the car *as a whole* is out of order; he already knows that. What he wants to discover is *why* it won't run, what *part* has gone wrong; whether he has sufficient gas, or whether his spark plugs are clean, or whether there is a leak in the compression. And this involves analysis as well as synthesis. You can't start a balky motor simply by working on it *as a whole,* however much you may be interested in its whole nature. And if a Gestaltist ever has trouble with his car, he will do the same sensible thing as will a Behaviorist: locate the specific difficulty. So also, in trying to correct the speech of our students, we simply do the common-sense thing, as well as the scientific thing, and try to locate their specific difficulties. The study of speech is, for students of college and university age, a matter of re-learning. To accomplish this end it is essential to go back and find the *part* that has gone wrong and thrown the *whole* out of commission, mend that part, and adjust it again to the whole. That is what Woolbert, and O'Neill and Weaver plainly mean; any other interpretation is an obvious distortion.

With regard to the teaching of speech, there may be considerable agreement as well as disagreement. Behaviorists will agree with Gestaltists that a word or a phrase or a sentence must be studied in its relation to the context (p. 20). It is, according to Behavioristic doctrine, the context which gives the word much of its meaning. Yet it must also be admitted that even in the same context the same word may be given various meanings, depending on the manner in which it is spoken, on what the voice does: on the *elements* of tone as well as on the context. The same principle is

applicable to other phases of speech, and Professor Parrish's inaccurate guess to the contrary notwithstanding, those of us who apply Behavioristic theory make daily use of it, and without feeling in the last that our theory is compromised thereby; it is, rather, strengthened and fortified.

So much for the essential agreements beteeen *Gestalttheorie* and Behaviorism. Some of the implications as expounded by Professor Parrish may call for a somewhat different treatment, however, for they imply, if not definitely state, a lack of such harmony and an oppositeness in import.

Professor Parrish insists, and correctly, that each part of a configuration "loses its identity when removed from its membership in the whole" (p. 12). This principle should apply not only to psychological processes, but to rhetoric, and even to the total point of view as expressed in a text-book. Professor Parrish himself applies it to the field of interpretative reading: ". . . how else can one study a word or phrase or sentence except in its context" (p. 20)! Possibly he does not apply it to other types of reading, for in his criticism of the behavioristic writings of Woolbert and O'Neill and Weaver, he commits precisely this very same error. He reads single passages out of their context and interprets them as if there had been no context at all, without regard for the *total* viewpoint of the texts. For it would take a considerable stretch of imagination to read into Woolbert's discussion of gesture, for example, the point that gesture is to be separated "from its context in behavior" (p. 17). Quite the contrary, Woolbert insists, and insists vigorously and repeatedly on such ideas as, "One of the notions hardest for students to master concerning gestures is the need for *total bodily co-ordination.*"[15] O'Neill and Weaver likewise emphasize the point that "any gesture, in order to be most efficient, should be a part of a *total bodily response.*"[16] The point brought out by both texts is that while in an actual speaking situation the speaker should be able to forget the details of his bodily movements, still *in practise*, in studying to improve gesture, to mend it, in developing correct habits of action, it is necessary to pay close attention to the different *elements* that make up the action. Unless one reads these texts or any text, in the light of the principles which

[15] *Op. cit.* p. 111.
[16] *Elements of Speech*, p. 76.

the authors themselves have stated and reiterated, he fails utterly to get their viewpoint *"as a whole."*

A similar error is found when he refers to Dewey as admitting the "possibility of this separation of body from mind."[17] The truth is that Dewey makes no such admission. If one were to begin reading, in the reference cited, on page 165, the following statement would be found: "It would be impossible to state adequately the evil results which have flowed from this dualism of mind and body, much less to exaggerate them. Some of the more striking effects may, however, be enumerated." Dewey then proceeds to numerate three such effects. On the page referred to, in the discussion of the second of these, we find this: ". . . any way *is** mechanical which narrows down the bodily activity so that a separation of body from mind—that is, from a recognition of meaning—is set up." What Dewey is here protesting against is the isolation from the totality of experience of the various acts involved in learning school subjects. Now take that isolated sentence just quoted. How can one know, without first knowing what Dewey means by "mechanical," whether he admits or repudiates the "possibility of this separation of body from mind?" It may be good *Gestalttheorie,* but it certainly is good common-sense as well as good Behaviorism to interpret such a sentence as this in the light of what precedes and what follows. And this Professor Parrish has not done. One is reminded of the man who argued that the Bible declares there is no God because a passage reads: "The fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no God!'"

Watson and "his brother psychologists" are charged with attempting to drive "consciousness" "into the realm of myth." Neither Watson nor any other Behaviorist makes such an attempt. They do, however, and quite properly, refuse to accept a *term* the meaning of which has never been defined. Some of them simply say that they do not know what the word means. Traditional psychologists, and Gestaltists too, for that matter, are hardly in a position to accuse Behaviorism of denying consciousness until they have formulated and agreed upon some definite statement of precisely what is being denied. And it is well known that former attempts to define consciousness have been signally abortive.

[17] P. 10. The citation here is Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 167.

As early as 1904 James, whose psychology Professor Parrish says is "largely based on shrewd, common-sense observation" (p. 8), raised the question as to the existence of consciousness.[18] He says: ". . . the stream of thinking . . . is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. . . . But breath, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness. *That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are.*" Read James with but a few changes and he becomes the first of the Behaviorists; with a few other changes he is the immediate predecessor of the Gestaltists.

What are the facts in the case as to whether consciousness is or is not denied by Behaviorists? Weiss includes an entire chapter on the subject in his "*Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior.*"[19] In this chapter he protests not against the existence of consciousness *per se,* whatever it may be, but against the use of the term to refer to some specific psychical entity. Watson claims that he can get along without the term. Both of these writers would certainly admit all the facts of experience that are admitted by other psychologists; but their point is that experience itself rests upon the total behavior of the organism, and that there is no separate psychical entity to which one gives the name "consciousness." If *Gestalttheorie* wants to define it as a "pattern of behavior," there need be no objection, for that is just what the Behaviorists do.

Wheeler declares that consciousness has no other entity than a synthesis of whatever processes we find we are dealing with in the organism, so far as they are physiological, the synthesis of neural discharges. The point of emphasis here is on the *synthesis,* the *pattern* of behavior. Lashley writes on a "*Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousness;*"[20] Markey writes on "*The Place of Language Habits in a Behavioristic Explanation of Consciousness;*"[21] Hunter in two articles also gives a behavioristic explanation of

[18] "Does Consciousnes Exist?" *Journal of Philosophy,* 1, 1904, 477-491.
[19] Columbus, Ohio, 1925.
[20] *Psychological Review,* 30, 1923, 237-272; 329-353.
[21] *Psychological Review,* 32, 1925, 384-401.

consciousness,[22] thus admitting the term. In their *General Psychology*[23] Smith and Guthrie include an Appendix on consciousness; and Holt has a whole book on *"The Concept of Consciousness."*[24]

As for the "subjective mode of approach to the study of the human mind," the case is still stronger for the Behaviorist. Watson freely admits the validity of the "verbal report" method. "The notion has somehow gained ground that objective psychology does not deal with speech reactions. This, of course, is a mistake. It would be foolish and one-sided to an absurd degree to neglect man's vocal behavior. Often the sole observable reaction in man is speech.... The verbal report or response is put down in our record of the results of the experiment and is used exactly as the conditioned reflex responses would be used had we adopted that form of experimentation in our test."[25] Weiss likewise accepts this method;[26] while Wheeler is a strong advocate of subjective methods as a check on the objective.[27] In a conversation with Professor Woolbert four or five years ago the question was raised as to whether he believed in introspection (subjective method) as a valid psychological procedure. His reply was, "Why, yes; I've seen it done." His discussions on Voice in particular are based largely on a subjective approach. So one may retain a subjective approach to the study of human mind and still assume to be a thoroughly consistent Behaviorist.

Perhaps a more fundamental point, however, in the discussion of objective and subjective methods lies in the question as to just what constitutes the one or the other. Where is the dividing line? When does a method cease to be objective and become subjective? For example, if one observes the movement of his own finger in a reaction-time experiment, is that subjective or objective? If one observes his word-reactions, the laryngeal movements, in responding to a given sensory stimulus, is that subjective or objective?

[22] *Psychological Review*, 31, 1924, 1, and *Psychological Bulletin* 21, p. 86.

[23] 1921, New York, Appleton.

[24] 1914, London.

[25] *Op. cit.*, pp. 38f.

[26] *Theoretical Basis*, pp. 234f.

[27] "Introspection and Behavior." *Psychological Review*, 30, 1923, 103-115.

Bentley has nothing to say about the subject. But he does point out that "The method which psychologists employ in searching out and analyzing experience is the *method of observation.*" Observation means here just what it means in the other descriptive sciences; namely (1) the careful noting of some property, attribute, or occurrence from a definite point of view and with a definite purpose, and (2) the formulation in words or other symbols, accepted by the science, of what is noted."[28] Washburn writes of "Introspection as an Objective Method."[29] Woodworth makes a distinction between objective and subjective observation, in that the former means the observation by one person of his own conscious action.[30] This is a rough differentiation, by which not even Watson and Weiss could be accused of confining themselves to the objective method. Carried to the limit of logic, it would mean that no one could possibly make an objective observation of his own behavior.

Gestalttheorie objects to the behavioristic description of the process of learning through the conditioned reflex. This objection is based upon two grounds: "First, 'that conditioned responses are less effective than those of a more natural order is indicated by the rapidity with which learning seems to wane after it has once been established.' And second, no generalizations are logically possible upon the conditioned reflex experiments because their artificial conditions 'have no counterpart in normal behavior'" (p. 13).

For the first objection, one need only to point to the experiments by Watson and others on the conditioned response. The lapse or waning is explained on sound physiological grounds, and hence on good behavioristic grounds. No behaviorist maintains that once the conditioned response is established it is always permanent. Habit seldom works that way in any organism past babyhood. The original responses have often become too thoroughly fixed to permit immediate and complete substitution. The more firmly fixed they are, the greater the tendency to drop the substituted response. But often in the case of a possible substitution where the original response is not firmly fixed, or has not been accompanied by a strong affective tone, a single trial is sufficient to fix the condi-

[28] *The Field of Psychology*, p. 42.
[29] *Psychological Review*, 29, 1922, 89-112.
[30] *Psychology*, pp. 10ff.

tioning. And if the conditioning process itself be accompanied by a strong emotional set-up, the chances are even greater of its being permanent.

As for the second objection, Professor Parrish is evidently unfamiliar with the hundreds, even thousands, of observations made by Watson upon children *under normal conditions*. Watson's writings are filled with reports based upon these observations, and citing specific case after case after case. No one can really read Watson and escape them. Moreover, the process of conditioning continues even into adulthood. If one will but look about him at the constant growth and multiplication of associations he must observe that the conditioned response has its part and a very large part, in normal, everyday behavior. The learning of a word—any kind of association—is based upon what Woodworth calls the "substitute response" or the "substitute stimulus." And learning is in large part a process of forming associations. Have you ever had the experience of hearing the noon bell and then suddenly coming to realize that you were very hungry? This is an everyday illustration of the operation of the conditioned response under normal conditions.

"Trial and error" as a method in the process of learning, is condemned by Professor Parrish because it is based upon the conditioned response and "insight" is offered in its place. Just what "insight" is, has never been adequately explained. Nor is it clear just how this "insight" applies to learning the way to acquire a "stage-fall." "In order to do anything gracefully and skillfully, one must first hit upon the 'fortunate variation' in behavior which is most suitable to the conditions" (p. 17). And what is this but the "chance success" of the Behaviorist? What is the effect of the practise? "It merely affords opportunity for making a good selection" (p. 17). This is good Behaviorism, so far as it goes; but practise affords the opportunity not only for *making* the selection, but for *fixing* it through the elimination of the poor factors—of the *elements* that make the whole a "poor" configuration, a "poor" integration, so that the pattern as finally established includes the "good" ones only.

Professor Parrish's statement of the two "shortcomings of mechanistic psychology" gives further evidence, I fear, of an astounding lack of familiarity with the literature of Behaviorism.

To say that it is "chiefly concerned with the simplest and most primitive forms of behavior, and with trying to discover whether these simple responses are instinctive or learned" (p. 9), is, speaking frankly, to admit that one knows nothing about it at all. As a matter of fact, Behaviorists are just as keenly interested in the higher forms of "mental" activity as are any other psychologists. I have already suggested a number of references pertaining to consciousness. No one can intelligently read Dewey's *"Human Nature and Conduct,"* or *"Democracy and Education,"* and charge that *he* is interested solely, or even chiefly, in the simplest and most primitive forms of behavior. Weiss employs the terms *consciousness, introspection, mind, mental processes, sensation, image, imagery, emotion, instincts, purpose, thought, volition,* and others, not with the idea of rejecting the facts of experience involved in these terms, but with the idea of determining the behavior involved. Likewise, Wheeler uses *sensation, perception, judgment, reasoning, concept, image, idea, will, feeling, emotion, sentiment,* and puts them into his system of psychology on the basis of acquired or inherited covert and overt behavior. Woolbert writes on "A Behavioristic Account of Intellect and Emotion;"[31] Rosenow on "The Genesis of Images;"[32] Kantor on "Memory: a Triphase Objective Action"[33] and on "Some Suggestions toward a Scientific Interpretation of Perception;"[34] Wheeler on "A Psychological Description of Intelligence,"[35] and so on. A glance through the Index to Watson's *Psychology* reveals the terms, *Forms of Thought, Free Association Method, Habit, Hallucinations, Hypnosis, Memory, Overlearning Personality,* and others.

The second of the two limitations mentioned is as exquisite an illustration of logic gone wild as any I have ever seen. We are told that the Behaviorist must argue that the best mind comes from the most muscular body. Whoever reads into Behaviorism such nonsense is reading something that simply is not there. One might with equal logic argue that a mail carrier, who certainly uses his legs all the time, ought to be a faster runner than the athlete, who

[31] *Psychological Review*, 31, 1924, 265-272.
[32] *Psychological Review*, 25, 1918, 297.
[33] *Journal of Philosophy*, 19, Nov. 19, 1923. 624-639.
[34] *Psychological Review*, 27, 1920, 191-217.
[35] *Psychological Review*, 31, 1924, 161-174.

practises only an hour or so a day. Or that the man who can put the shot farthest ought to be the best baseball pitcher since he uses practically the same muscles; or that "Babe" Ruth should be able to beat Bobby Jones in golf. According to this interpretation, Behaviorists should argue that the old fife and drum corps makes "better" music than the Flonzaley Quartette, and a stick of stovewood represents a higher art than does the most delicate cameo.

Now as a matter of fact, it is altogether possible that the "laborer at manual toil" may be a better "thinker" along the lines of his particular skill than his boss would be if he were to engage in such labor. And if the professor should leave his books and take up the work of the janitor with his broom, he might conceivably have to practise some time before he became as proficient as the janitor. But of course the reverse of this is equally true. The laborer would probably have difficulty in performing effectively the activities that his boss has made more or less habitual; and the janitor in all likelihood would do far better with his broom than he would with the professor's books. And obviously, if talkative people insist on talking nonsense, their patter is not likely to amaze others by its profundity, or to charm by its wit.

The fallacy lies in reading into Behaviorism the principle that the *quantity* of muscular energy expended, or the *number* of muscles involved, is the criterion of the higher forms of activity: that is, the greater the energy or the greater the number of muscles, the higher the form of behavior. One would not even need to be very talkative to develop a fund of wisdom; chewing gum would do the same thing, or at least contribute. To learn to be a sculptor, become adept in the use of the carpenter's chisel or the woodsman's axe. Perhaps Behaviorism will be charged with holding that Lincoln developed his powers of logic by splitting rails. (He may, at that, have learned the abstract lessons of hitting hard and of hewing to the line.) Develop power, muscular strength, physical brute-force, according to this interpretation, and you thereby qualify as the living counterpart of Rodin's "Thinker."

It requires but a smattering of knowledge of the writings of the Behaviorists to know that such an interpretation is absurd to the last degree and distinctly unfair. The actual criterion of the higher processes is not the amount of muscular energy expended, nor the number of muscles and glands participating, but rather

the particular type and degree of *complexity and integration* of behavior which is involved in the total activity. Nevertheless, the old principle of *mens sana in corpore sane* is still sound. It is altogether quite true that the professor might with profit to himself and to his students declare a holiday from his books and engage in some form of physical exercise; and that if "our American intelligentsia" possessed some of the physical vigor of many athletes, professional or amateur, they might be even more intelligent—though on this latter point one may upon occasion be justified in having one's doubts.

I am led to wonder if the specific implications of *Gestalttheorie* for the teaching of speech are advanced as new discoveries? "One obvious implication," says Professor Parrish, "is that mere repeated-practise of a separate sound will not insure its correct pronunciation in the context of a word or phrase" (p. 15). This point is developed in considerable detail. Most teachers of speech will agree heartily with this statement. As a matter of fact, they have been agreeing with it for years, and practising it. "They must practise it (the sound) in its context in a word or phrase" *(Idem)*. Quite so, and for the reasons given; otherwise it means nothing, and "sounds in isolation have not precisely the same physical formation that they have in association with others" *(Idem)*. Fortunately, teachers of speech have not found it necessary to await this monumental discovery by *Gestalttheorie*. I have never known anyone to teach otherwise, except perhaps someone in elementary schools who knew nothing about *Gestalt*, Behavior, phonetics, speech, or human activities in general, but may somewhere or other have heard about *"phonics."* It is to be noted, however, that the Gestaltist *would make the analysis*, just as would the Behaviorist, and would treat the various sounds and elements separately. What the advantage would be in taking time out to insist that these elements formed in themselves complete configurations I confess myself unable to see; such a device would necessarily emphasize the separation. Nor can I understand how the student would be better enabled to produce the required sounds, either separately or in combination with other sounds. It seems to be a matter for phonetics rather than for psychology.

Similarly, the proposed method for teaching the finer discrimination of vowel sounds is one that has been used for a longer time

than I know; it is the one I was taught, before I ever heard of *Gestalttheorie,* and it is the one that many of us have been using for some years. Hence it is not accurate to say that "this is a device that would hardly suggest itself to the mechanists. . . " (p. 17), for in some way or other, the device actually has been suggested and is in rather constant and successful use, and by many good "mechanists."

It may be a matter of interest to know that conditioned reflex experiments on the determination of the limen of discrimination, not only of colors, but of sounds and of other sensory stimuli, actually have been made, following in a general way the very method of procedure which, it is said, "would never suggest itself to the mechanist" (p. 17).

But I am curious to know upon what basis the statement is made that the "mechanists" "assume that sensations of color, pitch, and the like are 'absolute' " (p. 17). I should like to learn specifically of any Behaviorists who make such an assumption, and not of some Gestaltist who says that they do. Furthermore, "sensations" being an abstraction that not all Behaviorists accept as occurring in actual experience, it is not correct to say that as a group they assume anything at all about sensations, whether they are "absolute" or "relative."

The implications applying to gesture are interesting. "'In order to acquire a "stage-fall," ' " Ogden is quoted as saying, "'One must resort to practise; but practise will never bring perfection in the art unless one hits upon an appropriate method, and selects it by the way it *feels.*' "* (p. 17). " 'Practise merely affords opportunity for making such a selection.' " *(Idem.)* How does one hit upon an appropriate method? How may one be sure that, once he has hit upon such a method, he will be able to repeat at will? To say that the method is right when it "feels" right is nonsense; stage technique is not acquired by such a rule of thumb. It is acquired, rather, by careful analysis of action, movements, and an effort to eliminate those elements that prevent, and to foster those conducive to, the greatest effectiveness. One's feelings are almost never the final criterion: as a matter of fact, the method that looks best from over the foot-lights often feels quite awkward to the actor, until he has practised long enough to incorporate the correct elements into the total habit—as *Gestalttheorie* would have it,

into the configuration or pattern of behavior. It simply is not true, then, that a gesture "will become graceful or effective when it comes to feel right" (p. 17). It *is* true that when a graceful or effective gesture becomes habitual, then it feels right. It is equally true that an awkward or ineffective gesture, if habitual, may also "feel right." Ask any teacher who has tried to correct awkward students who think they are graceful because their actions feel right! The habit of good gesture is formed, not by merely "hitting upon the 'fortunate variation' in behavior which is most suitable to the conditions" (nothing other than "making a stagger at it"), but by practising until this "fortunate variation" becomes a permanent part of the total activity. By analysis, by careful, conscious attention to insuring the persistence of these "fortunate variations," and to the elimination of the "unfortunate variations," we are able quite materially to reduce the number of trials before the entire act blends into an integrated whole.

The Behaviorist does analyze "movement into its parts" (p. 17); but these parts when isolated are not parts of a gesture until they have been incorporated into an integrated pattern involving the whole organism, and having communicative significance. Thus, it is possible to study the "basic hand positions" quite apart from their connection with, or relation to, what the rest of the body is doing; but it is not possible to study them *as elements of gesture* without integrating them with other factors, such as distribution of weight, position of the feet, the bend of the arm, the carriage of the head and so on. Nor does an integrated action as a whole have significance until it in turn is considered with respect to the total speech; including thought, words, and voice as well. The speech as a whole forms a "configuration" which must be unitary in its effect.

But, says the Behaviorist, there is no denying that speech does consist of these elements—thought, language, voice, action; it can be analyzed into them, and each one considered separately (though not as separable). Furthermore, it is undeniable that the actions which are involved in speech are in turn made up of such elements as have just been considered, any one or more of which elements may be wrong, thus making the integrated whole wrong. The correction of poor posture consists in getting the elements of posture right, and integrating them into a co-ordinated pattern which in-

cludes what one is saying. The development of an effective gesture is a matter of putting together the proper factors of gesture, not in such a way a to form a mosaic, but so that when all parts work together they make the unified whole. It is not an aggregate of separate parts, nor yet an "assembly," any more than the juxtaposition of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen constitute a molecule of water. This Behavioristic practise is certainly not separating "the gesture from its context in behavior," as Professor Parrish says (p. 17).

Is it the common experience of teachers of Interpretation that students who have "an intelligent appreciation of the meaning of a passage" (p. 19) have *ipso facto* the ability or the technique to read that passage correctly *"at the first trial"*? What has the student gained in his previous reading and speaking that will enable him to do so? Suppose he has gained such ability; by what process has he gained it? Behavioristic theory maintains that he has the technique because he has fixed into permanent habit, *through trial and error,* the *elements* of behavior which go to make that technique. Unfortunately, the experience of most of us has not been so happy as that of Professor Parrish seems to be; our students, however much they have been speaking and reading all their lives, just don't seem to have the technique. Even Phillips' "Tone Drills" do not get for us the right results *the first time.* To be sure, they help, but even this transfer of patterns involves trial and error.

Arguing from *Gestalttheorie,* these patterns in "tone-copying" must properly be transferred in their entirety. But, if a word, phrase, or sentence is to be interpreted according to its context—meaning, presumably, that this smaller whole is a part of the larger whole (the entire selection?)—it is quite evident that this context cannot be transferred along with the word, phrase, or sentence. Consequently, even assuming its possible transfer, the pattern (quite apart from words) would not fit into the new larger whole, because the context would be different, and an entirely new interpretation would be necessary. But the pattern, if it is to be a consistent whole, must include the words, phrases, or sentences as well as the manner of their utterance. Obviously, the device known as "Tone-copying" does not include the carrying over of the exact wording from the "colloquial" to the "classical." All that is left

is the manner of utterance, without anything to utter—the product of a sort of vocal Cheshire cat. This is the logical implication of *Gestalt*.

Of course, Behaviorists use the device, without compromising their position as Behaviorists. What is transferred is the *elements* of tone, which have been analyzed out of the one, and applied to the other—the general quality, or force, the general rate, the general type of pitch change. (See O'Neill and Weaver or Woolbert *ad lib.*, *passim*, *supra*, and *infra*, fore and aft.) The *specific* "configurations" in the two, however, are not the same, because the specific elements are varied to fit the new context.

The "new light on persuasion" (p. 26ff) seems neither to be new nor to "clarify some present obscurity." In the first place, the assumption that "emotions arise from instincts and perceptions" is not a true interpretation of the behavioristic point of view, nor do I get that interpretation from *Gestalttheorie*. Probably both arise from somewhat the same biological necessity; but it is not accurate to base any conclusions upon the assumption that the one is derived from the other. The conclusion itself, is, of course, contrary to the common experience of teachers of speech, for most of us realize that emotion in speaking, when it comes to teaching students how to speak, cannot be left entirely to itself. One could, perhaps, give to his students a set of rules, such as are often given to children, without explaining their theoretical basis. But college and university students are hardly to be satisfied with such procedure. They want to know why, and have every right to be told why. Hence the advisability, the thoroughly defensible practise, of explaining briefly the general biological, the behavioristic, facts about emotion.

In the second place, in no standard rhetorical treatises or textbooks may one find reason to conclude that "mere repetition" has received undue emphasis. Furthermore this is not a logical implication, for rhetorical practise, of the conditioned reflex experiments. There is no question that much of our behavior is based upon the "substitute stimulus" and the "substitute response;" but that is not the whole case, as Professor Parrish would have us believe. One must not forget the factor of emotion, the affective tone, which is the mainspring of our actions, even though emotional responses themselves may be "conditioned." Persuasion

which neglects this factor is hardly persuasion; certainly it is not effective persuasion. The "discovery" which is to "save millions of dollars to the advertising men," it might be suggested, has already been known to them for lo, these many years. As a "new discovery," it isn't worth a cancelled postage stamp. Thirteen years ago, in a prominent text-book on advertising, appeared this statement: "A common blunder of advertisements consists in assuming that the mere repetition and constant reiteration of the name of a brand, a firm name, a trade name, will effect such a stamping in (the establishing of associations) that a sale will be effected by brute force. The theory is psychologically unsound. . . . Connection, association, rather than brute impression, is what will be effective, connection of such a kind that, given the moment of need, the brand in question will come to mind rather than any other brand."[36] Advertising practise has made tremendous strides since that time. A glance at the display of national advertisers in the successive periodicals and newspapers does not reveal an enormous amount of "mere repetition." And it is to be doubted if advertising men base their practise upon *Gestalttheorie* as such.

Third, Professor Parrish seems to think that for the Behaviorist the speaker's problem is merely to please his audience, "or to get their attention, or to alter their, or his, muscle tensions" (p. 27). These seem to be his only alternatives. The assumption that this is the case is one of those half-truths that may be more insidiously harmful than a direct contradiction. For there are really some other possibilities. As a matter of fact, even the Behaviorist is interested in responses other than these. Woolbert mentions four distinct purposes of speaking; O'Neill and Weaver give five. They might all be boiled down to the proposition that we speak in order to get other people to think, believe, and act as we want them to. Pleasing an audience may be a very justifiable end in itself. But getting their attention is only a means to an end. No one, not even a Behaviorist, is concerned primarily with altering muscle tensions. The essential purpose is to get some sort of unified, integrated, total response, whether it be appreciation, inspiration, understanding, diversion, or overt action. In so doing, muscle tensions are undoubtedly altered, both in the speaker and

[36] TIPPER, HOLLINGSWORTH, HOTCHKISS AND PARSONS. *Advertising: its Principles and Practise.* New York, 1915. The Ronald Press. p. 97.

in the audience; but these isolated and individual tensions are not the behavior in its totality. And it is such behavior that is to be influenced by the speaker. It is said that the "speaker must somehow present to his audience clear configurations. . . ." Admitted; but what the student of speech is justified in demanding is not "somehow," but as nearly as possible, *just* how. He needs to be taught methods of building up these configurations, what materials he shall use and how they shall be organized, integrated into a logical whole.

Fourth, the suggestion that in building a speech the students are to be required to "transform this inarticulate mass (of material) into an articulate pattern" adds nothing to already well-established principles. (It reminds me somehow of Spencer's definition of evolution.) In other words, take all this material and organize it according to the principles of rhetoric: unity, coherence, and emphasis. Perhaps *Gestalttheorie* would dispense with this analysis; at any rate, it has done nothing to these principles except to state them in a vague new terminology. What will the student actually do with his materials? He will, presumably, proceed to arrange them in a logical order, which will be no different from what he would have done had he been told to arrange it in logical order in the first place. What price turgidity!

We should all be interested in an "intelligence" test based upon such ability to "bring 'form' out of chaos." Would the basis of scoring be the degree to which the student's "articulate pattern" conformed to some standard pattern? Then what would be the criterion by which this standard pattern would be determined? I can conceive of a number of such "articulate patterns," all of them conforming to good rhetorical theory, being made out of the same "inarticulate mass" of material. Why would an intelligence test constructed on the basis of *Gestaltheorie* be more reliable than one based upon accepted rhetorical theory? Can one predict in advance the reliability of an intelligence test? What would be its advantage over present teaching, which arrives at the same end, namely, to "bring 'form' out of chaos?" And, further, why would one be better able to bring form out of chaos by *Gestalttheorie* than by those well-kown rhetorical principles?

Fifth, *Gestalttheorie* adds nothing to an explanation of why some speeches are good and some not. Periodicity may consist of

configurations; but neither the ancients nor the moderns had the advantage of knowing in so many words that they must built up "a succession of precise, clearly contoured patterns. . . ." (p. 28). "This characteristic," says Professor Parrish, "is evident in many of the popular modern orations intended for lyceum or chautauqua audiences." Let us pray that the orations of the ancients achieved permanence for some reasons in addition to those which make chautauqua lectures popular!

I strongly suspect that in the discussion of style (p. 25), when Professor Parrish wrote the clause, "particularly if the configuration has a 'strong effective tone,' that is, arouses emotion," he *wrote* it "affective." And when in the fourth point under persuasion, (p. 27) in quoting Ogden, he is made to say, " 'a total, vague, and undifferentiated response becomes, through a creative effort, differentiated and discreet,' " he should have been permitted to say, as was undoubtedly intended, "discrete."

I have just two more questions to raise. The first is this: When and what are we permitted by *Gestalttheorie* to divide from larger wholes into smaller wholes? If we are permitted to analyze rhetorically into "phrases, or even into finer units" (p. 20), why are we prevented from similarly dividing bodily action into its finer units? If *Gestalttheorie* permits treating the phonetic elements of a word separately, as is suggested (p. 15), by what logic does it "oppose the division of words and syllables into their constituent slides, stresses, and qualities. . ." (p. 19)? Apparently there are some things that may be analyzed; always providing of course that synthesis follows; other things apparently cannot be analyzed whether we expect to make the required synthesis or not. Upon what basis are we to determine what can and what cannot be divided into smaller wholes, like the poet's fleas:

> "Little dogs have little fleas
> Upon their backs to bite 'em;
> And little fleas have lesser fleas,
> And so *ad infinitum*"?

This point is not made clear; it is a source of perplexity to me, as it may be to others, because it simply is not defensible either in theory or in practise.

My second and last question is this: What is a "mechanistic" psychology? Professor Parrish seems to use the term synony-

mously with "behavioristic." If we put together a number of wheels and batteries, and shafts and pulleys, and gears and pinions, with a certain point of view, with the idea of making an integrated whole, the parts of which are interrelated and mutually interdependent, and which will do some specific bit of work, we have a *machine*. If we put together an accumulation of facts, arranging them in such a way that their interrelations may be observed, and if we view these facts from a certain point of view with the idea of describing or explaining a certain complex-level of phenomena, we have a *science*. To the degree that any such facts, covering the whole field from that particular viewpoint and within that particular complex-level, can be arranged into a system, we have a mechanistic product. Any science, if it is truly a science, is mechanistic. Mathematics is rigidly mechanistic, as are chemistry, physics, biology, and so on. *Psychology is mechanistic to the degree to which it can be shown that its facts are interrelated and interdependent, and cover the field at that particular complex-level.* When any particular "school" of psychology insists that it is not mechanistic then it admits that its facts do not all bear that relation one with another. Behaviorism is frankly mechanistic; it accepts the term gratefully, because its adherents believe that its facts can be arranged systematically. Upon its fundamental principles can be erected a unified structure that takes in the whole realm of "mental" activities, even the extremely complex forms of behavior which are involved in human speech.

Since Behaviorism as such was first offered to the scientific world it has undergone considerable development and modification. That some extravagances were committed in its name no one can well deny; most of these, however, have been repudiated, or at least toned down, by later writers. Yet, with all the modifications and development and toning down, there remain some fundamental propositions, among which are the following: (1) "Mind" or "mental activity," in its last analysis, is what the organism is doing—how it is behaving. (2) The organism tends to act as a whole, and works best when working as a whole. (3) The organism responds, not to isolated stimuli, but to *situations*. To these propositions both Behaviorists and Gestaltists must logically subscribe.

Gestalttheorie is essentially a method of experimentation in perception. In that field it has made an invaluable contribution

in its point of emphasis. But that is not the whole of psychology by any manner of means.

For the teacher and the student of speech, *Gestalttheorie* offers nothing new by way of basic principles. It makes no explanations that cannot be or have not been more intelligibly made on the basis of behavioristic theory. And its implications do not add one iota either to our understanding of the complex nature of speech or to our ability to improve the effectiveness of our communication.

MERE RHETORIC

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Fire in each eye, and papers in each hand
They rave, recite, and madden round the land.
POPE.

WHEN Socrates attacked rhetoric by comparing it with cookery, he was helping to oppose an irresistible force with an immoveable obstacle. Only the brevity of human life, slightly aggravated by hemlock poisoning, prevented his carrying that ever fascinating conflict to at least a local crisis. Rhetoric, then as now, held its prestige not from any moral or intellectual virtue but simply because it was deemed irresistible, indispensable, and heroic. The rhetorician might be good or he might be evil, wise or foolish, but he was always to be feared by his enemies and admired by his friends. Homer gave the world one of its best picaresque novels, with a hero, Ulysses, whose greatest gift was the power of eloquence; but he thereby fastened upon the Greek consciousness the notion that a man whose intellect would never have made him better than a dealer in used chariots was by the power of eloquence made a hero. And Greek thought passed on the tradition by which the rogue-hero of many a later epic has been made. It was this that Socrates threatened to destroy, and to prevent the destruction of which Socrates had to be killed. You may curse the gods and live, for your cursing is worship and stimulates worship in the hearts of those who hear you curse; but when you make your gods into cooks, you destroy the hero-worship and hero-fear that are the supreme religion of the land.

Socrates and Aristotle were not so far apart in their attitude toward rhetoric as is sometimes supposed. Socrates compared it with cookery; Aristotle wrote a cook-book which gave it system and dignity but which justified it because the human appetite was congenitally perverted. Rhetoric was not make heroic; it was simply considered necessary on account of the weak judgment of men. If the matter had rested with Aristotle rhetoric would have been mere rhetoric, a method justified by circumstantial necessity, not by inherent worth. It was not Aristotle but another sort of rhetorician by whom the Homeric tradition was carried on and crafty eloquence endowed with heroic proportions. Lucian's satire of "A Professor of Public Speaking" gives us the best notion of the men who really popularized the ancient and honorable art of rhetoric, the men who practiced what they taught instead of calmly observing, like Aristotle, the weaknesses of men. Lucian's professor of public speaking is so cock-sure of the heroism of his art that he instructs a new pupil in this wise; "Bring with you, then, as the principal thing, ignorance; secondly recklessness; and add thereto effrontery and shamelessness. Modesty, respectability, self-restraint, and blushes may be left at home, for they are useless and somewhat of a hindrance to the matter in hand." Even this attitude, however, popular as it was, partially destroyed itself and the prestige of rhetoric by arousing moral opposition and intellectual contempt. So that Socrates by making rhetorical heroes into cooks, Aristotle by justifying rhetoric as a necessary concession to human weakness, and the Sophists of the degenerate sort by their obvious ignorance and effrontery, were all actually working toward the same end, namely, the recognition that rhetoric was not heroic, but only necessary, not admirable in itself, but only an expedient method of controlling common habits of thought. Any one of these attitudes, if carried on long enough, might have proved an immoveable obstacle in the way of the irresistible force of the Homeric tradition that the rhetorician was a hero and a rightful leader in affairs of state.

The conception of rhetoric which has dominated modern thought is inherited, not from Socrates, not from Aristotle, not from the Sophists whom Lucian satirized, but from two largely independent but perfectly cooperative influences: the influence of Cicero and the influence of the Church. And that's where the

trouble lies. Cicero and the Church Fathers were presumably moral, upright, and intelligent men, but in order to make their own uprightness and intelligence generally effective they recognized the necessity of flattering the weak judgment of their auditors with mere rhetoric. But Cicero and the Church Fathers perpetuated the notion that their rhetoric was itself a good thing, although of course they damned the rhetoric of their opponents. The effect of their influence has been the lasting belief that rhetoric is the proper method of civic and moral leadership and the best method of making civic and moral virtue prevail. Because their motives were good and their minds sound, we have transferred our very proper approval of their motives and their minds to their method, forgetting that it was justified not by any inherent merit but simply and solely by the weak judgment of their auditors. We have developed a confusion of motives and methods analagous to the confusion responsible for such a conception as that of a righteous war. We know perfectly well that, however noble the purpose of a particular war may be, that war is itself, as a method, wholly unreasonable, ineffective, and wrong. We know also that mere rhetoric, *i.e.* all the devices of persuasion which are either substituted for or added to logical argument and veritable information, is likewise, as a method of enforcing justice and truth, unreasonable, ineffective, and wrong. Either war or rhetoric may be justified, or at least necessitated, by circumstances and the weak judgment of men, but the recognition of the fact that they are not reasonable or in any way admirable as methods is quite essential to any relief of the circumstances which necessitate them. The trouble is not that rhetoricians are knaves or fools, but that the false prestige which their method has acquired has largely atrophied the desire and effort to develop better methods of controlling public thought and policy. The relief of the situation must come, not from righteous (*i.e.* rhetorical) indignation or from Professor Shorey's plan of "establishing a coercive public opinion"[1] against rhetoric, but from the perfection and general use of methods which will obviate the necessity for rhetoric, and will, instead of ministering to the weak judgment of audiences, minister to whatever good judgment audiences may have and at

[1] "Democracy and Scholarship." *School and Society*, December 24, 1927. See E. L. Hunt's editorial, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH, April 1928.

the same time seek to develop that good judgment by encouragement and responsibility.

"Establishing a coercive public opinion" against rhetoric is, of course, simply following in the ancient tradition, of which Carlyle was the *reductio ad absurdum,* of fighting rhetoric with rhetoric. Training oneself to oppose rhetoric with rhetoric may be desirable as a method of self-preservation, but it ends the reign of rhetoric just as competitive armaments end war. If Huxley's famous condemnation of "plastering the fair face of truth with that pestilent cosmetic, rhetoric" had been characteristic of his general method, his opposition to the civil and ecclesiastical rhetoric of the time would certainly have been much less effective than it was. There is no sense whatever in merely damning or disclaiming the use of rhetoric. The rhetorician, like Meredith's Egoist, is "all of us." If Molière's Master of Philosophy had used the word "prose" as Coleridge used it, he would not have used it at all. When M. Jourdain asked him, "Et comme l'on parle, qu'est-ce que c'est donc que cela?" he would have answered, not "De la prose," but "De la rhetorique." The demagogues of our capitals and the demi-gods of our pulpits are hardly more rhetorical than our common talk. The preachers "Almighty God" is no farther from "the language of science" than the grocer's "strictly fresh eggs." Paul Valéry has given us a summary and an illustration of the universal truth in his declaration, "The disease of mistaking a hypallage for a discovery, a metaphor for a demonstration, a vomit of words for a torrent of important knowledge, and oneself for an oracle—this curse is ours from birth." It is the universality of rhetoric that makes the whole problem serious. The study of the ways in which language is used to persuade, unless it is undertaken with abundant and benevolent skepticism, is likely to make one either a charlatan or a cynic. Either he will learn to exploit the strong passions and weak judgment of his listeners, for a bad cause or a good, or he will retire in the demoralizing belief that men do not discover truths—they make them.

Hypallages and metaphors are as innocent in themselves as they are universal. It is in mistaking them for discoveries and demonstrations that all the evil lies. No sane man wants to abolish cookery and ordinarily he will much prefer it to medicine, but neither will he ever confuse cookery with medicine or go to a

cook for instructions as to preserving or restoring the health of his body. Yet the health of the body politic has always been and still is entrusted not to physicians of state but to rhetoricians, cooks who pamper the appetites of the electorate. Wishful thinking determines our conclusions, chooses our leaders, and dictates our social and political policies. The will to believe simply identifies what it likes with what it believes.

Rhetoric as a disinterested art is amenable only to the laws of aesthetics, and moral or scientific standards are irrelevant. It is quite possible to exalt an ideal of "pure rhetoric" just as we have an ideal of "pure poetry." Then we would frankly admire rhetoric as a thing of beauty, not of sense. The perfect rhetorician would say with Montaigne, "I take the first argument that fortune offers me; they are all equally good for me; I never see the whole of anything, nor do those see it who promise to show it to us." There might be interesting possibilities in this method of making rhetoric harmless. It would at least have the virtue of resting upon the necessary distinction between truth and conviction, or pseudo-truth. It would help us to realize that a conclusion is at best seldom more than a tentative truth, and that the one who never see the whole of anything sees just as much as those who promise to show it to us. In actual practice, however, the theory would in most cases go to pieces on aesthetic grounds. One contemporary writer on aesthetics, Dr. Katherine Gilbert, reduces ugliness to two tendencies, one, "the cleft between pretension and performance," and the other, "too ostentatious a handling of medium."[2] Pure rhetoric might fall on the horns of the dilemma. The art of persuasion without a persuasive end would be a method without an effect, which usually means a too ostentatious handling of the medium. Pure rhetoric which pretended really to influence the minds of listeners with "the first argument that fortune offered" would be guilty of the cleft between pretension and performance which is described as aesthetically unpleasant.

We may agree that the man who makes the worse appear the better reason is a sinner, and still agree that the man who makes the better reason appear the worse is a greater sinner, for not only is he less entertaining but he is also equally deceptive. Mak-

[2] *Studies in Recent Aesthetic*, pp. 163-167. University of North Carolina, 1927.

ing public opinion more rational certainly does not imply making our methods of communication and discussion less pleasing. It does require a careful discrimination between what we want to believe and what we have a right to believe. We may read Lincoln's Address at Cooper Institute and like the conclusion, "Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it." At the same time we should realize that it is mere rhetoric, that any Southern fire-eater might have said the same, and that we have no right to accept any of the argument of the Address because such rhetoric inspires our will to believe. We may also decide by purely rational processes that the exposition of what the Fathers who framed the government thought concerning the question at issue is not only convincing but also incontrovertible. At the same time we may thoroughly enjoy the argument and want to believe it, so long as we do not let our enjoyment and our want determine our belief. The trouble with our public discussion, the trouble that mere rhetoric tends to aggravate, is that we accept and induce others to accept what we want to believe instead of what we have a right to believe. As James Harvey Robinson describes it, "There is much defensive and offensive discussion but no great play of intelligence. Even those who attack existing institutions, ideas and habits often do so in a semi-religious spirit. The good and the bad, right and wrong, just and unjust are apt to be the starting point rather than the outcome of the inquiry."[3]

Now, a moral determination to be logical will not help us very much unless we improve the materials as well as the processes of our reasoning. One of the best observers and straightest thinkers of our time, Walter Lippman, writes, "Far more serious in the modern world than any difference of moral code is the difference in the assumptions about facts to which the code is applied. Religious, moral and political formulae are nothing like so far apart as the facts assumed by their votaries. Useful discussion, then, instead of comparing ideals, reëxamines the visions of the facts."[4] And according to Professor Robinson what we need is "a new form of literary ambition . . . to bring home to the greatest

[3] *Humanizing of Knowledge.* p. 53. 2nd. ed. Rev. Doran, 1926.
[4] *Public Opinion.* p. 121. Harcourt, Brace, 1922.

number of readers as much knowledge as possible, in the most pleasing, effective, and least misleading manner."[5]

Professor Robinson's statement is incomplete so far as it is confined to writers and readers; the spoken word deserves its share of responsibility and accomplishment in disseminating and popularizing knowledge. Especially is this important because oral misinformation can usually nullify the effect of literary information. And, of course, he is not strictly accurate in calling this process "new." Under the homely name of exposition it has long been practiced. But it has not been practiced by enough people with enough integrity of method to accomplish much in the cause of reëxamining our visions of facts. It has been confined mainly to innocuous subjects or corrupted by rhetoric. Pure exposition has very seldom maintained its purity outside the realm of the mechanical, and speeches explaining four-cylinder gas engines do not help greatly in solving social and political problems. Exposition as a means of persuasion, generally distorted by the conclusion to be drawn, is common enough, but its method is hardly more than that of Polus, who, when asked by Socrates to tell what rhetoric was, replied that rhetoric was the noblest of arts. Imagine the usual college student or graduate in the present election year trying to give an unbiased and accurate explanation of the civil policy of the Roman Catholic Church or the reasons for Republican influence!

Sometimes the confusion of exposition and rhetoric has more serious consequences. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, after fifty years of training and practice in rhetoric, tried to explain a treaty. The first speech of his memorable September tour was not affected by the fatigue and annoyance which he experienced during the days that followed and may fairly be taken as representative of his abilition to meet the situation. Immediately after expressing his pleasure at finding himself face to face with the citizens of Columbus, Ohio, and at having escaped the citizens of Washington, D. C., he announced the circumstances and purpose of his speech.

> After all the various angles at which you have heard the treaty held up, perhaps you would like to know what is in the treaty. I find it very difficult in reading some of the speeches that I have read to form any conception of that great document.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 80.

It is a document unique in the history of the world for many reasons, and I think I can not do you a better service, or the peace of the world a better service, than by pointing out to you just what this treaty contains and what it seeks to do.[6]

He was, then, committed to the task of explaining a document the uniqueness of which would make understanding difficult, and which, moreover, had been obscured and misrepresented by argument. Here is the substance of his explanation:

The treaty seeks to punish the wrong done by Germany. The terms of the treaty are severe but not unjust.

There is no indemnity but there is reparation, and a method of adjustment to the utmost point that Germany can pay, but not beyond that point.

Some of the statements made about the treaty are by persons who have not read it, or, if they have read it, have not comprehended it.

The treaty was intended not merely to end the war but to prevent any similar war. That is what the League of Nations is for.

The treaty is unique in the history of mankind because the center of it is redemption of weak nations.

Italy was denied a military foothold on the other side of the Adriatic. If there is a league of nations Italy will not need a military foothold there.

Some gentlemen have feared that the league will oblige us to do things we do not want to do. If the treaty were wrong, that might be so, but if the treaty is right we will wish to preserve the right.

The heart of the treaty is that it rectifies the age-long wrongs of Europe.

One of the chief efforts of those who made the treaty was to remove anger from the hearts of great peoples.

Upper Silesia will go to Germany or to Poland, as the people of Upper Silesia prefer. This illustrates many other cases where a plebiscite was provided for.

There are more Italians in New York City than in any Italian city but I hope, I believe that the Italians in New York City are as glad to stay there as we are to have them. I would not have you suppose that my Italian colleagues claimed New York City.

[6] Senate Document No. 120, pp. 5-15. 66th Congress, 1919. The digest immediately following is given in Wilson's own words. Omissions are not indicated because there are necessarily so many of them. No significant part of the explanation of the treaty is omitted, although necesarily condensed. The amplification to be found in the original speech is rhetorical, not factual.

The treaty contains a Magna Charta of labor—a thing unheard of until this interesting year of grace. A whole section of the treaty is devoted to the interests of labor, and next month there is to meet the first assembly under this section.

The central idea of the treaty is that nations consist of their people. Even the territories taken from Germany are not given to anybody. Powers are appointed as trustees over peoples unable to govern themselves.

The treaty gathers under the league the means of checking the evils that debase men—like the opium traffic, like the traffic in women and children, like the traffic in dangerous drugs, like the traffic in arms among civilized people. It provides for sanitation, for the Red Cross. Why, those clauses, my fellow-citizens, draw the hearts of the world together and make a team of them.

That is the treaty. Did you ever hear of it before? Did you ever know before what was in the treaty?

I have not come to debate the treaty. It speaks for itself if you will let it. When it is accepted men in khaki will not have to cross the seas again.

I say "when it is accepted," for it will be accepted. I have never entertained a moment's doubt of that, and the only thing I have been impatient of has been the delay. In the years to come men will be glad to remember that they had some part in the great struggle which brought this incomparable consummation of the hopes of mankind.

And Echo answers, "What was in the treaty?"

The rest of the thirty-seven speeches of the tour show the same technique of explanation. With monotonous regularity Wilson repeats the formula: I have come to tell you what is in the treaty. The treaty is unique in the history of mankind. Many of the things said about the treaty are untrue and the people who say them have not read or have not understood it. The heart of the treaty is that it rights the age-long wrongs of Europe. The principal idea of the treaty is the liberation of weak peoples. The center of the treaty is the prevention of future war. That is the treaty. I am not going to debate the treaty. I know that it will be accepted and that every one will be glad.

And the American electorate, still with very little notion of what was in the treaty, but certain that this explanation was mere rhetoric, chose as Wilson's successor one who accepted his nomination in a speech of which the following is fairly representative:

With a Senate advising as the Constitution contemplates, I would hopefully approach the nations of Europe and of the earth,

proposing that understanding which makes us a willing participant in the consecration of nations to a new relationship, to commit the moral forces of the world, America included, to peace and international justice, still leaving America free, independent, self-reliant, but offering friendship to all the world. If men call for more specific details, I remind them that moral committals are broad and all-inclusive, and we are contemplating peoples in the concord of humanity's advancement.

It is curious to turn from Wilson's September speeches to a comment made by him in his first presidential campaign:

> Mr. Roosevelt attached to his platform some very splendid suggestions as to noble enterprises which we ought to undertake for the uplift of the human race; but when I hear an ambitious platform put forth, I am very much more interested in the dynamics of it than in the rhetoric of it. I have a very practical mind, and I want to know who are going to do those things and how they are going to be done.[7]

This may be merely the poular device of anti-rhetorical rhetoric, but it also suggests a much more important phenomenon. We commonly think of rhetoric as an art practiced consciously and willfully by a self-controlled mind. Therefore, if the mind of the rhetorician is well-educated and well-motivated, we conclude that his art is a harmless, expedient, and even admirable method. But if, as modern psychology seems generally to indicate, mind is itself a function determined by habits, there arises the problem of how far the confirmed rhetorician is capable of controlling, or even of being definitely conscious of the processes of his art. "The influence of habit is decisive," writes John Dewey, "because all distinctively human action has to be learned, and the very heart, blood and sinews of learning is creation of habitudes. Habits bind us to orderly and established ways of action because they generate ease, skill and interest in things to which we have grown used, and because they instigate fear to walk in different ways, and because they leave us incapacitated for the trial of them. Habit does not preclude thought, but it determines the channels within which it operates. Thinking is secreted in the interstices of habit. . . . Thinking itself becomes habitual along certain lines; a specialized occupation."

Thirty years before his September tour Wilson wrote to his wife, "It's singular, considering the judicial frame of mind I

[7] *The New Freedom*, p. 193. Doubleday, Page, 1913.

try to cultivate, what a partisan I am in politics.''[8] Yet, ever since his boyhood days, when he had studied orations with his father (a preacher and formerly a professor of rhetoric) and with his father's assistance tried to improve on them, Wilson had cultivated what he himself called ''an unmistakably oratorical temperament''[9] and ''the art of putting things so as to appeal irresistibly to an audience.''[10] As an undergraduate at Princeton he made a ''solemn covenant'' with Charles Talcott, ''to drill ourselves in all the arts of persuasion, but especially in oratory . . . that we might have facility in leading others into our ways of thinking and enlisting them in our purpose.''[11] In an article in the *Princetonian* he urged students to study oratory, not for the sake of college prizes, but to gain ''the control of other minds by a strange personal influence and power.''[12] He wrote his first book, *Congressional Government*, ''to set reform a-going.'' A month after entering the graduate school of Johns Hapkins he expressed his disappointment in professors who were less interested in the rhetorical method of reform.[13] His own career as a teacher was entirely consistent with his judgment as a student. And when he tired of teaching, which he dubbed ''a merely talking profession,''[14] he became a politician. By heredity and environment he combined all of the four great rhetorical traditions: the legal, the ecclesiastical, the pedagogical, and the political. Throughout his career he not only studied all the arts of persuasion but practiced them diligently, in arguments at the bar, sermons from the pulpit, and lectures to his college classes and the Congress of the United States. It is not entirely surprising that the will to cultivate a judicial frame of mind should be unsuccessful against lifelong habits of making one's own thinking irresistible and enlisting others in one's purpose by means of oratory. The best of intentions do not make it easy to play judge and advocate at the same time.

[8] Ray Stannard Baker: *Life and Letters of Woodrow Wilson*, I:308. Doubleday, Page, 1927.

[9] *Ibid.* I:228.

[10] *Ibid.* I:186.

[11] *Ibid.* I:103-4.

[12] *Ibid.* I:91-3.

[13] *Ibid.* I:184.

[14] *Ibid.* II:23.

As President of Princeton Wilson once said, "You know what you mean by an extraordinarily well-informed man. You mean a man who always has some fact at his command to trip you up; and you will generally find that all this man can do is to throw little chunks of fact in the way so you will stumble on them and make yourself ridiculous. And if you say, 'Very well, please be kind enough to generalize on this matter,' you will find he cannot do it."[15] Yet, in his political speeches, including the September speeches on the treaty, we find repeatedly such protestations as, "There is one thing that I respect more than any other, and that is a fact."[16] The charge of insincerity seems a hasty and superficial explanation in the light of Wilson's whole career and the testimony of men who knew him intimately. Dean Fine of Princeton, for instance, writes that Wilson's convictions "seemed to have for him the authority of objective unquestioned truths."[17] The chivalrous determination that a Beautiful Theory should not be left to be murdered by a Gang of Brutal Facts frequently produces a mêlée in which theories and facts are hopelessly confused. LeBon tells us, "The power of words is quite independent of their real significance. Words whose sense is the most ill-defined are sometimes those that possess the most influence. . . They evoke grandiose and vague images in men's minds, but this very vagueness that wraps them in obscurity augments their mysterious power." The rhetorician constantly tends to estimate the truth of his statements by their rhetorical effectiveness. The habit of rhetorical thinking largely incapacitates him for disinterested, impartial thought. And the grandiose and vague images with which he expresses his convictions in order to influence other men's minds exert the same power upon his own mind. "As you go up in the balloon," writes Mr. Lippmann, "you throw more and more concrete objects overboard, and when you have reached the top with some phrase like the Rights of Humanity or the World Made Safe for Democracy, you see far and wide, but you see very little."[18]

The ordinary baloonist has one great advantage over the rhetorician, however, in having instruments by which he can

[15] *Ibid.* I:251.
[16] Speech at St. Paul, September 9, 1919.
[17] Quoted by Baker, *op. cit.* II:238.
[18] *Public Opinion*, p. 215.

objectively measure his distance from the earth. It would not be desirable for a man in Wilson's position to see himself as others saw him, but it was highly desirable that he should be able to see himself as he saw others. Yet, in proportion as the rhetorician persuades others he loses the benefit of their criticism, and in proportion as he persuades himself he loses the ability to criticise himself. When controlled by his persuasive purpose, his intelligence and information simply help make his rhetoric irresistible to others and to himself. What appears at first as a working generalization, liable to inconvenient opposition by "chunks of fact", comes in time to be seen as itself an indubitable fact. Integrity of purpose only aggravates the difficulty, for the very earnestness of the desire to make reason and the will of God prevail dominates the critical spirit which is quite essential in determining reason and the will of God. Wilson himself once said, "I am not afraid of a knave. I am not afrad of a rascal. I am afraid of a strong man who is wrong, and whose thinking can be impressed upon other persons by his own force of character and force of speech."[19]

One of the best methods of protecting the rhetorician himself, and hence also his other victims, against the influence of the rhetorical habit is the constant practice of dialectic, in the sense of discussion by dialogue. Educated people have always professed admiration for Socrates, but almost as intensely as the ignorant they dislike the obligation of stopping to define terms and following wherever the discussion leads them. College students learn to prepare and deliver plausible arguments and emotional appeals and to form psychological crowds, but they very seldom acquire the ability either to carry on or to survive a searching cross-examination. Yet, one advantage which the dialectical method distinctly has is that it can be developed and its benefits gained through academic instruction. It would be very easy for teachers of rhetoric to substitute dialectic for a large part of their speech-making and debate. It would also be very easy to encourage class-room audiences to interrupt their speakers as freely and perhaps as intelligently as the hecklers of Hyde Park interrupt theirs. Both practices would be helpful, although temporarily painful. Wilson may not have realized how truly he spoke when he said, "It is

[19] *The New Freedom*, p. 220.

always dangerous for a man to have the floor entirely to himself,"[20] but we could profit by the truth of his statement. Nor would we have to go quite so far as Mr. Mencken and say that anyone who makes a set speech becomes an actor and hence an ass.

Dialectic, however, can easily become merely disorganized rhetoric. After all, we suffer more from the rhetoric of innumerable conversations than from the speeches of a few public leaders. No one supposes, for instance, that Harding was elected by his ability to contemplate peoples in the concord of humanity's advancement. Much more important was the aggregate of equally vague and grandiose images expressed in the pseudo-dialectical discussions of countless groups of citizens. Students of public speaking, whether engaged in dialectic or having the floor entirely to themselves, would do well to follow Aristotle's practice more and his precepts less. Discussion is too much concerned with large generalizations which constitute major premises, and with immediate policies which constitute conclusions, and too little concerned with the minor premises which determine the general category of the specific problem under discussion. The desire for the Rights of Humanity or a World Made Safe for Democracy, and the desire to have a treaty accepted, crowd out the consideration and discussion of whether and how the treaty gives humanity its rights or makes the world safe for democracy. As Mr. Lippmann says, "The orthodox theory holds that a public opinion constitutes a moral judgment on a group of facts. The theory I am suggesting is that, in the present state of education, a public opinion is primarily a moralized and codified version of the facts. I am arguing that the pattern of stereotypes at the center of our codes largely determine what group of facts we shall see, and in what light we shall see them."[21] This is a problem requiring a change in the fundamental nature, and not merely in the formal method, of our public discussion. That change is best described by the antithesis between exposition and rhetoric, although the two are, of course, not mutually exclusive. There is, at least, a distinct difference between the subordination of exposition to a particular conclusion, which is the usual practice of the rhetorician, and the sub-

[20] Speech to American Federation of Labor, Buffalo, November 12, 1917.

[21] *Op. cit.* p. 125.

ordination of persuasion, even to the extent of eliminating the conclusion altogether, to the object of presenting "as much knowledge as possible in the most pleasing, effective, and least misleading manner."

To quote Walter Lippmann once more:

> It is because they are compelled to act without a reliable picture of the world, that governments, schools, newspapers, and churches make such small headway against the more obvious failings of democracy, against violent prejudice, apathy, preference for the curious trivial as against the dull important, and the hunger for sideshows and three legged calves. This is the primary defect of popular government, a defect inherent in its traditions, and all its other defects can, I believe, be traced to this one.[22]

Reliable pictures of the world to be effective in controlling public opinion must not only be formed by disinterested research; they must also be disseminated by disinterested publicity. So long as men who are in a position to disseminate these pictures are content with their moralized and codified versions of the facts, and encourage themselves in the use of such versions because they feel the necessity of ministering to the weak judgment of their auditors, public opinion has little chance of improving itself. So far as the public's writers and speakers transfer their attention from making their conclusions irresistible to making clear the materials from which conclusions are to be drawn, public opinion has a chance to exercise reason instead of the will to believe. The short-cut method of rhetoric justifies itself on the ground of necessity, but perpetuates the conditions which make it necessary.

Finally, we need a deliberate revision of our commonplaces of rhetorical judgment in order to overcome our emotional bias in favor of the orator, as against the well-informed man who merely tells us the truth and lets it go at that. We need to realize, for instance, that earnestness almost always involves a highly moralized and codified version of the facts, and that it requires equanimity to see the truth clearly and see it whole. We need to remember that the speaker or writer who, instead of proving his arguments, identifies them with our present beliefs is appealing to our common habits of rationalizing and not to our reason. Instead of accepting a conclusion because it promises great benefits, we need to scrutinize it the more carefully the larger its promises

[22] *Ibid.* p. 365.

may be, for the more likely is it an attempt to make us swallow the whole story for the sake of the happy ending. These and similar revised standards of rhetorical criticism would give us greater accuracy in distinguishing hypallage from discovery, metaphor from demonstration, a vomit of words from a torrent of important knowledge, and the oracle, whether oneself or another, from the mere orator.

Rhetoric has still a long and merry and even useful life before it, but saner criteria of criticism, and the active and general encouragement of exposition and dialectic in its stead, would gradually make it less necessary and less influential. Deprived of its power over the judgment of its victims, including its users, and restricted to the business of merely pleasing our sensibilities, it would be as little harmful to social and political reason as the Swiss Guards of the Vatican are to international peace. Its users might still be honored as cooks, but not followed as heroes and leaders in affairs of state. Meanwhile, the best method of suppressing the harmful power of rhetoric is the method the Spartans used to suppress their unfit population, the method of unexcited but uncompromising exposure. This expedient may serve us fairly well until such time as the human race generally develops a safe and scientific method of intellectual birth-control.

JEWEL'S ORATION AGAINST RHETORIC: A TRANSLATION

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Introduction

IF we take at face value the oration here translated, we must believe that John Jewel (later Bishop), at some time in the period when he was Prelector in Humanities and Rhetoric at Corpus Christi College, Oxford,[1] came before the assembled students of

[1] The heading of the oration places it in this period, which seems to have begun after Jewel had proceeded Master of Arts, in 1544, and to have ended in 1552. He was licensed to preach, and had a charge, in 1551. Choosing a central date, we may say that the oration belongs *circa* 1548. In that year Jewel was twenty-six years old.

the college, announced that he would have nothing further to do with the subject of rhetoric, and urged them to study it no more. Such, as will be seen below, is the plain import of the document. But a bare reading is enough to raise doubts and difficulties concerning this interpretation; and pursuit of relevant facts leads one rather to interpret the oration as a *tour de force* of mingled irony, burlesque, and rhetorical display, with perhaps a modicum of serious intent.

We have little external evidence concerning the *Oratio contra Rhetoricam*.[2] Had it been a serious announcement of an about-face on the part of a popular teacher, surely the biographers of Jewel and other scholars of the period would have taken some notice of it; this they failed to do. Hence it is possible to believe, in spite of the statement on the manuscripts, that the oration was never delivered. Yet this is not a necessary conclusion, for Jewel's greater works, written after 1560, quickly overshadowed the few remains of his academic life.

The basis of all biographies of Jewel is the "official" account of his life by Lawrence Humphrey, a contemporary and friend.[3] From him we learn of Jewel's early studies to make himself a good speaker. These included practice in the woods of Shotover, near Oxford, where in imitation of Demosthenes young Jewel declaimed aloud, exercising himself in all manners of pronunciation and gesture. From Humphrey also we learn of Jewel's popularity as a lecturer, thus described by a later biographer:[4]

> The public labors of Jewel as Reader in Humanity and Rhetoric combined, with these obscure toils [as tutor] to fill up the measure of his great reputation. The writings of Cicero were prominent among the various subjects which he illustrated by his learning and genius. And such was his power of inflaming his audience

[2] It exists in three manuscripts: Corpus Christi College MSS. cclvii and cccIv, the second being merely a transcript of the first; and British Museum Harleian MS. 129.72. It was first printed by Jelf in *The Works of John Jewel, Oxford*, 1848, viii, 209-220; and again in *The Works of John Jewel*, edited by Ayre for the Parker Society, Cambridge, 1850, iv, 1282-91. The translation below follows the text arrived at by Ayre from a collation of the manuscripts.

[3] *Joannis Juelli Angli, Episcopi Sarisburiensis, vita & mors*, London, 1573; also prefixed to *Juelli Opera*, London, 1600.

[4] C. W. Le Bas, *The Life of Bishop Jewel*, London, 1835, p. 12. Le Bas did not know of the *Oratio contra Rhetoricam*.

with the ardor of his own mind, that the fame of his eloquence was soon spread through the University.

We also find in Humphrey's biography thus much of an account of Jewel's teaching in rhetoric:[5]

> The *Partitiones Oratoriae* of Cicero he proposed both to himself and to his pupils, as a most exquisite work, and worthy of the closest attention. He moreover, composed a dialogue, embracing the whole sum of the Art of Rhetoric. . . . In the course of every week, they [his pupils] were exercised in declamation; and they were constantly accustomed to compose, or to recite, either in prose or verse.

This "dialogue embracing the whole sum of the Art of Rhetoric" is not extant; unless it be that Humphrey here alludes to the present *Oratio,* which in the course of thirty years of oral tradition might have come to be so described.

It must be remembered that in spite of this denunciation of rhetoric Jewel seems to have accepted appointment in 1553 to the position of Public Orator of Oxford University; that he later became one of the most eloquent preachers of his time; that in his famous controversial works he cites Cicero and other rhetoricians without prejudice; and that Gabriel Harvey in his *Rhetor* (1577) lists Jewel as one of the ornaments of English eloquence.[6]

As to the oration itself, the reader is at liberty to take it as seriously as he likes. The fundamental paradox of a man's using his best eloquence to denounce eloquence is amply exemplified in similar attacks elsewhere. Perhaps such a speaker or writer emulates the drinker who would have one more spree before entering upon teetotalism. Or he may think that eloquence is the only force powerful enough to destroy itself: compare "the war to end war." But these questions arise: if Jewel were seriously attacking rhetoric, would he permit himself the extravagance of denouncing orators for their practice of calling upon the immortal gods, not three minutes after he himself had done so? Would he use as an argument against orators the fact that thieving Mercury is their patron, and then immediately condemn them for drawing arguments from fables? Would he so specifically bring into question the very

[5] Translated by Le Bas, work cited, p. 11. In Humphrey, ed. 1573, pp. 27, 28.

[6] "De Chaucero, Moro, Eliota, Aschamo, Iuello, nostris gemmis nihil in praesenti dico." f. Q (recto).

figures of speech which he freely used? And finally, if he were making a serious argument, would he not, before students preparing to enter holy orders, draw some authority from the Bible or from fathers of the church?

His attacks upon Cicero and his laudation of the Scotists deserve special notice. Jewel was a great admirer of Erasmus, who in several works and specifically in his *Ciceronianus* (1528) had satirized the extreme Ciceronians, writers and speakers who insisted that no word could be good Latin unless Cicero used it. We are led to believe that Jewel's anti-Ciceronianism in this oration is genuine. In an oratorical style which owes much to Cicero he feels free to employ a non-Ciceronian vocabulary. Yet from the extravagance of his attack upon Cicero's influence, both in Rome and in Oxford, we must also believe that he is burlesquing those who go too far in their anti-Ciceronianism. And when he glorifies the Scotists and laments the decay of learning in his own age, surely Jewel is indulging in pure irony. For Erasmus frequently turned his satire against the Scotists; and Jewel himself was an enthusiast for Greek and the new learning which had supplanted the discipline of the schoolmen.

The translator has not thought it necessary to search out all sources made use of by Jewel, but has indicated several in footnotes to the translation. The principal topics of an anti-rhetoric may be traced back to Plato's *Gorgias* and Lucian's *The Teacher of Rhetoric,* and had been drawn upon by many before Jewel took them up. Where he appears to be most original he comes nearest to obvious burlesque; as in his attributing the preliminary stage fright of speakers to their fear of penalties laid upon orators by various states; and in his measure of the comparative value of lawyers and orators. The clear echoes of Erasmus' *Encomium Moriae* (first published in 1509) suggest that Jewel may here be attempting a similar mixture of jest and earnest, a satire cutting at once in more than one direction. We might grant him such serious purposes as the exposure and denunciation of rhetorical excesses and the promotion of sound literary studies. But there is every indication that in carrying out these purposes he chose, whether as an attempt to engage his students by the brilliance of the exhibition or in imitation of the great work by Erasmus or similar,

though less notable, works by lesser men,[7] to produce a "show piece," having a strong admixture of burlesque and irony.

ORATION of Master Jewel, Prelector of Humanities in Corpus Christi College, Oxford, AGAINST RHETORIC; Delivered in the Hall of the College before All Members of the College.[8]

I am aware, most learned hearers, in how ill repute they are wont to be—especially in these days—who frequently alter the course of their studies, and from time to time choose for themselves a new field of discipline. For it is a point of dignity with us to have these matters as we wish them to be, and we are loath to consider anything which may cause us to be led away or to desert. Surely it is the part of light and inconstant men to be carried everywhere about as by wind and tide, to profess themselves at one moment poets, at another philosophers, now mathematicians, and now theologians. And though I be in great fear lest now this fault may be imputed to me, who have put so much time upon the study of eloquence and the reading of philosophy, shall I by sudden change of will apply myself to the poets; still, because most of us are born with a defect of judgment, so that we are prone to be deceived and to err in choosing a way of life, and because whatever I do, I do for your advantage, I cherish the hope that my decision, arrived at by your leave, can easily be approved to you all. For no one ever has entered upon the study of letters, under auspices however happy, but that either experience or some accident has overturned perhaps all the plans of his former life. Indeed, we are not Januses nor do we have eyes in the back so that we can see what the future may be or can discern in our minds things afar. For this cause Homer, that wisest of poets, has called us *meropas*,[9]

[7] *Laus Formicae* ("Praise of the Ant") by Melanchthon, *Laus Podagrae* ("Praise of the Gout") by Pirckheimer, *Encomium Asini* ("Encomium of the Ass") by Passerat, *De Arte Natandi* ("On the Art of Swimming") by Wynman, are examples from Jewel's own century. Such *tours de force* have always accompanied the study and practice of rhetoric.

[8] The title of the Harleian manuscript differs: *Oratio in Vituperium Rhetoricae per D. Juellium ex Corp. Christi collegio habita coram omnibus ejusdem colegii alumnis.*

[9] This word really means *articulate* or *capable of speech*, and hence *human*. But Jewel seeks to imply that it is a form derived from the Greek *meros*, meaning *partial*. Jelf's note on this sentence (work cited, p. 209) is as follows: "This derivation of the word is possibly offered only in jest."

in that we observe as it were only the face of anything, and we cannot survey with our eyes the complete thing, or take in the whole. And so, if a course has not at first succeeded, the next move is to correct it by a second reckoning. Who of you has not heard how Marcus Cato as a grown man and a senator, a censor, a sexagenarian even, studied in Greek letters, which previously he had ever hated? Who does not know that Aristotle, after he had learned how the word of Isocrates was held in honor (and even by his own pupils), giving up his former plans, abandoning his philosophy, as an old man, white-haired, and a philosopher, suddenly changed almost his entire method of training? Why mention others? Such is the infirmity and blindness of our reason that what will best befit us, and what will be most important to us in the future, we may not see; and often we slip into some certain branch of study before we have been able to discern what would be best. But so far as I am concerned, I prefer, since I am seeking your edification, to follow prudence, rather than by heedlessly holding to my settled course to win praise for constancy. For if I shall act in accordance with this consideration only, that I have sought to have regard for the talents and the profit of so many choice youths, who, then, judging fairly, can carp at my determination?

Now the gravest and greatest motives impel me to change my course. For I see—I, of all men!—that the whole time which thus far we have devoted to eloquence has been wasted and worse than wasted. Many of you marvel, I know when you hear these words from me—yes, from me. Yet it is as I say. So long as my zeal is for your instruction, I see no reason for pretence. Would that the hours we have up to the present time spent in study might be brought back, entire! For we have learned from experience in this case that rhetoric holds neither reward nor dignity; that the whole study of eloquence, I say, which so many Greek and Latin writers descant upon, which I so desirously embraced, and to which by my exhortations I drove all of you,—I openly say and announce that it is void of dignity and reward, it is wholly idle, inane, futile, and trivial. Whilst I briefly and in few words expound this, seeing that it is a matter of concern to you (which circumstance I place above any personal consideration), I beg you to attend closely (as is your wont) that this vain study of speaking you may hold in little esteem, and may turn your minds more fruitfully to some other

kind of work. All that is to be said of rhetoric I do not promise here to say; nor do I judge that anyone, in any place, unless a prater and rhetor indeed, could in so brief a time tell all. For since there are so many things—nay, all things—in this art empty and frivolous, the very business of speaking seems to me idle and absurd. Nothing is so illiberal, nothing is so puerile in its lightness, that it is not sought after as an ornament and an elegance in speaking; while every care and cogitation centers upon the apparatus of words and nimbleness of tongue. Shameful, beyond question, that one who has a soul, who has a mind, who has a heart, should cultivate only the tongue, should bend every effort to enhancing it! That one should leave those parts which are greatest unedified, uncultivated, neglected! Why was lasting silence ordained of those wisest of men, the Pythagoreans? Why brevity and plainness of speech among the Spartans, were it not ridiculous and unworthy the seriousness of men to abound in a multitude of words? Why did Homer call words "winged," except that they seemed to the divine poet to be borne as by wings, to be tossed by the wind, and to contain nothing solid or steadfast, never able to stand or to stick? Such, forsooth, are the points and weighty matters of orators,—bound up with the sound of words and with trivialities; no one is so stupid or doltish as not to know at what rate such things ought to be regarded, or what they are good for.

Now all of us are sufficiently furnished for speaking by nature; we learned long since by our own impulse, without master or tutor; by this gift of nature alone we surpass the beasts and dumb brutes. These we do not excel in vigor of spirit, in ruggedness of body, nor in any kind of strength, nor in prudence, nor in cleverness, or in reason, or in craft but solely in the power of speech. For babes and boys, even such as suffer a weakness of the tongue and jaws so that they cannot form words or articulate a speech, so squall and cry, so produce, with great effort and tension of the body, vague and chaotic sounds, that even they seem to say something. Never was nation so barbarous never tribe so wild, but that in some measure it was fitted and formed by nature for the habit of speech.[11] Certain studies, talents, and customs belong to certain

[11] This sentence and some others later in the paragraph seem to echo the following passage from Erasmus's *Praise of Folly* (anonymous trans-

nations; but the faculty of speaking, and language, are innate and implanted in the minds and hearts of all, yea, even as if engraven there. Wherefore those who devise a special art of speaking, and profess to teach it, are as imprudent and silly as if they should devise and profess an art of seeing, an art of hearing, an art of walking. For why take more account of the tongue than of the feet, or of the eyes, or of the ears? Why din into our ears that which no one, however stupid, was ever able, so far as he cared about it, to be ignorant of? Possibly these mischievous fellows feared lest, except they had taught us to chatter, we should have been forever mute! And yet men spoke, and by speech transacted important business among themselves, ere ever that divine pair, Cicero and Demosthenes, were born.

Wherefore there is no need to refer, with infinite and childish pains, whatever we say to art (I know not what art) and to rules. Indeed, is it not great insolence, to exploit for one's self, out of the whole number of men, a faculty which was given to all alike! To turn over what was ever common to all to the wantonness and garrulity of rhetoricians! For if in speaking we seek this (as we certainly do), that we may be understood by others with whom we deal, who can discover a better mode of speech than to speak intelligibly, simply, and clearly? What need of art? What need of childish ornaments? For if one is to talk in schools, acumen is more desirable than elegance of speech; if in courts before a judge, surely an angry judge will contemplate anything rather than an abundance of words; for he inquires how credibly we speak, not how verbosely and copiously. But if a speech becomes a bit too copious and fluent, he surmises some deceit to be underneath and snares to be laid for him. Truth, indeed, is clear and simple; it has small need of the armanent of the tongue or of eloquence. If it is perspicuous and plain, it has enough support in itself; it does not

lation, Brentano's, N. Y., n. d., p. 65): "In the first golden age of the world there was no need of these perplexities; there was then no other sort of learning but what was naturally collected from every man's common sense, improved by an easy experience. What use could there have been of grammar, when all men spoke the same mother-tongue, and aimed at no higher pitch of oratory, than barely to be understood by each other? What need of logic, when they were too wise to enter into any dispute? Of what occasion for rhetoric, where no difference arose to require any laborious decision?"

require flowers of artful speech. If it is obscure and unpropitious, it will not be brought to light in vociferation and flow of words. For after two orators have contended with one another, and each in turn has begun to sprinkle and to scatter that learned dust of his, if the judge sees but art, swiftness of tongue, strife and clamor of words, cries, and insolence, he will have no grounds for his judgment and no finding. The orators are ready with a host of things, usually light, empty, injurious, contradictory things, and, like the beams of a balance, in whichever side you pour the greater sum to that side they incline. For it is not by piety, not by love, nor by justice, nor by religion, that they are moved; but by spoil, by goods, by fees, by bribery. And truly, if in a tangled or slippery case it is enough that a brawler and pettifogger should shout through some hours by the clepsydra, what good is the bench, what good are courts, laws, oaths, rules, and the customs of our ancestors? What good are senators, praetors, judges, and magistrates? Why should we appeal to the authority of witnesses, of records, of speakers, of writers, of examinations, of experts in the law? Excellent decisions indeed, if, in all points of right and equity there is brought to the bar not an interpreter of law from the senate, but a rhetor from the school! If the suit stands by the vocalizing of the orator, totters when he is hoarse, and collapses when he is silent!

In truth, just as doctors are not applied to except for a man who is diseased and feeble, no more are orators except for a cause which is forsaken and desperate. Where no law, no equity, no right appears, there the orators pitch in with the tongue and with volubility of words,—there they shine. And as fishermen who go after eels catch nothing unless they, as it were, spread night over their nets, by roiling the water from top to bottom; so orators, if they cannot snatch away all light (as they seek to do), see to it that the point of the matter and the truth are obscured. But why do I say "obscured"? How if they even speak falsehoods? How if they speak nothing else? How if they even study to do so? For in what other way could Protagoras by speaking make the worse appear the better cause? By what other means could Carneades speak at Rome against justice, and prove supreme virtue to be the bane of states? Pericles, forsooth, when publicly humiliated and outdone by his adversary, and when the crowd before him perceived the fact, by smoothness of words persuaded those about him

that he had conquered—so that the people were moved by his eloquence more than by their own eyes. Thus many rhetoricians embark upon careers as liars; nor is it any wonder, for they have Mercury as their patron and tutelary god. They glory in claiming him as the discoverer and prince of studied speech. Him! Ye gods! The deity who deceives, who lies, who first introduced the customs of robbery, of theft, of mendacity, of perjury! Who, through treachery, robbed Tiresias of his cattle, Mars of his sword, Vulcan of his tongs, Neptune of his trident, Apollo of his arrows, Venus of her girdle, and finally Jove himself of his scepter. This fellow they venerate as the father of orators, to this god they pay their vows! From this master they learn to be insolent, to swear falsely, and by tricks, slanders, and flatteries to confuse and to obscure right, authority, laws, equity, and justice. Such courses the orators undertake and profess: they have only so much right on their side as they have tongue and impudence. For if they trust to the truth and equity of their cause, why do they flee simplicity and an ordinary mode of speech? why pursue all these verbal graces, these obscurities and pedantries? Why for free and untrammeled discourse contrive feet, rhythm, and like fetters? why go into battle with hints, conjectures, opinions, fables, and rumors? why devise so many snares for captivating our ears? What do they want of these tropes, figures of speech, *schemata*, and what they call "colors" (to me they seem rather *shades*),—epanorthoses, antimetaboles, suspensions, catachreses, enigmas, extenuations, premunitions, exclamations, aposiopeses, apologies, circumlocutions, diminutions, and hyperboles? Why fill the forum with cries, vociferations, and tears? Why call down the gods from heaven? Why raise the shades from the underworld? Why have buildings, temples, columns, tombs, and stones cry out? What do they want of such faces? Why that thrashing about of the body?[12] Why that sudden contraction? that waving of arms? that slapping of the thigh? that stamp of the foot? Why is it they speak not with the

[12] With this passage compare Erasmus, *Praise of Folly* (as before, p. 151): "Good Lord! how mimical are their gestures! What heights and falls in their voice! What toning, what bawling, what singing, what squeaking, what grimaces, making of mouths, apes' faces, and distorting of their countenance; and this art of oratory as a choice mystery, they convey down by tradition to one another."

mouth, not with the tongue, not with the jaws, but with the hand, fingers, joints, arms, face, and the whole body? For idle men have fashioned all these things for themselves, and they become much more conversant with this arsenal than with the subject itself and with truth. O gentle triflers, who will never in your whole lives, I know, lack a subject of study!

Now, truly, if neither should a bad cause be dressed up with extraneous colors and ornaments, nor a good one so shrouded, what place can be left for rhetoric? What also if the rhetoricians disagree among themselves, and as hangmen and physicians kill others by a variety of system and means, so they do away with truth by various kinds of lies. Indeed, I don't know how it is when they disagree in their professional methods, that they all so miraculously agree among themselves in the art of mendacity. Tisias does not approve of Corax, nor Theophrastus of Tisias, nor Demetrius of Theophrastus, nor Hermagoras[13] of Demetrius. Then Aristotle, lest he should be behindhand, damns all the precepts of former rhetoricians. Cicero departs from Aristotle, Fabius from Cicero, and Hermogenes from Fabius.[14] But why mention those? To-day, when there are extant more than six hundred rhetoricians, out of that whole number you can find no one who agrees with any other in his system of instruction. It can be held that all are wrong; or, since they teach contradictory and obviously inconsistent things, certainly it cannot be held that all teach the truth. Need I call to mind the particular style of speaking that has pleased one or another of them? And since some have exalted the copious style, others the meagre, others the bold, others the graceful, others the acute and vehement, others the modest and sober, never have two orators resembled each other or followed the same steps in speaking. To Cicero, some seemed too copious, others too concise, some too light, others too grave, others, tumid and verbose, and others, bloodless and dry.[15] Why go on? That supreme and supremely

[13] The Corpus Christi College MSS. have *Hermogenes;* the Harleian MS., according to the reprint followed, has *Termagoras;* Hermagoras is plainly meant.

[14] Quintilian, whose full name was Marcus Fabius Quintilianus.

[15] These opinions might have been gathered from Cicero's *Brutus, De Claris Oratoribus, De Oratore,* and *Epistolae:* using the last source, the author of the *Dialogus de Oratoribus* (ascribed to Tacitus) wrote (Chap. xviii, Murphy's translation): "We have all read the letters of Calvus and

eloquent Demosthenes was held in contempt by Aeschines, and censured as barbarous. Cicero himself was scorned by his fellow-citizens: he, I say, Cicero, father of Roman oratory, after he had toiled through all Greece for the sake of speech and eloquence, and had brought to his native land a host of exotic words, by other orators was hooted from the platform as feeble and effeminate, as too relaxed, as an enervate Asiatic.[16] And this man all those who wish to be considered pretty speakers set themselves to imitate. This man when they write, this man when they compose, this man when they say anything, they fix upon with all their heart and soul. When they would flow with abundance of choicest words, they so interrupt themselves in speaking, so hesitate, so deliberate, so reject some word or other and choose another, and replace yet another, so punish and torture themselves, that when they wish to appear especially Ciceronian and elegant, nothing could be more affected than their speech, and nothing is heard with greater disgust. For Cato, Varro, Caesar, and Terence, it appears were deficient in Latinity, or even spoke out and out barbarously; so these fellows give their entire devotion to Cicero alone, so they imitate every tiny distinction, and stuff their sentences with rimes; and, as if they had no sense of their own, they know nothing unless Cicero knew it before them, preferring to taste with another's palate rather than with their own. They read no poet, or physician, or historian; they come in contact with no civil or common law, no record of antiquity, no geometers, no mathematicians, no philosophers: in one Cicero they pitch their tents for life; and in him they seek out not learning, not the knowledge of things, not judgment, but letters, accents, vowels, elegance of speech and supply of words. But if they should copy him completely—a thing which has never happened, even in the case of the most clever, for no one ever differed from others as does Cicero from himself—even if they should copy

Brutus to your famous orator. In the course of that correspondence we plainly see what was Cicero's opinion of those eminent men. The former appeared to him cold and languid; the latter, disjointed, loose, and negligent. On the other hand, we know what they thought in return: Calvus did not hesitate to say that Cicero was diffuse, luxuriant to a fault, and florid without vigor. Brutus, in express terms, says he was weakened into length and wanted sinew."

[16] Beside the passage quoted in the preceding note, compare Quintilian, XII, x, 12.

him completely, yet would they seem feeble, enervate, Asiastic; or, if they fall short in their copying, rustic, stupid, unpolished, barbarous. But what judges do orators have, who pass on all this variety, and whose judgment and ears they are to satisfy? Are they the wise? Surely the wise are scarce, and the truly wise are won by anything sooner than by eloquence. Rather it is ordained that all this labor, these pains, these studies, shall be judged by the suffrage of fools: indeed for their ears eloquence was conceived and brought to birth. Not to judicious auditors, not to grave men, not to philosophers, does it make appeal, but to the scum of the populace, to mobs, to factions. Pallas herself, the goddess of polished speech, delights not in councils of the elders or in the senate, but in the rabble and the mob. Except for such critics, I mean cobblers, tailors, servants, fishers, mule-drivers, Cicero himself could not have been skillful enough;[17] but there eloquence flaunts itself, there it reigns, there it triumphs. O fair and imposing faculty! which waits upon the ignorance of the untutored masses, but flees the judgment and gravity of the learned!

I know that these considerations seem to your minds weighty and important; but really they are all light and inconsequential when compared with what I now shall say. For unless I shall have shown states destroyed by eloquent men, and great empires turned into a great desert, all these things which up to this point you have heard, even the greatest, you may account as nothing. For to me it is plain that whoever first introduced eloquence into human affairs was most illadvised. I shall not speak of oaths called into doubt—which to violate is maliciously to destroy the foundations of the commonwealth. I shall not mention seditions, factions, conspiracies, treasons, wars, burnings. For who of us has not heard of the lamentable pillaging of Athens, greatest and oldest of cities? which, though called the Hellas of Hellas, the epitome of all Greece, by the eloquence and the tongue of Demosthenes was levelled to the ground, was virtually extirpated and wiped out. Who will believe that any human force, even though working over a long

[17] Compare Erasmus (as before, p. 158): "Yet these preachers, however ridiculous, meet with such hearers, who admire them as much as the people of Athens did Demosthenes, or the citizens of Rome could do Cicero: among which admirers are chiefly shop-keepers, and women, whose approbation and good opinion they only court."

period, could have subdued the city of Rome, ringed about with such walls, fortified with so many moats, and established in the wisdom of so many kings? And yet at the time when Marcus Cato bestirred himself and pitted Augustus against Antony, straightway the might of Rome, which had stood for so many centuries through the united efforts of its citizens and through the contributions and services of the whole world, the labors of a single orator, in a short time, demolished. That state, I say, which had flourished upon the victories, the trophies, and the triumphs of so many emperors and generals, which fortune herself adorned with the spoils of all tribes and nations, which not Gracchus, not Carbo, not Marius, not Sulla, not the fanaticism of Catiline, not the boundless power of its enemies, not all the barbarian hosts, could destroy; with all its ramparts, all its citadels, all its temples of the gods, its shrines, hearths, and altars, a single orator, Marcus Cicero, not by wisdom but by the tongue, not by sagacity but by loquacity, not by reason but by eloquence,[18] in a little time destroyed and completely wiped out, with all but the very name and descent as well! Where now are those who were wont so often to lament and cry aloud that the might of the republic was overthrown by avarice, lust, and licentiousness? This eloquence it is,—this is the bane, the perdition, the death of states: where this goes, there ruins, catastrophies, and fires follow. Now why should I mention the Gracchi, Brutus, Cassius, Critias, and Alcibiades, when I have mentioned the leaders and the prince Demosthenes?[19] What may we hope from the common run when we see what the greatest orators have brought about? Or what would the life of mankind be, were we all orators, seeing how a few have prostrated great commonwealths?

There was a certain humble Kentish woman who, being one time in London, encountered by chance the great crowd of noble youths who are customarily engaged about the courts; having asked who they might be and what they wanted, when she learned

[18] The paronomasia of this phrase, coming after the rime of the preceding one, is destroyed in the translation. Jewel's Latin is, *non prudentia sed eloquentia, non ratione sed oratione.* The second phrase might be translated, "not by taking thought but by talking rot."

[19] Compare Erasmus (as before, p. 43-44): "To these [the two Catos] may be added Brutus, Casius, the two Gracchi, and Cicero himself, who was no less fatal to Rome than his parallel Demosthenes was to Athens."

that they were law-students and in a short time would be lawyers and advocates, "Oh, how terrible!" she cried, "Oh, the poor, unfortunate country!" Asked why she, a lowly woman and a stranger, felt so keenly about the matter, she said: "A single lawyer in our district has already made away with the fortunes of all, and plundered the whole region. What will these do, bold both by training and by nature, and educated in deceit from their tender years?" What, indeed, would she have said if she had seen the same number of orators? For lawyers, to be sure, when they mislead men into fraud, and defend a case by unfair pleading, seem to sell their good faith, their wits, the laws, edicts, oaths, and the decrees of the senate. But orators, since they profess all things out of themselves, sell their own faces, their gestures, their tongues, their words, and such great trifles. For this reason we have seen that they were condemned in the judgment and estimation of all the ancient states. Ctesiphon, who professed himself able to speak for a day at a time, the Spartans ordered to be expelled and banished. The Romans by a decree of the Senate expelled all orators, not from the city alone, but from all Italy. See, by the immortal gods, how the wisest and gravest men have regarded this sort of people! Actors, flute-players, procurers, parasites, and prostitutes have stood higher with the senators and elders. For they did not allow the orators to remain even in the suburbs, or to lurk in recesses and retreats, lest contagion should spread to others. And these things were ordered on the advice and authority not of light Greeks, not indeed of barbarians, not of the ignorant multitude, but of Cato, of the elders, and of the state itself. Hence it is that the more skillful anyone is in speaking, so much the more awkwardly and abominably is he embarrassed in beginning to speak:[20] for his conscience

[20] Jewel is alluding to a passage in Cicero's *De Oratore*, I, xxvi, xxvii, in part as follows (Guthrie's tranlation): "Even the best speakers, they who speak with the greatest ease and grace, appear to me almost with an air of impudence unless they compose themselves to speak with a certain bashfulness, and are under some confusion when they set out; yet they can never appear otherwise; for the more a man excels in speaking he is the more sensible of its difficulty. . . . For I have often observed in you and experienced in myself that I grow pale at the beginning of a speech, feel a flutter over all my spirits, and a trembling thro' every joint."

and the thought of his crimes do not let him stand wholly at ease; he quakes at the thought of laws, tortures, sentences, chains, and exile. For why did reason and speech suddenly desert Plato when about to speak before the judges on behalf of his teacher, Socrates,—the best of causes? Why did Theophrastus shamefully break down in public discourse, as not even a bright school-boy would have done?[21] Why did the greatest orator, Demosthenes, in the presence of Philip lose his mind, his faculties, even himself? What means all this trepidation, pallor, hesitancy, daze, and tremor?

But I leave states and elders, whose authority may be of little weight among orators; yet why are they not moved by the example of wise men, of philosophers, of the gods? For the immortals, if they ever say anything, speak in the ordinary way and with the fewest possible words. That divine man and, by the judgment of Apollo, wisest, Socrates, when he was to fight for his life and fortunes, chose not to be defended by any distinguished eloquence. Gymnosophists, bards, and philosophers, when they have constructed their workshops of wisdom and have devoted themselves to the contemplation and study of things infinite, have never cultivated these studies; not because time or talent was lacking to men at once the most disengaged and the most sapient, but because they deemed this subject an absurd and childish matter, unworthy of philosophical esteem. But why do I go back to the ancients? We have had men in recent times who did not attain to so much as a semblance, I will not say of eloquence, but of pure Latin speech; when Cicero, neglected and scorned, lay in mould and darkness; when Scotus held the ports of the schools and the paths of literary study; when they did not know so much

[21] Compare Erasmus (as before, p. 42): "Next to Socrates comes his scholar Plato, a famous orator indeed, that could be so dashed out of countenance by an illiterate rabble as to demur, and hawk, and hesitate, before he could get to the end of one short sentence. Theophrastus was such another coward, who, beginning to make an oration, was presently struck down with fear, as if he had seen some ghost, or hobgoblin. Isocrates was so bashful and timorous that though he taught rhetoric, yet he could never have the confidence to speak in public. Cicero, the master of Roman eloquence, was wont to begin his speeches with a low, quivering voice, just like a school-boy afraid of not saying his lesson perfect enough to escape whipping."

that by others, who had not learned the mysteries, they were thought to be mad and to rave. Yet how beautifully learned they seem, what acute philosophers, what estimable theologians! Then how great an admiration there was for sound literature! What a throng of studious youths! These were the seats, these the shrines of letters, here was the fountain, the source, of all humanities. O then fortunate university! O happy times! Nothing was done except by our decree: we had power to make peace, to stir up seditions, to put an end to wars, to bring our princes to union among themselves; our end was knowledge of the divine will, piety, religion; what we decreed was fair, right, sacred, and just. Then hither, I know not why, as Cerberus from the underworld, Cicero was brought back from darkness into day. Literary studies flickered out, ardor of spirit languished, numbers dwindled day by day, colleges were deserted, the whole glory and splendor of the university departed. All these evils Cicero brought upon you, Cicero emptied our study-halls, Cicero gave the death-blow, the mortal thrust, Cicero quenched the light and flame of Oxford.

I see that my time is up, and that you are judging my criticism of eloquence, as frivolity and fruitlessness, itself to be fruitless and frivolous. I shall add only this one question the answer to which I do not know for myself. Why do rhetoricians, while pretending so much zeal, insist that the very flower of their training is to cover up all beauty, art, and eloquence,—as if they were roots and stalks? This is not the part of honest men, but of vandals and robbers: never was an artisan, however lowly or base, ashamed of his art. Tailors, medicine-vendors and panders seek crowds and daylight; they display their wares openly and freely in public. The orator alone dares not carry his stock in trade out in sight: he sees to it that when he is using the highest art and skill of speech, he will seem to be farthest from art, "a plain, blunt man" who never could have learned anything. What witnesses or other authorities need we look for, when orators condemn themselves out of their own mouths? Why do they shun light and inspection? Why are they ashamed of their profession? Why do they pretend to be something other, why act another part? In any matter of business, what confidences can we have in those who lie about themselves and their own art? What must we think they do within their homes, who do not hesi-

tate to perjure themselves in the sight of all the people? These are they upon whom depends the safety of the commonwealth, to them we hasten, we bring our causes, we make them rulers of our life and death; we commit our fortunes, wives, children, dignity, and safety to those who are ashamed to learn and to profess their own art.

I refrain from going on. I doubt not that you are satisfied in your minds as to what eloquence is in every respect capable of, and what weight it should have. Accordingly, most learned youths, do not consent to spend so much time and effort on a thing which is absurd and idle, and which brings nothing of use or fruit to the common life; which nature itself has planted in the hearts and minds of all; which darkens a good cause, illuminates and adorns a bad one; which lays down rules for deceits, frauds, and lies; which was devised and created for error, for profit, and for democratic heedlessness; which avoids the judicious censure of the wise; which has overthrown great commonwealths; which the most ancient states rejected; which philosophers of all times and countries have repudiated; which our own forebears held in contempt; which dimmed the old and ancestral glory of this seat of learning; which, finally, rhetoricians themselves are ashamed, after they have learned it, to admit they know. It is not consistent with your dignity or your quality to degrade your studies to such low levels, and not to be able to raise your eyes to sound literature. Be those, I pray, the studies of others, who care not what they do; your talents and your youthful years compel me to another course. For neither are you weakened by age nor heedlessly exposed to the thronging and company of men. Young men of excellent parts, of highest hope,—young men, you have been born for the special mastery and enhancement of letters, and in these continuously trained. Others choose different ways of study and of life: we are to find our pleasure in the knowledge of things, to which from boyhood we have been given over and committed. Such is the meaning of all these schools, these splendid buildings, these sumptuous colleges, these great foundations. For this cause we have travelled a long way, and from far have come to Oxford on business with learning and the arts; this way our forefathers came, to the renown of virtue and doctrine. Let us look to them, let us contemplate them, let us

strive toward the imitation and pattern of them; in that path which they pointed out for us let us persist. For we are not to be wayfarers, not heralds, not criers, not pettifoggers. Wherefore, if a regard to usefulness or the consideration of your own worth has weight with you,—shall we not scorn the barren proliferation of words and the trivialities of eloquence: may we turn all our thoughts, our efforts, our intellects, to the knowing of profound matters; may we apply ourselves with all diligence to this duty, that none may ever have occasion to regret time lost and a youth misspent. I have spoken.

A COLLEGE ORATION BY JOHN MILTON

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[Three hundred years ago John Milton was a student in Christ's College, Cambridge. Among the scholarly activities in which he participated was the disputation, an exercise theoretically in dialectic, questions being put by one party and answered by the other. In practice, however, set speeches were delivered, somewhat as in the modern college debate, thereby giving the speakers opportunity to display their oratorical and rhetorical, as well as argumentative, ability. As might be expected, few of these student efforts have survived. Fortunately Milton preserved some of his *Prolusiones Oratoriae*, which, late in life, almost in desperation, he published to help fill out a book. After the academic fashion of the time, they were in Latin. Only a few fragments have been translated into English, by Masson in his *Life of John Milton*. It is with diffidence that I present to the readers of the QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH a translation of the whole of one of these college effusions of our great poet, hoping that no expert Latinist will discover too many errors. Those instructors who are preparing candidates for oratorical contests, and the candidates themselves, will find a marked difference between the efforts of modern students and this one delivered three hundred years ago.][1]

ON THE MUSIC OF THE SPHERES

IF there is any place for a man of my poor powers, fellow students, after so many speakers of consequence have been heard today, I shall attempt even at this moment to express, in accord-

[1] I wish to convey my thanks to J. Hamilton Meade and to C. Stubbs for kindly assistance and helpful criticism.

ance with my small ability, how well I wish the established exercise of the present occasion: and I shall follow, albeit far outdistanced, in the course of this day's demonstration of eloquence. Accordingly, while I avoid and shun entirely those common and ordinary topics of discourse, the purpose of this day, and likewise of those who I suspected would speak appropriately concerning matters fitted to the time, kindles and straightway rouses my mind to attempt with ardor some new theme. These two reasons are able to furnish incentives or keenness to one somewhat sluggish and for the most part possessed of a dull wit. Wherefore a few words at least suggest themselves to be pronounced, as they say, with open hand and with rhetorical embellishment, about that famous heavenly harmony, concerning which very shortly there is to be a disputation with the closed fist; consideration of the time being observed, which now presses me on and restrains me. I would prefer, however, that you, my hearers, should regard these things as said in jest.

Now what sane man would have thought that Pythagoras, that god of the philosophers, at whose name all mortals of his age stood up in very sacred veneration:—who, I say, would have thought that he would ever have expressed in public an opinion so uncertainly founded? Surely, if indeed he taught the harmony of the spheres and that the heavens revolved with melodious charm, he wished to signify by it, in his wise way, the very loving and affectionate relations of the orbs and their eternally uniform revolutions according to the fixed laws of necessity. Certainly, in this he imitated either the poets or, what is almost the same thing, the divine oracles, by whom no secret and hidden mystery is exhibited in public, unless clad in some covering or garment. That most skilful interpreter of Mother Nature, Plato, has followed him, since he affirms that certain sirens sit one upon each of the circles of the heavens and hold spell-bound gods and men by their most honey-sweet song. And finally, this agreement of things universal and this loving concord, which Pythagoras secretly introduced in poetic fashion by the term Harmony, Homer likewise suggested significantly and appropriately by means of that famous golden chain of Jove hanging down from heaven.

Aristotle, the envious and perpetual calumniator of Pythagoras and Plato out of the shattered opinions of these great men, paved a way to renown by claiming that this symphony of the

heavens was unheard, and he imputed to Pythagoras the tunes of the spheres. But if either fate or necessity had decreed that your soul, O Father Pythagoras, should have been translated into me, there would not have been lacking one who would easily have come to your rescue, however great the infamy under which you were laboring at the moment. Indeed, why should not the celestial bodies during their everlasting courses evolve musical sounds? Does it not seem fair to you, O Aristotle? Truly, I hardly believe your intelligence would be able to endure with patience that sedentary toil of the rolling heavens for so many ages, unless that ineffable song of the stars had prevented your departure and by the charm of its melody had persuaded a delay. It would be as if you were to take away from heaven those beautiful little goddesses and should deliver the ministering gods to mere drudgery and to condemn them to the treadmill. Nay indeed, Atlas himself long ago would have withdrawn his shoulders from a heaven that was about to fall had not that sweet song soothed, with its most delightful charm, him, gasping and sweating under his great burden. In addition to these things the Dolphin, wearied of his constellation, would long ago have preferred his own seas to heaven, if he had not rightly been burning with the thought that the singing orbs of the sky excelled by far the sweetness of Arion's lyre. Why, credible it is that the lark itself should fly right up to the clouds at early dawn, and that the nightingale should spend the whole lonely night in song, in order that they may adjust their strains to the harmonic mode of the sky, to which they listen attentively. Thus also from the very beginning of things the story has prevailed about the Muses dancing day and night around the altar of Jove; hence from remote antiquity skill with the lyre has been attributed to Phoebus; for this reason the ancients believed Harmonia ought to be regarded as the daughter of Jove and Electra, whom the whole choir of heaven is said to have lauded in song when she had been given to Cadmus in marriage.

But supposing no one on earth had ever heard this symphony of the stars, does it therefore follow that all has been silent beyond the circle of the moon, and lulled to sleep by the benumbing silence? Nay rather, let us blame our feeble ears which are not able, or are not worthy, to overhear the songs and such sweet

tones. But this melody of the sky is not really unheard; for who, O Aristotle, would have conceived of your constellations as dancing in the mid-region of the air, except that, when they hear the singing heavens clearly on account of their nearness, they cannot restrain themselves from performing a choral dance?

But Pythagoras alone of mortals is said to have heard this song; unless that good man was both some deity and native of the sky, who perchance by direction of the gods had descended for the purpose of instructing the minds of men with holy knowledge and of calling upon them to improve. Certainly he was a man who combined in himself the whole gamut of virtues and who was worthy to converse with the very gods like unto himself and to enjoy the company of the celestials. Therefore I do not wonder that the gods, loving him very much, permitted him to take part in the most secret mysteries of Nature.

Moreover, the boldness of the thieving Prometheus seems to be the reason why we hear so little this harmony, a deed which brought upon humanity so many ills and likewise took away this happiness from us, which we will never be permitted to enjoy so long as we remain brutish and overwhelmed by wicked animal desires; for how can those be susceptible of that heavenly sound whose souls, as Persius says, are bent toward the earth and absolutely devoid of celestial matters? But if we possessed hearts so pure, so spotless, so snowy, as once upon a time Pythagoras had, then indeed would our ears be made to resound and to be completely filled with that most delicious music of the revolving stars; and then all things would return immediately as it were to that golden age; then, at length, freed from miseries we would spend our time in peace, blessed and envied even by the gods.

At this moment, however, as it were in the midst of my speech, time has cut me off; and I suspect this has happened very opportunely indeed, lest I prove an obstacle to this whole occasion by a style, rude and quite lacking in rhythm compared with the harmony which I mentioned before; and lest I myself should be a hindrance, preventing you from hearing it. And so I am done.

AN ESSAY TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF COSTUME

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WE read much of costume as a part of theatrical effect, the discussion for the most part being tucked into a chapter on scenic design or combinations of color; or perhaps in the last paragraphs of an actor's reminiscences of playing certain character rôles. It is never entirely neglected by theatrical artists, but usually it is treated as a necessary detail in the picture displayed in the proscenium frame; in few books is it discussed with an eye to the dramatic quality inherent in the actual costume itself. Books in plenty have been written on the costume of the stage, of course; on its history, is construction, its traditions, its contribution to and dependence on pictorial art. But few deal with that quality of costume which makes it theatrical material, the stuff of which drama is made. Costume has, or should have, a philosophy of its own, as certainly as architecture has; and theatrical costume more particularly than social costume, although the social tendencies influence both.

Now of the many ways in which it is possible to regard the problem of formulating a philosophy of costume, two naturally present themselves: that in which costume may be regarded as a part of scene and that in which it may be regarded as independent of scene. In a sense, of course, costume without scene is impossible, since all varieties of costume, both on the stage and off, appear in some kind of setting more or less related to them. Both costume and architecture, like all man-made articles and those of nature which can be bent to his will, are reflectors of prevailing social ideas and standards. This relationship is not one of cause and effect. Instead of the style of costume being a result or an effect of proximity to a style of architecture, they are both effects of a common cause which lies deep-rooted in the mind and heart of the man, generation, or race that conceived of them. It is this independence of origin that seems to justify us in regarding costume as a means of dramatic effect without bearing heavily on its connection with scene, that seems to claim for it an inde-

pendent place among the attributive arts of the theatre. Social dress is so regarded, and although it is frequently discussed in relation to the psychology of the person wearing it, very few writers relate it to architecture, positive as such a relation may be.[1] In the theatre, the connection between costume and scene is more obvious because of their juxtaposition and because, in the synthesis of effect for which the dramatist strives, there is a conscious attempt to form a connection. If, however, we chose to regard dress in the theatre as a sublimated form of social dress, varied according to the needs of dramatic production, that is, theatricalized, as all ideas must be on the stage, then it can be studied by itself, following first the same principles and influenced by the same tendencies as the dress of society, and then conforming to the exigencies of the stage.

This essentially is the reason for adopting historical dress in a period play, because the dress as well as the setting establishes for the actor the social attitude of that century. Stark Young, in his *Theatre Practice* shows clearly that:

> A costume truly expressive of its epoch catches exactly the characteristic quality from the civilization out of which it arises, the social ideas, canons of taste, the point of view with regard to life and art. The Spain of Philip the Fourth finds its provincialism and remoteness from the rest of Europe, its magnificence and courtly sauvity, its power and wealth and self-assurance and elegance, expressed in those costumes that we see in Velasquez' pictures. . . .The fanaticism and pride, the wealth and decorum and austre magnificence show in the fabric and in the cut of the gowns of those Infantas and court suits of Valesquez' admirals and kings and princes. The costumes of Ghirlandaio have all the severity and dis-

[1] GERALD HEARD, in his *Narcissus: An Anatomy of Clothes*, follows the impetus of the nineteenth century to evolve everything from something either non-extant or extant in a different form, and presents a survey of costume from the Minoan Age to ours as an evolutionary process, beginning in the inmost cell of man, working outwards to form him, then his clothes, and finally the house in which he lives. Heard believes that while architecture and clothes may have little or no causal relationship, side by side they are *prima facie* evidence of one and the same idea—that they show the Life Force, as he calls it, working on plastic material, deviating when the material proves resistant and refining to a nicety when it cannot proceed. The same ideas which prompt man's behavior control the design of his clothing and the construction of his house.

> tinction of the Florence of his day. The figures of Lisa Tornabuoni and those ladies and cavaliers and scholars with her in the chapel frescoes of Santa Maria Novella stand firmly without being dull; they are alive and stiff at the same time, they are angular and elegant, decorous and intense at the same moment. They have a grand austere thinness and a kind of poignant chic. The textiles they employ are severe and rich, intricate and strangely puritanical, and the design and flow of the lines and masses of their garments is both harsh and wistful. In the costumes of the Byzantium of later Greek days, the moody splendor of the East, the decaying exoticism of Hellenic civilization, the eclectic culture, the relaxation and excess of the barbaric, all appear. These qualities in historic costumes—in costumes from foreign lands whose separation from us in space amounts to one in time—the designer recreates in terms of the art of the theatre.

The last line from Stark Young is significant: it must be remembered that historical accuracy is not enough, and that the theatre demands a treatment of its subjects peculiar to its art. The styles of the drawing room receive a degree of exaggeration, a heightening or a suppression of detail, which supplies the characterization or accentuates the flair. Fidelity to historical research alone does not insure the adequate dramatic presentation of a social idea. He goes on:

> Costumes become the art of the theatre when clothes are translated into something which they are not before, and have added to them something that was not there before. This something added is derived from the play, from the scene, the lights, the dramatic mood and idea, the whole theatrical occasion of which the costumes make a part. . . . Beginning with actuality, I mean with clothes as they exist for any observer, the artist-designer does what the artist in any case must do, which is to establish and create the relation of his own inner world to the world outside of him. That is to say, he uses the literal costume with which he begins as the means through which he can express what he has to say. He will extend a line here or heighten a quality there; he will intensify a tone, he will eliminate and underscore, he will do whatever is needed to force the costume to say the dramatic thing that is necessary to the moment. Sometimes for his designing he is entirely free. He has no clothes that he must follow or resemble, he can use fabric, color, and line purely in themselves to express what he likes. His final problem, however, is the same as it is when he uses the actual

and recognizable clothes for a starting point: his final problem is the expression of an idea in stage garments.

Those innovators of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in France, Talma and Noverre, for example, who tried to establish a mode of theatrical costume based on reason and science wished to change the art of the theatre with its attendant delight and of the imagination into an archaeological display. Talma's passion for Romans in togas is a desire not so much for theatrical effect as conformity with the artistic ideals of Louis David and his school of realists. Like all beginners, his reforms were at first ludicrous, for they defied social and theatrical conventions. In an age when actresses wore hoops and ribbons in all rôles, and actors kilts and plumes, the appearance of the togaed Talma might well strike his audience as peculiar and his fellow actors as indecent. In the annals of the French stage, the story of Mlle. Vestris' discovery of Talma on the stage dressed like a Roman of ancient days and her quite reasonable indignation should not entirely present the affair from Talma's point of view. Perhaps if he had been able to wait until the other actors had been convinced of his idea, until the stage could be made to accept historical accuracy as a necessary principle in conjunction with the demand for theatrical effect, in short, until the entire production could assume a theatricalized Roman appearance, the good Mlle. Vestris would have understood. For her principle in its application was as correct as his: that a typical dress, modified from contemporary styles, was a definitely theatrical thing, and the appearance of Talma was more truly, as another member of the cast said of him, more like antique statuary than theatrical art. Lack of historical accuracy does not disturb an audience when the convention does not demand it, provided what Stark Young calls the "theatrical idea" is presented.

Costumes of Clowns and Comic Caracters

Perhaps the connection between the social idea and dramatic necessity is most clearly seen in the costumes of clowns and comic characters. Comic dress, as Wilson Disher maintains in *Clowns and Pantomimes,* begins always with the prevailing mode of society, so that the comic and its connection with the familiar may be seen at once:

> The story (of Hippisley's son needing a comic scar like his father's) is instructive because it points to the purpose of the clown's mask. Unlike the actor's disguise, which made him into another being, it served merely as a disfigurement. The sooty-mime's fun was not the fun of the knaves and butts of the New Comedy at Rome in the same century. Instead of representing a comic character, he had to be himself in spite of his disguise. His familiar manner made his every-day reality known to the audience; his fantastic face made him a creature of the imagination. He was thus in himself a standing joke.

Harlequin's original costume was calculated to produce on his audience the same effect as tatters would today; and as soon as his rags and patches become so conventionalized that their relation to man's dress is lost, Harlequin tends to lose his essentially funny character:

> Motley serves the same purpose as the mask. The fool's was a livery crowned with vainly valiant cockscomb and children's bells, to take the meaning out of his offense. The clown's served the same end by copying the tatters of the lout, exactly as the garb of Discæopolis did when he set out to mock the warrior without losing hold of his wartime audience's sympathy. At length patches and livery were merged in one design. Then history had to repeat itself. The dress of a poor man's tragedy was again borrowed, and again became motley. Now the process begins again. In fact, whenever the clown's costume is elaborated out of recognition, the conscious mirth-maker finds inspiration anew in the unconscious mirth-maker. When Harlequin's patches had become a pattern of colored lozenges, the Clown of the English Harlequinade was invented as a tatterdemalion. After his rags had become frills, the black-faced scarecrow, called Jim Crow, appeared. When nigger minstrels wore white collars and red-and-white striped trousers, the comedian was born with a red nose (not because the mediæval devil and the Elizabethan Jew had red noses) and with patched trousers (not for any other reason than that patches are funny in every-day life).

The essentially funny element in Charlie Chaplin's costume is that it is the dress of mankind, betraying human nature by a judicious inconsistency:

> That costume (he says) helps me express my conception of the average man, of myself. The derby, too small, is a striving for dignity. The moustache is vanity. The tightly

> buttoned coat and the stick and his whole manner are a gesture toward gallantary and dash and "front." He is chasing folly and he knows it. He is trying to meet the world bravely, to put up a bluff, and he knows that, too.

Harlequin also puts up a brave front: in days when men wore plumes in their hats, Harlequin's sported a brave little rabbit's tail; his bat, like the twirled cane, was for show; and he, too, has a moustache to caress.

This judicious inconsistency illustrates the use of the incongruous which underlies all comic effect. Laughter, says Bergson, is an act of the brain, intellectual, critical, destructive, unfeeling, and hostile; it is divorced from emotion; it is a judgment or comparison; it is essentially logical. The comic figure is one who has drawn himself out of the emotional current of society by his critical attitude of mind and in great part by his dress: and from that vantage point he indulges in a sort of social ragging of his fellow creatures. Whereas the tragic actor makes his appeal to the heart, the comic appeals to the brain. He points a finger of ridicule at those foibles of mankind which are trivial, external, and conventional, while the tragic actor holds up those flaws which strike deep into the soul. Hence his costume, which satirizes material things only. For although the tragic actor pays the most scrupulous attention to the fit of his clothes and their appropriateness for the rôle, so that they may become as much a part of him as possible, one of the clown's chief sources of effect is an incongruity in the fit of his costume and in its appropriateness to his character. Clothes that don't fit or are unbecoming are avoided by the sensitive who appreciate the impulse to laughter which they indubitably give, but are rejoiced in by the comic actor.

This lack of fit in a costume is related to the idea of incongruity which includes a resemblance of the familiar, and then a complete turn of events which makes it utterly absurd. We expect that a man will walk ahead erect and he slips and falls; we expect that a man will break his neck by falling out of a fourteenth-story window, and he gets up and walks away. Aristophanes' dead man on his way to the next world is no different from any other corpse until he sits up and speaks. Just so we expect a man's appearance to be what we are accustomed to seeing, and are surprised when his shoes are too long, his coat is too

short, or his hat is too small. Incongruity is funny only so long as it does not excite pity, however. The blows one man gives another are funny as long as we do not fear his being hurt, which in an ordinary experience he would be. This intrusion of natural pity into the scene would be fatal to the comic effect. Hence the comedy of the clown's slapstick, another source of comic effect apart from, but related to, his costume. It has well been called the *deus ex machina* of comedy. When all else fails, the clown, like the reformer, uses the big stick. Harlequin's bat was not always symbolic, but it was always ineffectual. It belies its nature as does the costume of the man carrying it, in that as a stick it amounts to little. Blows that would permanently disable the average man are seen to have very little genuine effect on the clown. True it has a comic effect: the clown wabbles and falls and the crowd laughs. But the crowd must understand that he is not really hurt, or the comedy is lost. So the folly-stick of the court jester, if used as a weapon, is infinitely ludicrous.

Further, this lack of fitness gives the clown a real and yet unreal appearance so that whatever may happen to him is neither actuality nor pretense. Thus blows and suffering in general are mitigated; and when suffering is genuine, terrible is its poignancy. "That boast," says Disher, "of being something more than human explains the pathos latter-day minds see in the clown. To become apparent in spite of concealment of the pigment, his pain cannot be less than terrible. The clown who dies in his mirth-paint gives an added terror to the spectacle of death." But by that time the message of the clown has changed; as a symbol of pathos, the wistful heart beneath the gaudy clothes, he has passed out of the province of comedy to that of emotion.

It is also true in comedy that the costume more than the actor is the part. In periods when stage conventions have been highly stylized, as in ancient Greece, the heyday of Roman comedy, the *Commedia dell' Arte* and the English Pantomimes, the story and the scene depend on what character steps out on the stage. Such characters as Harlequin, Pantalone, Colombine, or Clown have only to present themselves before the curtain and there is no need to wait until the story unfolds to find out what sort of persons they are and what they are going to do. They are instantly recognized by their dress, which was familiar to

all in the audience, as invariable types. Harlequin will be clever and knavish, the Doctor pompous and learned and the butt of Harlequin's jokes; the Soldier a *miles gloriosus;* Pantalone, old age, no match for youth, and so on. Originally of course, before these personages became the spangled creations of the English Harlequinade, their costumes as well as their personalities were familiar in society. They wore a theatricalized social dress. Harlequin's suit was the livery of a servant—he can trace his ancestory back, on one side at least, to the slave of Roman comedy; the Doctor's robe was seen in and out of the universities then flourishing; the soldier's plumes and sword paraded the streets then more often than they do now; and Pantalone's dress was seen on every shopkeeper in Venice. Of course the joke was instantly seen by the crowd. As the actors continued to play these parts, the rôles became associated with the costume; and although succeeding generations forgot that Pantalone had been a shopkeeper, they knew what was his character and how he would dress.

What is true of the clown's costume is also true of his make-up. In the Old Greek Comedy, the mask was both a protection and a characterization. In the New Comedy, the convention persisted because of the size of the theatres, which made facial expressions practically useless unless greatly exaggerated. In Roman, and later, Italian comedy, the mask persisted, sometimes only a half-mask, sometimes with a huge and disfiguring nose, sometimes a characteristic beard and moustache. In Rome the smudgy face of the slave evolved finally into cheeks blackened with soot, a practice which Harlequin adopted later. Devils in the Middle Ages were firmly believed to have red noses; and characters in the old French farces resorted to the use of flour as a means of disguise. Just as the jester's motley and the patches of Harlequin mitigated in a measure the force of the clown's impertinence, so the mask gives him a sort of licence, a shelter from behind which he chuckles at his foolish fellows.

THE COSTUME TRADITION OF THE FRENCH STAGE

The costume of serious drama has followed also the principle of adapting social dress for the stage, a principle that is most clearly seen perhaps in the traditional costume of the French classic stage.

It is small wonder that, on a stage obedient to the restrictions imposed by the French classic period, costume should become highly formalized. Before this, the attempts at staging and theatrical effect in dramatic performances—that is, the gesture in that direction made by the church, the guilds, and the mountebanks, of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance—included a simple regard for costume. The *Commedia dell ' Arte*, as we have seen, had typical costumes as a fixed tradition. The mediæval farces, mysteries, and moralities attempted a sincere effect of characterization; gilded wigs for angels, flowing robes, black devils and so forth appeared on the platforms and pageants. Perhaps it was not so much historical as mythical accuracy, but the venture was theatrical. As the drama came more definitely to assume the outlines and responsibilities of an art, it acquired, and was forced to adhere to, a set of conventions; and one of these was the use of modern costume adapted for theatrical purposes.

Costume changed often throughout these formative years, both on the stage and off, with the evolution of society's morals, manners, and philosophies; but once the mode for the drawing-room had been established, the theatre tended to follow it, translating it into the terms of its own artistic purpose. The age of the classic French tradition of theatrical dress—that of Louis XIV and the more or less transitional period of the following century—in offering its dress to the stage had something theatrical to start with. André Levinson, in an article in the Theatre Arts Monthly on *Berain and the French Costume Tradition*, remarks:

> The fact is that for Berain, the costume of the court, which was his point of departure, was already itself a definite step in the direction of the theatre. Versailles was a gigantic stage where everyone considered himself a part of the spectacle, in which he played a rôle strictly circumscribed by an established convention. The *grand lever* of the King was a masterpiece of production, carefully worked out and sumptuous. The theatrical producer of those days only needed to heighten somewhat the various aspects of an existence remarkably composed and rhythmic.

Life at court was then extremely theatrical. It was one vast dramatic spectacle, with the King playing the lead, and the courtiers playing actors and spectators both. The natural love of display and of the ceremonious was refined to a nicety. The court

balls, elaborately decorated and costumed, became the parent of the ballet and were the sport of kings before the opera claimed them for its own. The method of their performance shows how clearly the dress was related to the action. It may be too much to say that the costume influenced the ballet, but Levinson presumes at least that it did, since the theatrical display was derived from social custom.

Described by Fournel in *Ballades et Mascarades,* the organization of the ballet included *entrée, vers* and *recit.* The *entrée,* he says, had considerable action:

> A certain number of persons who advance, show by their masks, costumes, gesture, and dancing, an action like a little drama, either comic or serious, complete in itself but connected with other, that is, subsequent *entrées* by a general idea, so that each represents a different side of the same subject.

That is, in the ballet of *La Fontaine de Jouvence,* for example, the first *entrée* is made by Youth, Laughter and Folly, who arise from the fountain, which is in the middle of the playing space, and after dancing, retire again. There follow several more *entrées* of various characters, more or less serious in nature, each in quest of youth, who advance to the fountain with movements appropriate to their kind, until the entire ballet company is introduced. Each of these has a scene in which a little by-play describes the character or tells a story.[2] Following the *entrée* was the *vers,* which was read by the spectators and explained the action of the *entrée;* and that was followed by the *récit,* a prologue explanatory of the various characters and their actions subsequently. The *entrées* were as a rule made in the rhythm of a pavanne, a majestic and courtly dance, which when indulged in by the assemblage at large, Vuillier, in his *History of Dancing,* describes thus:

> The gentleman, his hat in one hand, his sword at his side, a large cloak thrown over his arm, gravely offered his right hand to his partner, rigid in her long train, heavy and stiff

[2] The stage directions for a Colonel Galat:s read: "Le Colonel Galatis désireux de rajeunir, pour estre plus propre au metier des armes, se présente á l'entré du cabinet. Mais voyant ce qui se passe en ce mystère, il se retire promptment, et ne veut pas que sa nation luy puisse jamais reprocher qu'il se soit mis en hazard de boire de l'eau." Fournel adds: "Colonel Galatis is a Swiss and the joke on the love of the Swiss for wine occurs frequently in comic and satiric pieces of the time."

with gold and jewels; like a couple of idols the lord and lady advanced in solemn cadence.

And again:

> It was truly beautiful to see kings, princes and great lords, draped in fine cloaks, tilted up by swords, and queens and princesses in robes of state held up by maids of honor advancing . . . and pacing in cadence rather than dancing.

Thus the pavanne, which introduced the ballet and was performed in the same sort of costumes, with the added incumbrance of a mask surmounted by a huge headdress. Levinson likens the performance to a huge chess game, with the pieces moving solemnly about: in describing the women in the ballet, he says:

> Each set piece of scenery is flanked by a member of the chorus, while the dancers in the middle form a symmetrical group of their own. The movements of such dancers were determined and given their rhythm by the exigencies of their struggles with the weight of the brocaded skirt, that extended to their ankles. They were actually reduced to a rhythmic promenade. Often they were little more than movable details in a sumptuous décor—decorated towers that the ballet master moved around on a giant chess-board.

The dancer had now the problem of moving the costume, as it were, for the total effect was one of an architectural unit set upon the stage as a piece of scenery. Dancing the part meant doing with the costume what could best be done to bring out its beauties. Another writer (E. Urlin, *Dancing, Ancient and Modern),* in speaking of the minuet, remarks that unless the costume is the appropriate one of the eighteenth century the dance is not effective. And this costume it will be remembered is not superlatively gorgeous because the ballet requires a measure of theatricality, but is the court splendor of the time.

The male dancers in the ballets, however, discarded the cloaks and swords and provided the variety of a lively gavotte. Quoting from Levinson again:

> The male dancer, on the other hand, lightly clad in short kilts that gave his limbs full play, was master of the scene, leaping, prancing, and whirling. It took more than a hundred years for action to triumph over decoration in the evolution of the feminine dance costume, until the "tutu" of white tarlatan, originated by Eugene Lamy for *La Sylphide,* the functional costume eliminated the decorative tradition.

Of course there was little more attempt to indicate historical

characters than to care for the convenience of the dancers, but according to Levinson this was not at any expense of the spectacle:

> His (Berain's) return signifies the passing of the theatre of illusion and the restoration of the conventions of the theatre. It reaffirms the autonomy of the spectacle; recognizes no laws save those inherent in itself. It breaks with the heresy of imitation in art. To proclaim Berain a master is to condemn the carefully documented, historical costume.[3]

Starting with contemporary dress, Berain merely put it to the use of the stage. He deals with the scene of the theatre in the courtly manner of the *grand siècle,* as Levinson puts it, sumptuous, artifiicial, if you like, and highly stylized. But then so was the century. The nineteenth century, with its passion for verisimilitude, seemed, says Levinson, to make the spectator forget that he was in a theatre and to transport him to a museum:

> Puffed up with pride in its scientific achievement, prey to a mania for historical accuracy, it glorified verisimilitude. To make the spectator forget he was in the theatre was the highest ambition.

But Berain, designing for the ballet in the seventeenth century, seemed to trust a sure, intuitive, theatrical sense, which was bred in him as in others of his time. "The most important rule in connection with stage costume at the Opera under Louis XIV," says Bapst, who misunderstood this spirit, "was to reduce the characteristics of all ages to a common formula of fantastic unreality."[4] But Berain did quite the opposite: he took what was to him reality and utilized it in the theatre. If it were a Roman general that he wanted to show, he gave him a uniform like that of the Prince de Condé, for that was military and spectacular as well, added a plumed helmet, a cuirass, and short sleeves, and he became a soldier of the theatre:

> Mithridates and Achilles were Marshals of France, removed from everyday reality by certain stylizations of costumes. Their apparel "a la romaine" included a richly feathered helmet, a magnificent periwig, a gold or silver cuirass, small clothes that resembled short kilts and buskins,

[3] Levinson nevertheless adds: "Happy as one may be to resume relations with him, it is questionable whether one would wish to follow him to the bitter end. This resurrected man is almost too exigent and might, in the end, overpower those who unearthed him."

[4] Quoted from Levinson.

while short sleeves, either caught up or fluttering left the arms bare. Such details suggested Caesar, yet the silhouette and general effect, unmistakably signfied Condé.[5]

To dress Alexander the Great as Marshal Foch or to put an eyeglass or epaulettes on Achilles would be for us to change the play to burlesque, for we in our age lack that self-conscious theatricalization of our social functions. We shrink from the pompous, the artificial, the ceremonious:

> We see traces of it (Berain's tradition) under the burlesque scenes of Offenbach's parodies, where with satirical intent the producer of the operetta treated the costumes and the scenery of *La Belle Helene* in a purely theatrical manner that was the facetious counterpart of the mythological spectacle of Quinault or of Molière. Achilles in antique helmet, sporting an eyeglass or displaying his epaulettes, saves us from the realism of an archaeological museum, while appealing to our risibilities.

Further, Levinson deplores that:

> Our existence today has no style whatever. Our dress is purely utilitarian. It would be an arduous task to attempt the theatrical synthesis of the sack coat.

Similarly, as the manners of society grow less theatrical, the stage becomes more logical. Costume must begin to follow historical, ethical, or psychological realities. The purely theatrical is put aside. The costume of the ballet seems to have endured reforms first, probably because of the impediment the heavy costumes proved to new steps and solo effects requiring more agility. As the dance increased in popularity, inevitably its performers were irked by the conventionality of the court dress. One of the first traditions to go was the mask. In 1772, the dancer Gardel was required to take the place of Vestris who did not appear for his cue, and he refused to go on representing the sun in a towering black wig and copper sunburst. The fact that the audience accepted the startling change of a dancer tossing about him own blond locks is more significant than Gardel's successful stroke. Earlier than this La Camargo, a popular dancer, shortened her skirts to a few inches above the ankle to display her dexterity in the *entrechat*. Mlle. Clairon, Lekain, and Talma on the stage all defied the conventions of the generation before them. A handkerchief for tragedy and a

[5] Levinson tends to minimize the resemblance to Roman styles, which is quite marked.

snuff-box for comedy were regarded as indispensable. The tragic hero wore plumes and kilts below a cuirass; the heroine, hoops, fringed and beribboned, no matter what the century of the character portrayed. When the dramatist insisted on a unity of time and a unity of place as logical and as unalterable as the *liason des scènes,* it is unlikely that he would allow much romanticism in the selection and manipulation of costumes. But as the drama approached an age which was to see the realistic painting of Louis David and the architecture of the neo-Greek school, costume is dominated by a feeling for freedom from convention, and fidelity to the ideals of reality which the art in general of the age was following. When Clairon played Electra in flowing black, with heavy chains on her hands, the audience accepted it because it was already turning its mind away from the formal classicism of Corneille's theatre and toward the romanticism of the generation to follow. It may be interesting and amusing to note what Préville says of Lekain: "he was of medium build, he had short and bowed legs; a reddened skin . . . and the costume, half-French, which was used then in tragedy was in no way advantageous for the concealment of his defects," and that "he followed Dufresne, one of the handsomest men that it is possible to see,"[6] and so was inclined to follow the naturalistic theory of historical accuracy in his Roman plays; or that Talma had the effrontery to appear on the stage with bare legs when the rest of the cast wore boots and kilts; but it is more significant that the audience was ready to accept the change.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries show that ideas regarding stage costume were in a state of flux. The work started by Lekain and Clairon, and developed into a definite movement by Talma was by no means barren in its results. Costume on the stage departs from costume in the drawing-room as a growing interest in antiquity shows itself. The reforms of Talma and of Clairon were chiefly with regard to Roman and Greek settings. Following Talma, although the ideal of historical accuracy had taken hold, the application of it to all kinds of plays was not universal. In 1829, for example, plays of Molière were given in the *Comédie Française* in which the more definitely character parts, Alceste Oronte, Orgon, and Philaminte wore costumes of the reigns of

[6] Quoted from *Histoire du Costume au Theatre,* by C. Jullien.

Louis XIV and Louis XV, and Eliante and Célimene wore dresses copied from the *Journal des Modes* of that week; the reason being that to modernize the other costumes would necessitate some changes in the text. Jullien, who reports the incident, goes on to say: "Comedy (that is Molière's) is the truthful image if society, of its customs, its conventions, and of a costume of a century removed from ours," and that to modernize the costumes is to defeat the dramatist's purpose. The idea is not imitated by other producers later in the century, however. At this time producers were particularly concerned with the play and the actors and not the *décor*. The respect for stage scene which was bred in Louis's court has lost its significance since men like Molière and designers like Berain, painters like Lebrun, no longer influence the stage. This century shows a struggling toward some general tendency in costume, a desire to formulate once more a standard or convention, but obviously the spectacular element is yielding place to the historical. In 1830, Mlle. Nears at the *Comédie Française* not only prepared her costume like those in which Molière was originally played, but persuaded her fellow actors to do likewise. In the later part of the eighteenth century in England, George Anne Bellamy speaks of the impropriety of dressing a Roman matron in the habilaments of an Egyptian queen, that is the traditional black velvet and pearls of English tragedy actresses. Heroes, following the French convention, wore the inevitable plumes, until Garrick declared them absurd—because he was a rationalist, however, not because he thought them theatrically ineffective.

Of course, the problem of wearing a costume and playing up to its possibilities is more evident in the ballet than in dramatic action. Yet the presence of pantomime in a play shows clearly that similar problem exists for the actor also. The manipulation of a court gown which had such long and heavy trains that an attendant was frequently necessary to carry it, was no small accomplishment. The ceremonious character of the court was conceivably due to the deportment that these costumes demanded. The principle remains in the design and wearing of all stage costumes. Recent experiments illustrate the designer's part in this: Oliver Saylor in his *Russian Theatre*, speaks of costumes designed in accordance with a Cubist set which required in the wearing a certain sweep of movement to convey the idea, broken by a striking tableau.

A performance of *King Lear,* in which the costumes were made of rubber to give them a statuesque dignity, and the recent performance of *Pinwheel,* in which sail cloth gave the costume the desired angular effect illustrate how the designer will help the actor. Instances of costumes familiar in the ballet—cloaks that fly back, skirts that swirl, carry the same idea. What could be more conducive to the Spanish rhythm than flare of the gypsy's skirt or the long fringe of her shawl?

In our age, the flair for the dramatic in costume, which Levinson regrets, is gone. It held briefly in the days of hoopskirts and trains for women, but since men discarded long-skirted coats and particularly swords, it has gone for them entirely, unless we except the cane and the still more infrequent flowing opera cloak. From its very nature, as Levinson points out, we cannot translate our dress into that of the theatre by a mere addition of a plumed helmet. Since the black moustache of the villain in melodrama left the stage in defeat, we have lost the knack of making clothes play the part.

ADOLPHE APPIA'S THEORIES OF PRODUCTION

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TO understand Adolphe Appia's theories regarding the production of word-tone drama, as explained in *Die Musik und Inscenierung,*[1] it is necessary to understand the term, word-tone drama; and to understand that term, it is necessary to review briefly Richard Wagner's attempt to find a new dramatic art form in the middle of the nineteenth century. At that time glittering grand opera furnished a means by which singers could display throat dexterity and in which the dramatist's task was chiefly that of "platform dresser for the altogether independent experiments of the composer."[2] Wagner's search was for an art form

[1] APPIA, ADOLPHE, *Die Musik und Inscenierung,* F. Bruckmann, München, 1899.

[2] WAGNER, RICHARD, *Prose Works,* translated by W. A. Ellis. Kegan, Trench, Trubner and Co. London, 1893. Vol. II, p. 31.

which should have its roots in German soil; that form he believed he had found finally in the word-tone drama.

The germ idea of the word-tone drama lies in the folk epic which originally was not contaminated with what Wagner calls the products of the subsoil of polite education or the criticism of the learned insects of research. "The songs of Homer, such as we now possess them," says Wagner, "have issued from the critical siftings and compilings of a time in which the genuine epos had long since ceased to live.... But before these epic songs became the object of such literary care, they had flourished mid the folk, eked out by voice and gesture, as a bodily enacted art work."[3] This idea of a double growth of the arts of poetry and tone Wagner expresses again in his reference to folk song in general. "It never happens to the folk to sing its songs without a text; without the words the folk would brood no tune."[4] From this idea he proceeds to the word-tone drama, which is not symphony because it is more than mere instrumental music; nor is it opera because it lays stress upon the emotional incident and word selection of the play, as well as upon the singing. Word-tone drama, then, consists of two essential elements; first, the plot and word foundation of the play, and second, the music which expresses, in each portion of the play, the meaning underlying the words and the plot. In Wagner's words, "We become knowers through feeling."[5] Through the intelligent union of dramatic structure and of music into the word-tone drama, we stand on the solid ground of dramatic action and then add music, the universal language of feeling, for the complete expression of the play. It is not "abstract literary impotence" which Wagner seeks; it is a "living, artistic creation."[6] Because he did seek the elemental, the robust, the living in his search for a new art form for the German people, rather than the aria-singing dexterity of opera stars or the psychic analyses of literary dilettantes, he naturally emphasized the necessity of a sound and healthy dramatic foundation in the play itself; he stressed the importance of the emotional incidents of the play in order that the music might have something genuine to express.

[3] *Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 39.
[4] WAGNER, *Prose Works*, Vol. II, p. 39.
[5] *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 209.
[6] *Ibid*, Vol. II, pp. 18, 35.

Wagner's word-tone dramas, however, were never adequately expressed upon the stage because the Wagnerian music was so superior to the attempt to express it in space through punctilious realism. Too much emphasis was placed upon the painted backdrop in the attempt to objectify the poetical, musical vision. There was, therefore, even on the stage of the Bayreuth *Festspielhaus*, which Wagner had thought would be an adequate refuge for his brain children, a wide gap between the mighty, cosmic rhythm of that vision which the musician's inner eye could see, and the puny, painted, lifeless frame of the stage picture. If his drama had been satisfactorily produced, it would have been possible for an audience to pass unconsciously from the inner being of the drama, that is, the musical score, to the world of outer appearance on the stage before them, and never feel any discrepancy as they passed back and forth between these two worlds, the one of time and the other of space. But the intensity of the Wagnerian conception outweighed the intensity of the form used to present those mighty conceptions. As a result, the only refuge for these brain children of Wagner's was in himself, and not in Bayreuth, as he had hoped when the *Festspielhaus* was built there.

Adolphe Appia, in *Die Musik und Inscenierung*, after first justifying the Wagnerian word-tone drama form and explaining why Wagner did not succeed in embodying his dreams upon the actual stage, discusses the problem of how word-tone drama can be fully expressed upon the visible stage where the appeal to the eye must be as intense as the appeal to the ear through the musical score. Appia firmly believes that the Wagnerian word-tone drama was a great step toward the real expression of the inner reality of the drama, for it brought with it the possibilities of expression in two art worlds,—that of tone and that of poetry. The next step in this development, however, according to Appia, must be in transposing the artist's concept more effectively to the stage; therefore, the next step is concerned chiefly with the development of *Inscenierung*, by means of which the visual and the musical will be correlated. This process will be the result of an *Inscenierung* in which the four elements of actor, painting, setting, and lighting are definitely controlled in their relation to each other by the music.

Appia begins his analysis of this point concerning *Inscenier-*

ung by showing that the drama, because of the great number of means which the artist must use to communicate it, is the most exacting and intricate of all art work. The painter and the poet see how their work attains form gradually, and they possess the power to control this form themselves because in their work, content and form are identical. In the work of the dramatist, however, content and form are not identical. The dramatist, by himself, is unable to bestow finite form upon his work, and the production of his play, therefore, may be entirely unlike the first dramatic conception in his brain. In other words, each dramatic conception, arising in the brain of the dramatist, must be transposed. This transposition must take place twice. The idea which is born in the word-tone poet's mind must first be transposed by him into words which communicate his thought. Then this must be transposed by the dramatic producer, in order that the dramatist's conception, embodied in words, may be communicated to an audience. It is this second transposition which does not lie in the hands of the writer of the play or of the word-tone drama. It is in this second transposition, therefore, that *Inscenierung* is important, because it is the means by which the play is produced, and it is thus the procedure over which the dramatist has no control.

Upon *Inscenierung* depends the failure or success of production. In Appia's opinion, it has often been inadequate because it has lacked a definite, regulating principle and has been subjected to the fluctuations of taste and the whims of the public. The problem of accurately and truthfully transferring to the stage the conception of the dramatist has remained an unsolved one because the emphasis has been placed upon the creation of a sort of scenic illusion for the eye, and upon giving back, upon the stage, this or that phase of life in piece-meal fashion instead of presenting a well-rounded, unified production, regarded as an organism. In organism each of the four elements of *Inscenierung* should play its part in relation to the whole, no one element usurping an importance out of proportion to its function in the life of the organism. It is essential, therefore, that there be some regulating principle which shall govern the relationship existing between the actor, the painting, the setting, and the lighting. This regulating principle is music.

The following diagram is the one which Appia uses to illustrate the creation and the production of word-tone drama, and the relation of each part to the whole.

The Temporal or Musical Element of Word-tone Drama	A	Out of Music (in the widest sense) springs The Conception of the Drama which the author embodies out of Word and Tone to form Drama
and permits		to be presented through
The Spatial or *Inscenierung* Element of Word-tone Drama	B	Actor, Setting, Lighting, Painting — And thus creates the word-tone drama

As the diagram indicates, out of music, in the widest sense of the term, arises the artist's conception of the drama; this conception he embodies in word and tone, thus giving to it a definite text or score, a tangible representation to him of what was at first only an abstract idea in his mind. This portion Appia designates the time element of the word-tone drama. The second main division comprises the spatial element of the word-tone drama, that is, the means by which the time element or tone, is given form in space upon the stage through actor, setting, lighting, and painting. In word-tone drama properly produced the *Inscenierung* becomes practically musical space; on the stage we see actor, setting, lighting, and painting, each functioning in relation to the other to express before our eyes in space what the music is expressing in time, through its beat or measure. What there four elements of *Inscenierung* do on the stage is determined by what the insistent, powerful, and absolute voice of the music requires for its fullest expression for the eye as well as for the ear.

To understand how music can function as a regulating factor, apart from its generally accepted function as a universal medium of expression, it is first necessary to turn to the pantomime, "where," says Appia, "through the silence of the actor, the music and the *Inscenierung* are placed in very obvious relation to each other. Whoever has worked with the pantomime knows that in it, the music determines the beat or time element and the succession or sequence of events or the narrative element. . . . The music prescribes the duration and the sequence of the episodes; the whole silent play must be given form with mathematical accuracy through the music; the scenic life of the pantomime does not, therefore, depend upon the whim of actor or producer, but upon the various sections of time which the music determines. If now, we add to the instrumental music of the pantomime, the song, the word, of the word-tone drama, nothing is fundamentally changed in the relation between the music and *Inscenierung* so far as the function of music as a regulating factor is concerned."[7]

"One may have found it logical that musical measure of time can be transposed into space through its application to stage production," says Apia, "without, however, having comprehended how music does this."[8] In answering this question, he considers chiefly the problem of the actor in relation to *Inscenierung* in word-tone drama; and in discussing that problem, he contrasts the actor of mere word drama and the actor of word-tone drama. If an actor in word drama wishes to express sadness as the result of vanished fortune, all he can do is to indicate that sadness, mainly through facial play bolstered by the text which he is speaking. His movements have meaning only as long as they are supported by the text. Obviously, then, the optical problem, particularly that of seeing the facial play of the actor, is important; yet the most that the actor in word drama can hope to do is to *indicate* for us but not to *express* for us, the life content, the inner essence of the play. In the word-tone drama, on the other hand, the music can arouse a feeling of sadness in the audience without their knowing at first that this feeling is what the actor on the stage before them is experiencing at that particular point in the play. That is, they are experiencing this sadness just at the point

[7] *Die Musik und Inscenierung*. p. 7.
[8] *Ibid*. p. 123.

in the play where they should be feeling it if the play is a real expression in space of what the music is expressing in time. The actor in word-tone drama, then, is the connecting link between the poetical, musical creation and the production of that creation in space on the stage. What the actor does at any given moment is definitely prescribed by the music which strengthens what he can do by means of facial play, gestures, and movement.[9] In word drama we may be able to feel intensely at certain moments over the fate of some character in the play, but we can never get as deep down into the roots of the play as we can in word-tone drama, where the living actor obeys the voice of the music so that we get the rhythmic life expression, not mere scenic illusion. Thus the moving actor in space is the interpreter of the music for the lifeless stage.

Since the actor is the living link between the music and the stage, he must in some way be united with the lifeless setting so that the combination makes an organic whole. This process of uniting him to the lifeless setting and the painted background has been effected by Appia through lighting. To him, lighting is more than a means of illumination to enable an audience to see what is happening upon the stage; it is as vital a thing as the actor, because it is the living waves of light that unite the actor to the dead setting, so that the whole which we see upon the stage becomes an organism in space, expressing what the music is expressing in time. And why, asks Appia, should lighting not be something more than a mere means of illumination? Was not Phoebus Apollo god of light as well as of music? Is there not, then, a close connection between music and light as far as their powers of expressing inner reality are concerned? Of what use is a painted back drop or painted scenery unless it can be united

[9] Appia's *L'Oeuvre d'Art Vivant*, Edition Atar, Genève, Paris, 1921, contains interesting designs which illustrate his theory regarding the balancing of the human body in space, under the control of music. These designs he groups under the heading *Rhythmic Space*. Some of these are also reproduced in his *Art Vivant ou Nature Morte?*, Bottega di Poesia, Milano, 1923. When he produced Paul Claudel's *L'Annonce faite à Marie* at the Dalcroze School of Eurhythmics at Hellerau, in asociation with Jaques-Dalcroze and Alexander von Salzmann, he applied the theories illustrated in the cuts indicated. cf. *Theatre Arts Magazine*, New York 1922, Vol. VI, p. 175.

with the three-dimensional form of the actor? To Appia it is nothing but hieroglyphics, good enough for a museum perhaps, but worthless in expressing or helping to express in space what the musical score, born in the brain of the word-tone poet, is expressing through sound. By means of lighting, the setting and the painting are united with the living form of the actor, and thus the audience is able to live through the eye as well as through the ear. Reproducing the interior of a Moorish palace, or a grove of birches, or the kitchen of a peasant is nothing of itself. What gives all these material objects of daily life any significance is the light, because it unifies them with the other elements of the *Inscenierung* and is an active, creating thing. "According to the old Greek myth," says Appia, "true light was the son of Night.... Where there are no shadows, there is no light."[10] In this use of shadows, therefore, lies the secret of his use of light as a unifying factor between the two-dimensional painted scenery and the three-dimensional actor. "With light, the word-tone poet paints his picture," according to Appia.[11] By using light for shadow effects in connection with the flat, painted canvas, he secures a degree of plasticity which unites the actor and the painted scenery.

Since most of this analysis of Appia's theories of production is necessarily abstract, it is difficult to put any of it into concrete form for purposes of illustration.[12] Such expressions as "inner

[10] *Die Musik und Inscenierung*, p. 49.

[11] *Ibid*, p. 93.

[12] Pictures and designs illustrating Appia's theories of production may be found not only in *Die Musik und Inscenierung* but also in the following publications. Some of these are reproductions of the cuts in *Die Musik und Inscenierung*.

APPIA, ADOLPHE, *Art Vivant ou Nature Morte?* See footnotet 9.

APPIA, ADOLPHE, *L'Oeuvre D'Art Vivant*. See footnote 9.

MACGOWAN, KENNETH, *The Theatre of Tommorrow*, Boni and Liveright, New York, 1921. pp. 82, 84, 192. Four designs for Richard Wagner's *Die Walküre* and one design for Paul Claudel's *L'Annonce faite à Marie*.

MODERWELL, HIRAM K., *The Theatre of Today*, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1925. Frontispiece and pp. 22, 30. One design for *Die Walküre* and two for *Parsifal*.

ROUCHÉ, JACQUES, *L'Art Théâtral Moderne*. Cloud et Gay, Paris, 1924. pp. 61, 64, 65. Note especially two designs for Act III of *Tristan und Isolde*.

life content of the play," or "essence of the dramatist's concept" or "embodiment of soul life" belong to a somewhat ethereal type of diction. It is possible, however, that some of the points, particularly regarding light, may be made clearer by reference to Appia's *Inscenierung* for *Tristan und Isolde*. In this play, the episodic, realistic portion is of little importance; according to Appia, that is the first fact which the producer of it should realize. The audience, watching it, is supposed to be moving in imagination, in the mysterious atmosphere of a world beyond the bodily, tangible world, at least, after act one. In this world music is all-powerful. The problem of *Inscenierung*, then, is a subtle one because it consists in getting harmony between what the eye sees on the stage and what the music is expressing in time. This problem is not as difficult in *Parsifal* or in *The Ring of the Nibelungen* because in these plays the outer world of scenic representation and of episodes is a more important part of the organism of the play than in *Tristan und Isolde* where there seems to be chiefly a communion of souls in a misty, spirit world.

One of the scenes to which Appia refers is that in which Isolde is waiting outside the castle wall for her husband, King Mark, to leave on the midnight hunt. The situation, of course, is that Isolde, though queen of King Mark of Cornwall, loves Tristan. At this particular point her soul is supposed to be reaching out into stellar space toward the soul of her lover. The moment that King Mark and his men have galloped off from the castle, the setting ceases to be of the same importance as it was. With their departure, we are aware, through what we are hearing in the musical score, that we are on the threshold of the spirit world in which the communion of the souls of Tristan and Isodle is to take precedence over such realistic details as the sharp corners of the gray castle walls or the outlines of trees in the adjoining park on this warm, summer night. As we listen to the music, we are no longer interested in whether there are trees in the park or whether it is a warm, summer night, or whether the castle walls have the correct, realistic look of castle walls or not. The music at this point indicates that the world of realism is disappearing before the world

Theatre Arts Magazine, New York. Vol. II, 1917-1918, pp. 131-135.
Vol. VI, 1922, pp. 205-209.
Vol. VIII, 1924, p. 817 ff.

of the spirit, in which Tristan and Isolde dwell in the next seene of the play. The music expresses this to the ear, but the problem of the *Inscenierung* is to express it with equal intensity to the eye. Appia's solution is to do this, not by intensifying any portion of setting, that is, not by making us more aware of details on the stage, such as the gateway of the castle, or the walls, or the trees. We should not be distracted by any thought of whether, after all, that is a correctly constructed gate or castle. We should, if possible, be transported, along with Tristan and Isolde, into this somewhat neutral territory of the spirit where realistic details do not matter, but where the communion of souls seems to be the main problem.

To do this, Appia, in his stage setting, has a torch burning on the castle wall, to the right of the gateway. This torch symbolizes actuality; therefore, the moment that Isolde extinguishes it, we should understand that along with her, we are passing from the world of material things into the mysterious world of the spirit. We get this feeling more through the music we are hearing, but Appia's point is that while the music at this point is really the vital element, there should be nothing on the stage to clash with the feeling which the music arouses in us. If he brought out his setting in a cold, clear outline, there would be a clash. Therefore, it is not setting but lighting which is important in the *Inscenierung* at this particular moment of the play, and it is the music which determines that lighting is the main factor at this point. That is, music determines at each point of a word-tone drama the relative importance of each element of *Inscenierung.* The moment that Isolde extinguishes the torch, the entire stage becomes nothing but dusky space. The trees in the park, the castle walls, and the castle gateway seem to be fading out of our consciousness as the mystic element of the play begins to take precedence over the realistic. At the same time that we are receiving this impression from what we see in this mysterious, dark space on the stage, the music, says Appia, is pushing the sense of it deeper and deeper into our consciousness.

Then follows the warning of Brangane, that King Mark and his men are returning from the hunt. We now become conscious once more of the world of reality, of the park and the trees and the castle walls. Again it is the lighting which is used to express the

dramatist's conception. Suddenly a faint light appears at the right side of the background. King Mark and his men break in. What Appia calls the "cold forms of earth life" appear with the beginning of that faint white light, which slowly increases. As this light increases we begin to take account of the actual setting again. We come back from this timeless, spaceless world of the mysterious, dusky light in which we have been and see the hard outlines of reality, as do Tristan and Isolde. The only place on the stage which remains in this former, delicate light is the seat at the foot of the terrace below the castle wall, where the two lovers have been sitting. The purpose of the lighting throughout this play, as Appia indicates, is to show the spectacle of the outer life, of the king, his men, the court, in contrast to this rather disembodied, inner aspect of the drama which, to Appia, is its real expression. To him, the lighting motif, particularly in Act III, is as important as the music motif; through lighting, he is able to make the visual appeal in this act as intense as the musical appeal, so that no discrepancy exists between the two, and we are able to pass from one to the other without any "clicks."

In spite of the fact that Appia believes the visual appeal should be as strong as the musical appeal in the production of word-tone drama, it is interesting to notice that he admits it cannot always be done and that the author is the only one, in the last analysis, who really possesses his brain child. Our eyes and ears frequently get no more than an echo or a reflection of the artist's idea, for human media, according to Appia, are frail in embodying artists' dreams. To him, the dream is the eternal thing, and if the producer can get only a part of that eternal thing embodied in the "fleeting pictures of the moment" on the stage, he has done a fairly courageous piece of work which rises above the worship of scenic illusion and of following the fluctuations of public taste instead of the truthfulness of music as a controlling factor in the attempt to produce the artist's concept for the eye as well as for the ear. If a word-tone drama is ever perfectly produced, Appia concludes, we can pass with freedom and without conscious effort from the world of outer appearances to the inner being of the drama, at every point of its unfolding,—a condition which, in the presentation of Wagnerian drama did not exist, because the realism of the spatial setting on the stage clashed with the idealism

in the musical score in time. In other words, the *Inscenierung* was not artistically applied in embodying the word-tone poet's concept. For the future, the development must be toward an idealism in the visual phase on the stage to correspond with the idealism in the music. What the eye sees must not be out of harmony with what the ear hears.

NEW BOOKS

[New books are sent to staff reviewers, but voluntary contributions are glady considered. Manuscripts should be sent to Hoyt H. Hudson, Review Editor, Princeton University.]

Dialectic. By Mortimer J. Adler. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1927. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. Pp. 265. $3.50.

As a contribution to an understanding of the nature and function of argument, this book is too important to be ignored. The whole subject of the educational meaning and value of debate is in a state of bewildering confusion, and while Mr. Adler is not directly concerned with problems of pedagogical procedure, more is to be gained in this instance from the detachment of the theorist than from a preoccupation with practice. Mr. Adler brings to his task an excellent equipment in psychology, logic, and metaphysics, and has, in addition, the temperament of the dialectician.

Ancient and medieval education valued dialectic, not as a method of discovery, but as a method of argument and disputation. The dominant intellectual concerns of the era introduced by Galileo and Newton have been investigation, experiment, and demonstration; intellectual progress has been conceived as the subjection of material once treated dialectically to the processes of 'scientific' thought. Under the domination of this conception, "dialectic has been ignored, its value underestimated, its form misunderstood. What was at one time considered indispensable in the training of either a gentleman or a philosopher has now become an element quite carefully to be excluded from the curriculum, as subversive of the scientific discipline. Instead, logic inductive and deductive, became the required course of study, and it is worth noting that it has completely failed to achieve the importance in the modern scheme that dialectic occupied in the ancient and medieval."

An analysis and criticism of widely held notions concerning

'scientific' thought leads to a discovery—or rediscovery, rather—of dialectic. Thinking is often conceived to be a matter of having and dealing with ideas, but this conception fails to recognize the function of words. Both psychology and linguistic study are compelling a recognition of the close relationship of thought and speech. This new light seems to lead to a return to the old pre-scientific union of rhetoric and dialectic in the classical period, and to the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic) of the medieval schools. Another prevalent conception of thinking is that it is a process which an individual mind carries on by itself when it has ideas and deals with them. But to view thought as exclusively concerned with induction and deduction and similar ways of inference is to ignore the conversational basis and origin of language and thought. The thought and language of the child grow out of an attempt to communicate with others. Anthropologists find the same thing to be true of the language of primitive peoples. The dialectical process, whether it occurs within the borders of a single mind when there is a conflict within it, or involves two minds, is in either case much closer to our habits of thought than the derivative practices of induction and deduction. A third belief about thinking, once widely held, that thinking is an activity of reason, and is essentially independent of irrational purposes and desires, has been pretty well exploded by psychology and psychoanalysis. The development of logical theory has also made it clear that thought in any field is dependent upon hypotheses and definitions which must be assumed; but these are logical equivalents to what the psychologist calls prejudices and wilful thinking. Dialectic, as essentially controversial, has suffered in the eyes of 'scientific' thinkers because it is especially liable to the contamination of emotions and purposes. But it turns out that all thinking suffers from the same irrelevancies; also, the postulates and definitions of a science can only be examined by dialectical reasoning. A final belief that has caused dialectic to suffer in the contrast with scientific thought is a conception of thought as seeking to end in knowing—to rest in truth. In a sense truth is irrelevant to dialectic; dialectic is more concerned with agreement or disagreement; it explores premises and consequences and determines the meaning of terms in a dispute; its ending is understanding rather than truth. These limitations, however, are not entirely confined to dialectic. It

seems impossible to formulate a generally acceptable definition of truth, nor can any tests of truth be universally agreed upon. Dialectic, then, cannot be dismissed as peculiarly fruitless if it offers no promises of ultimate truth.

A comparison of dialectic with scientific thought suggests the need for a formulation of the methodology of dialectic. Mr. Adler may grant too much to the adequacy of the present formulations of scientific thought, but there can be no doubt as to the greater inadequacy of dialectical theory, and his analysis of both the psychological factors and the logical structure and implications of dialectic should do much for its intellectual respectability.

By way of illustrating the traits of controversy Mr. Adler offers three interesting and significant "specimens of human discourse" and draws from them certain fundamental theses regarding the nature of dialectic. He then proceeds to describe dialectic empirically, logically, and metaphysically. Under the empirical description he examines the part played by language and by human nature in dialectical discourse. The use of language involves men in controversy because of the connotative ambiguity of words and the pervasive metaphorical character of language. But when controversy occurs for these reasons, dialectic never employs language to ask what the facts are; it asks what the facts mean. What may be ambiguities in verbal usage and multiple metaphors in linguistic statement, become conflicts and contradictions in discourse; dialectic serves the double function of clarifying the use of words, on the linguistic side, and resolving difficulties in discourse, on the logical side.

The psychological analysis of human nature participating in argument results in four rules for dialectic: (1) Exhibit and expose frankly all the temperamental and emotional factors in the argument. (2) Make all the assumptions explicit. These assumptions probably cannot be demonstrated, but the degree to which they can be detected and stated explicitly marks the degree of an individual's insight into an argument, whether it be his own or another's. (3) Qualify the necessary attitude of partisanship in an argument by an attitude of impartiality.

> If an individual is able to appreciate the irrational context in which his own thinking occurs, and to recognize explicitly the assumptions from which his thinking derives, his

> partisanship becomes self-critical; if he extends to his opponent the intellectual courtesy of the same privileges he himself has found necessary, his partisanship is qualified by impartiality. . . . In some individuals who habitually have the dialectic temper it is even possible that during the entire course of controversial thinking, the accents of partisanship and impartiality may constitute its rhythm, as if a Greek chorus were to accompany the entire action of the antagonists by the repetition of the logical injunction that whatever proposition is asserted may or may not be so according to the acceptance or rejection of the intuitions in which it is founded.

(4) Take an argument with an attitude of utter impracticality.

> If argument be taken as a purely intellectual affair, the resistance to the exposure of emotional determinants is removed because the temperamental bias is chiefly directed toward beliefs having practical import, and furthermore, because the rule of explicit postulation and the attitude of impartiality indicate that dialectic is not concerned with genuine beliefs at all. Belief is an incident in the practical life. . . . The statement that controversy or dialectic should not be taken seriously were better made in the terms of tragedy and comedy. . . . The attitude of impracticality in dialectic is the assumption of the comic spirit, what might be called the philosophic sense of humor. . . . The mind that has been properly tempered by these attitudes is able to experience the apparent tragedy by being thoroughly and relentlessly dialectical, and also to stand apart from it, unhurt, untouchd, only smiling. In its impartiality before all ideas, in its freedom from what is really special pleading, in its ability to entertain any notion whether or not it be true or credible, such a mind enjoys that dialectical insight which makes controversy and reflection sane pursuits, and has those moments of quiet laughter which makes them what Plato called a "dear delight."

These four rules constitute the etiquette rather than the technique of dialectic. The technique must be sought in the logical description, but that is not a matter which we shall take up here except to state Mr. Adler's conclusion that any proposition may be true in some system of implication, which is to say that any thesis may be true in a universe of discourse regarded as a realm of possibility. For the conception of possibility Mr. Adler refers his readers to a companion volume in the same series, *Possibility,* by Scott Buchanan. The two volumes are the fruit of cooperation, but the problems of the latter volume do not come within the scope of this review.

In the interpretation of dialectic Mr. Adler indentifies it with philosophy by insisting that philosophy has no special subject matter and no special problems; philosophy is essentially a method, the method of dialectic. Dialectic has no concern with truth in the scientific sense of being a statement which corresponds with facts. Its interest is the meaning of propositions and their possible relations to other propositions. It therefore cannot result in belief. Any system of propositions arrived at dialectically will suggest to the dialectical mind an opposing system. Any set of dialectical propositions is "only one-half of a conversation, a single voice in a controversy."

> In terms of its method and its claim, science represents an intellectual attitude profoundly in contrast with the attitude of dialectic. The empirical attitude is an emphasis upon two values, the dogmatic value of belief and the pragmatic value of action. Scientific thinking satisfies these two values: in its claim to extrinsic and determinate truth, it may result in belief; through its dealing with entities in the realm of action, it may eventuate in conduct. In other words, science is capable of application.
>
> On the other hand, the dialectic attitude is an emphasis upon the values of impartiality and impracticality, of unbelief and inaction. It avoids ever resting in belief, or in the assertion of truth. . . . If truth and practical consequences be the ends of scientific thinking, philosophy [dialectic] may be regarded in contrast as the source of intellectual freedom.

Three major criticisms of debating have appeared in recent articles and editorials on the subject. There are those who feel that it is heavy, over-serious, rigid, untouched by "insight." On the other side are ranged the critics who denounce it as unscientific, non-problem solving, and as essentially insincere, leading to a destruction of genuine convictions, and a dangerous facility in assuming pretended ones. The first criticism is in effect that debating is not sufficiently dialectical; the other two imply that it is too much so.

These criticisms show little conception of the meaning of the dialectical attitude and method. Nor is much light to be found in text books, nor in the articles on debating that have appeared in this JOURNAL. The whole problem needs a restatement and a fresh attack. Mr. Adler's book suggests a new approach (or rather a return to a very ancient approach)—a clear statement of the spirit,

method, and function of dialectic, its relation to the subject matter of debate (which at present means practically its relation to the social sciences, which Mr. Adler believes to be still in the stage of baby-talk), and finally its relation to the purposes of school debating.

EVERETT HUNT, *Swarthmore College.*

An Outline of Contemporary Drama—BY THOMAS H. DICKINSON, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1927. 298 pp.

The *Outline of Contemporary Drama* contains an abundance of highly significant material which has hitherto been available only in a number of sources.

In the discussion of contemporary Drama, it is most difficult to overlook the influences which have gone to make it what it is. For this reason, Mr. Dickinson has not undertaken an outline of Drama as it is, but has included the developments and contributions of the last century.

The century is divided into three periods. The first period, extending from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the late eighteen-eighties, marks the decline of the Romantic play, the decline of the distinction between tragedy and comedy and the substitution of a new form, the tragi-comedy. During this period, in which France held the foremost place in the field of Drama, Eugène Scribe led in the production of irresponsible and frivolous entertainments, which were characteristic of the popular demands of the theatre.

A movement which characterized this revolt from Romanticism was that inaugurated by Alexander Dumas, in isolating and dramatising the current social and moral attitudes, and setting the people to discussing the motives and principles that underlay the actions of his plays. It was this movement which terminated in the Drama of Ibsen, in which we have joined, for the first time, the world of the theatre and the world of affairs.

The second period, which extended from the late eighteen-eighties to the beginning of the twentieth century, was characterized by the movements, more especially in France and Germany, for the freedom of the Theatre, which led to the Naturalistic movement and dramatic revival.

The task of freeing the theatre enlisted many capable men who were unwilling to submit themselves to strict form, but were willing to contribute their creative imagination and individualities to that which was to become the nucleus of dramatic experimentation.

Great changes characterize the third period, which includes the first quarter of the twentieth century. The first movement of importance was that of localization of the theatre, initiated by the 'Irish National Movement' in an "effort better to adjust the theatre to the demands of society in both the cities and the provinces," and, "to readjust the internal structure of the theatre, as a producing mechanism, to the better purposes of Art." The next movement was one of synthesis, in which the separate arts were moulded into a new art of the Drama; and finally the decline of the intellectualistic drama, which has given place to the futuristic.

Mr. Dickinson emphasizes, in the development of the Drama, its international character and the influence of one dramatist upon another. He develops material which in other than outline form would be impossible in the bounds of one small volume. "Lacking (he states in the preface) the means to expound the mysterious vitality of the plant itself, we can in such a book as this only outline the plan of the garden and show how it has been cultivated by successive generations of workers into its present form."

By interspersing, here and there, an interesting biographical note about the leading contributors in each movement, he makes most interesting material out of that, which, when given in outline form, is likely to be dull reading.

An Outline of Contemporary Drama is valuable as a supplementary handbook to Mr. Dickinson's *Chief Contemporary Dramatists* (first and second series), but it is more valuable as a general Guide to the Study of Modern Drama; indeed it is the best brief guide available.

JOHN PARLETTE, *Cornell University*

The Drama in Adult Education. A Report by the Adult Education Committee of the Board of Education. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1927.

The Drama in Adult Education is the sixth of a series of reports made by a special committee on adult education constituted

by the British Board of Education in 1921. In general, this report comprises a survey of the situation in England with respect to drama, followed by a critical evaluation of those elements in the situation which merit the support of persons interested in Education. The investigations of the Committee cover a wide field, as is shown by the fact that they gathered evidence, both oral and written, from nearly a hundred individuals representing a full range of active interest in the drama.

Beginning with a brief discussion on the nature of drama, and of the historical backgrounds of the dramatic art in England, the report proceeds to a survey of the existing situation. From the educational standpoint, two divisions are recognized, (1) education through seeing the drama, and (2) education through participation. In the first of these divisions is included investigations covering "Repertory" Theatres, Playgoers' Societies, "The Old Vic," The Lena Ashwell Players and The Arts League of Service; in the second division the investigations cover such fields as Amateur Societies in Towns, The Drama in Educational Institutions, The Drama and the Church, and The Drama in the Countryside, with an adequate survey of the work of representative individual societies in each of these special fields.

The last sixty pages of the report are devoted to an attempt to bring together the issues, and to draw some conclusions therefrom. In this part of the Report a section on Drama as an Instrument of Education is a particularly valuable contribution. Designating drama as an "artistic medium" possessing a very wide appeal, the Committee recognizes in it a powerful instrument of education; at the same time, they are very careful to state that "the conditions under which drama is presented are a matter of the greatest importance to all who are interested in education." However, instead of setting up any special standards of their own, the Committee regard as acceptable the standards of various social and educational associations such as The British Drama League, and Tye Villiage Drama Society. Using the standards of such associations as a guide, they include discussions on the choice of plays, the art of acting, speech and movement, folk dancing and craftsmanship. This is followed by a brief section on the cooperative aspect of dramatics, the difficulties of amateurs, and some of the problems of teachers and producers. In the concluding pages are set forth

in outline form the specific recommendations of the Committee. This is by no means the least important part of the Report, for herein is to be found the result of the mature judgment of the nearly forty men and women who constituted the Committee.

Both from the standpoint of the evidence gathered, and of the findings of the Committee, this is an important report. Everyone who is interested in "drama as an instrument of education" should have a copy of it within reach; it contains more real meat on the subject than any half-dozen more widely heralded books containing discussions of the educational aspects of the drama.

D. T. MARTIN, *Cornell University*

Persuasion and Debate. By GEORGE ROWLAND COLLINS AND JOHN SEYBOLD MORRIS. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1927. Pp. xi, 280.

To many people debate means primarily the application of formal logic to public discourse. That this conception is at best only a half-truth, the teachers of argumentation are fully aware. Yet the tendency in courses on argumentation and debate is to concentrate upon the logical elements, presumably because of the difficulty with which students grasp the procedure of finding evidence and organizing it intelligently, and because of adherence to the well-founded doctrine that clear thinking must precede successful efforts to induce belief and to influence conduct. That argument and debate are fundamentally persuasion and that persuasion involves more than logic, probably no one will seriously question.

Thus the two purposes of the authors of *Persuasion and Debate* are in no sense iconoclastic: "to provide a thoroughly modern exposition of the basic logical and psychological principles and practical methods of oral and written persuasion" and "to present a brief but comprehensive discussion of that specialized form of persuasion commonly known as debate." The aim to strike a proper balance between logic and psychology in their application to speaking and writing immediately wins approval from the teacher with a broad conception of public address. Furthermore, few will object because the authors use "persuasion" to include appeals both to reason and to feeling, and because they seek to avoid the terminology both of logic and of psychology.

After the introductory chapter dealing with such matters as the nature and value of the art of persuasion, the conception of conduct as including both thought and action, and the justification of debating as an educational force, the book is divided into three parts: "Analysis," "Synthesis," and "Debate."

The section on analysis consists of three chapters: "The Subject and Purpose," "The Subject-matter," and "The Audience." In *Platform Speaking* by Collins (pp. 69ff.), analysis of purpose comes first because "a precise knowledge of aim is a primary necessity," but in *Persuasion and Debate* choosing a subject comes first because "the student . . . will find it easier and more natural to choose his subject before selecting his purpose." On the other hand, choice of purpose should precede analysis of subject-matter, although "ethical considerations necessitate a choice of purpose after an analysis of subject-matter," because "in some cases the exigencies of the situation make such a procedure necessary." (p. 25) The adjectives indicating the qualifications for an interesting subject apparently are definitely limited to three; vital, concrete, and antagonistic. If we consider at all the classification of audiences, we must realize that such hard and fast requirements are misleading. In the discussion of finding main issues in which five steps are given: (1) need for change, (2) causes, (3) best remedy, (4) theoretical operation, (5) practical operation, should not a sixth be added regarding the possibility of new and greater evils arising from the proposed remedy? Perhaps this idea is implied in the fourth and fifth steps, but it is extremely doubtful if students will discover the implication.

The second section of the book has chapters on "Planning," "Materials of Development," "Explicit and Implicit Methods," "Types of Objective Reasoning," and "Refutation." In the discussion of planning, the propositions to be selected from a brief for a particular audience are listed and those eliminated are also listed, but no adequate reasons are given for the choices made. To the student the selection is very likely to seem arbitrary. Even when "additional hints on selection" are offered, there is little satisfactory evidence recorded to persuade the student that he should follow the course prescribed. An audience of people who habitually ride in subways ought not to have to be told of the need for subways, as the illustrative passage on page 78 suggests. The

student needs not "more general hints," but more specific reasons and evidence to guide him in making selections. In the chapter on materials of development we find the classification into explicit and implicit materials, the former referring to argument and the latter to other forms of support. Although this terminology may be advocated by some schools of psychology, it seems confusing and useless in a textbook on persuasion. It suggests the advice of Quintilian (*Institutio Oratoria*, III, xi. 21): "But this affectation of subtlety in the invention of technical terms is mere laborious ostentation." Since the authors themselves object in their preface to the use of psychological terminology and wish to avoid it wherever possible, the two chapters called "Materials of Development" and "Explicit and Implicit Methods" would seem to plead for revision. Still more questionable in the latter chapter are the illustrations set before the student as models of the procedure advocated. If our students were to deliver such a paragraph as the "completely developed paragraph" on pages 125-6, we should certainly have much to criticize. The figures of speech seem forced and inappropriate. The total effect is unmistakably that of a machine-made product. The same criticisms may be made of the illustrations in the chapter on types of objective reasoning. Consider this as a model "implicit proposition" (p. 135): "They will put shackles on the hands and ball and chain about the ankles of the public-spirited whenever the people agitate for adequate protection, while they grind the bones of the children in the mills to make cheap labor yield excessive profits."

The third section on debate, consists of five short chapters: "The Resolution," "Contest Plans and Constructive Preparation," "Rebuttal Preparation," "Strategy," and "New Aspects in Formal Debate." The chapter on contest plans seems to encourage the old type of debating regarded as a gladiatorial combat. Various comparisons are made between forensic and athletic contests, particularly football. To be sure, many valuable suggestions are offered to the "coach," but should these appear in a textbook for students, unless the volume is designed for a teachers' course? The chapter on strategy seems to be rather questionable because it presents ideas which might better be left unsaid. The whole discussion savors too much of the undergraduate mind, as for example in the comments headed "'Canning' the Rebuttal." Here

more than a page and a half (pp. 193-4) are devoted to presenting in great detail a plan of mechanical rebuttal with its advantages in a contest. Then follow these three sentences: "But with all these advantages, the method is not recommended. The team using it is sure, but it is too likely to be inflexible, and inflexibility is not a virtue in debating. Then, too, platform thinking is reduced to a minimum by this method, and every debater should learn to think on the platform." Why present with attractive details a plan not recommended? Likewise the discussion on charts seems to be an excellent example of contra-suggestion. Why the authors even deign to discuss "coaching from the audience" (p. 200) is difficult to understand. The chapter on new aspects in formal debate seems to be written more for those in charge of debating than for students, and the omission of any mention of the Oregon plan of debate seems to make the survey incomplete. The appendices following the third section contain a great number of useful exercises, lists of topics, and a complete brief.

In general, while the book presents much interesting and valuable material for students and teachers, it seems too dogmatic and too prone to give a student the impression that it is exhaustive when it is merely suggestive. More and better examples and a simpler, less pedantic presentation of the theory would make the text far more attractive. Finally, if the book is to be judged as a comprehensive treatment of persuasion and debate, it leaves much to be desired. Many phases of conviction and persuasion are not even mentioned. On the other hand, although a much more thorough discussion of the technique of persuasion would be necessary in advanced courses, the text will introduce the student to the problem and will show him that to move audiences logical argument alone is insufficient.

WILBUR E. GILMAN, *University of Missouri*

The Teacher's Book of Phonetics, by SARAH T. BARROWS AND ANNA D. CORDTS. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1927. $1.40.

Although increased interest in speech has led to the demand that teachers, especially in the primary grades, assume greater responsibility for the pronunciation of their students, little has been done to furnish ill-prepared teachers with the means of accomplishing this difficult task. Too often the better-speech movement has

been forced to substitute enthusiasm and moral fervor for understanding and skill. Teachers whose own pronunciation has never received proper attention have taught students their own faults; teachers who suppose that conventional spelling gives the key to pronunciation have encouraged barbarous spelling-pronunciations. In short, speech improvement has long suffered at the hands of the incompetent. It is therefore gratifying to find *The Teacher's Book of Phonetics* intelligently prepared and eminently useful. Its usefulness will be most apparent to the teacher in the primary grades, for whom the book is designed. But its simplicity of exposition will be helpful to others who feel that the technical complexity of most books on phonetics is a great obstacle to comprehension.

After a brief explanation of the importance of phonetics, the authors set out to show the teacher how to study her own speech and that of the child, and how to help the child with the information thus gained. Exercises are given to help the child learn the sound, and others to establish the sound firmly once it has been learned. The distinction between these two kinds of exercises is important; some books on speech improvement include only the latter: long lists of words which the child dutifully practices with the wrong sounds. Subsequent chapters deal with the organs of speech, the sounds of English, the foreign child's difficulties, the phonetic alphabet, and the question of pronunciation. There is a brief bibliography at the end, and the books is well indexed.

The chapter on the organs of speech is clearly diagrammed. It includes a number of good exercises for lips, tongue, soft palate, and breathing apparatus. The explanations of bodily processes are clear, except for breathing, which is badly confused. The internal intercostal muscles, for example, act in defiance of all laws of physics and physiology. It is regrettable that the authors could not have consulted Dodds and Lickley's *The Control of the Breath* or some standard text on physiology before writing this section.

The chapter on the sounds of English is clearly written. The symbols of Webster's dictionary and those of Krapp, which differ slightly from the international symbols in several instances, are used. Length, stress, and melody are discussed independently of each other but no attempt is made to show their interrelations. In the chapter on foreign speech the special problems of children who speak German, Swedish, Czech (erroneously called Czecho-Slovak),

French, Spanish, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese are discussed. An additional section on Yiddish would have been extremely useful. Although the phonetic alphabet is first presented in the chapter on the sounds of English, it is not fully made use of until the chapter on the alphabet itself. The authors have withheld the new symbols lest they seem too difficult at first; they have accomplished a very difficult undertaking in writing the first five chapters with practically no aid from the phonetic symbols. In the sixth chapter the advantages of the symbols are clearly shown, and one brief passage is transcribed in illustration. There are a few errors in the chapter, but their importance is negligible.

The word lists in the chapter on pronunciation appear to consist of phonetic transcriptions of dictionary diacritical spellings. But why go to the dictionary for second-hand information? Phonetics is more than a method of interpreting the dictionaries; the phonetician's only material is the sound of living speech. One of the most notorious instances of the way in which dictionaries theorize about pronunciation is shown in their ignoring of the principle of gradation in unstressed syllables. Following the lead of the dictionaries, Miss Barrows and Miss Cordts have listed word after word with full vowel quality indicated in the unstressed syllables; they have apparently been unable to rid themselves of the delusion that spelling conditions pronunciation. Aside from this reliance on the dictionaries, however, the chapter is well done, and the position of the authors on the question of standards is sensibly taken. Throughout the book the faults are of a minor character, and the good points of the book outweigh them greatly. It is to be hoped that primary teachers will make extensive use of it.

C. K. THOMAS, *Cornell University.*

Successful Speaking. A Text for Secondary Schools. By WILLIAM PHILLIPS SANDFORD AND WILLARD HAYES YEAGER. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1927. Pp. ix, 223, with appendix.

After kicking the Gettysburg Address into Main Street, recently, Henry L. Mencken proceeded to deposit all text books on Speech into the waste-basket. He declared them to be insufferably dull. Public discussion needed above all other things, he declared, a competent text on *How to Win.* That criticism comes to mind with the title and technique of *Successful Speaking.* "There is just

one test for successful speaking," say the authors. "It is this: Does it accomplish the result the speaker wants to accomplish?"

With the premises thus established rises the eternal question, *How* is the speech to be fashioned so that it will "accomplish the result the speaker wants accomplished?" What is a man to say? What is he to do? Mr. Mencken frankly admits that he is ignorant of what the content of such a book as he has in mind should be. Professors Sandford and Yeager express themselves very positively on this problem; with commendable fearlessness they state in their Preface:

> Effective speech depends, not merely upon the skillful use of the body and voice as agents of expression, but *mainly* upon exercise of judgment and tact in dealing with facts and ideas. . . . We do not decry the excellent work that has been done in the teaching of expression; we do declare that above and beyond this there must be excellent work in the teaching of thought and of composition.

Whether or not we agree with the technique offered here, there is no gainsaying the courage with which the authors take their stand and the consistency with which they develop their text. Excepting the inspirational opening chapter, *Speaking and Success*, and the well done concluding chapters, *Preparing a Debate* and *Producing a Play*, which offer practical suggestions to high-school teachers, the book is practically devoted to the exposition of how to make speech thought and speech composition "accomplish the result the speaker wants to accomplish." Chapter titles indicate this: *Choosing the Purpose; Selecting Subjects and Finding Material; Planning the Speech;* and *Making the Speech Interesting.* That the authors devote one hundred pages to these pivotal chapters further indicates the sureness with which they advance their thesis that the speech is the thing.

I am inclined to think that we teachers of speech have cause for congratulating one another by reason of the fact that our colleagues are producing more readable texts,—Dolman's *Handbook,* Brigance's *The Spoken Word,* Woolbert and Nelson's *The Art of Interpretative Speech,* for example. I would add *Successful Speaking* to this list. I believe this text will hold the attention of the average high-school student. It is boiled down to fundamentals. It has generous quantities of simple illustrative material.

It speaks in the language and interests of the secondary school student.

To high-school teachers wishing a readable, condensed, well-illustrated text, and who would make speech delivery the handmaid of speech content, Sanford and Yeager's *Successful Speaking* will be a welcome book.

EARL W. WILEY, *Ohio State University.*

Fifth National Oratorical Contest and Third International Oratorical Contest for Secondary Schools. RANDOLPH LEIGH, Director, 323 Star Building, Washington, D. C. Pp.51.

For some reason mysterious to me, I have been asked to review this little pamphlet, which is designed merely as a handy guide for those having to do with the contests indicated by the title. In it will be found brief statements concerning the history of the contests, their objects, the American Committee and the newspapers supporting the contests, the European trip awaiting the eight national finalists, rules, schedules, suggestions to contestants, President Coolidge's address at the international finals in 1926, the national final speeches of 1927, the international final speeches of 1927, and the standard ballot.

The suggestions to contestants seem to be such as would be made by any intelligent observer who has had to listen to these contests and who was not burdened with many preconceptions in regard to public speaking: learn the rules, stop when the whistle blows, be good sports, and the like. When the author comes to suggestions on the preparation of a speech, his advice is less fortunate, as in his warning against gathering too much data, a bit of advice that seems to be followed all too faithfully. A bibliography of helpful books to read would strike me more favorably; but perhaps much reading would not lead to the kind of speeches desired. Concentration on a "single and vivid impression" is a good suggestion for a short speech, but the supporting statement that, "under that rigorous rule of brevity, Lincoln, rather than Burke, should be your oratorical model," leaves something to be desired. No doubt the warnings against quotation come naturally from one who has heard speaker after speaker recite the preamble of the Constitution and Gladstone's famous remark about the greatest work ever struck off at one

time by the hand of man; nevertheless there is more value in quotation than a youngster would gather from the author's statements. I am not much impressed by the argument that "the human voice has a peculiar way of betraying its master when he shifts from the utterance of his own thoughts to those of another." What of it? One who acknowledges his citations need not worry about that. The further statement that "declamation never has the same force and fervor as the expression of individual conviction," is not justified by my experience with boys. Anyhow, these statements, with the next suggestion, "make up in sincerity anything you may lack in polish," make me feel the advice is all based on some unwarranted assumptions in regard to the originality, the conviction and the sincerity that are likely to get into schoolboy orations on the Constitution.

One queries if this inadequate and misleading division were not better omitted; but one hastens to take the edge off this remark by admitting that one of the best reasons for such omission is that it is extremely difficult to put in a page and a half, or in ten pages, a set of briefly phrased suggestions that that will do youngsters more good than harm. Taken as a whole, the booklet will well serve those who believe these contests worthwhile, and are seeking information about them. I don't and I'm not.

When these contests were started many of us were lukewarm because we felt that competitions which practically make indiscriminating praise of the Constitution and its founders a condition of winning are well calculated to develop rant and insincerity. This opinion has nothing to do with the virtue of the cause to which the propaganda is directed. Some of us had lived through the contests in support of prohibition and world peace, and knew how much oratorical enthusiasm for prohibition can be generated by the contests of a half-pint bottle. My own attitude toward these newer contests is not due to any sympathy with the writers and young teachers who are training our students to despise the work of the Fathers. I do not claim the right to stand by the Grand Kleagle and Mayor Thompson; but I heartily believe in American institutions, including their improveability. Moreover, I believe there is good in the right sort of contests; but doubt if those which place a premium on setting forth a given doctrine, no matter how good in itself, are sound. I doubt if inducing

youths to give undiscriminating praise to the Constitution will do anything to counteract the adverse criticism of our institutions which President Coolidge deprecates in the speech included in the booklet, or to "secure a broader knowledge on the part of the people of the fundamental principles of our government."

It may be different in the secondary school contests; but what I have seen of the parallel college contests convinces me that the orations are often written with tongue in cheek, simply to win. It was my painful task one year, as judge of a sectional college contest, to read eighteen orations. A drearier waste of ignorance and fustian would be hard to find. In only one or two could one find evidence that the writers had given any attention to political science. One guessed that the writers had read only some purple patches of praise and perfervid perorations; and had thought not at all. Fervor, yes; but of the sincerity the booklet urges only "a trace." Last year I heard a sectional contest. Very poor speaking, by students mostly of small caliber, and the content of the orations made the few students who came to hear grin, and their elders sigh.

But soft! I must be wrong,—at least so far as the secondary school contests go. And I am glad to admit that the speeches that are included in the pamphlet are better than those I have heard and read in the college contests. Anyhow, I am weakened by what I learn from this booklet. Here one reads the enthusiastic praise of the enterprise by a President of the United States, one surely not given to easy enthusiasms; and one reads further that the first national contest, in 1924, was judged by five members of the Supreme Court. We are not told what the judges thought of the speeches; but we learn that soon after the American Bar Association passed a resolution "calling upon the newspapers to continue the contest as a contribution toward better and more intelligent citizenship." One might like to know just how much attention the Bar Association gave the resolution; but anyhow, two years later the plan had become international, and this year there are expected entries from the United States, England, France, Canada, Mexico, Germany and Japan, all to promote international harmony by hymning the glories of their respective national institutions. One is awed by the liberal prizes, and especially by the

trip through Europe, June 30 to September 17, New York to New York, that awaits all who reach the national final contest.

Plainly enough there is money back of the enterprise; and one has to bow to the newspapers that are putting it over,—the *Springfield Republican, New York Times, Washington Star, Atlanta Constitution, Chicago Daily News, Louisville Courier-Journal, Los Angeles Times,* to name only a few of the fifty-four of the most respectable and most influential journals in the land. Surely one must not suspect these papers of sponsoring and supporting this expensive enterprise because they find it as profitable as some papers do baby and beauty contests.

Yes, we who have questioned these national contests must be wrong; and, if so, we the more anxiously question the international development. Does not this defeat the original aim, and destroy the harmony of the jubilant pæan in praise of the unmatchable excellence of our government? One is chagrined to read in the *National Oratorical Contest News,* for January 9, 1928, that the Spanish speakers can get off many more words a minute than those who speak English, including American; and that the French contestant of last year could utter distinctly "almost a fourth as many words again in nine minutes" as an American can utter more fuzzily in ten minutes. Will not some clever mathematician work out the exact percentages so that we may have a clear understanding of the extent of this disturbing inferiority before we proceed to see what can be done about it, if anything? Anyhow, I think we should keep these contests to ourselves so that our young people shall not be exposed to the demoralizing fact that our superiority is not acknowledged by all the peoples of the earth. The worst of it is that the judges last year let a wop from Mexico win. If this thing is to go on, as it gives every sign of doing, the judges should be picked with more care, preferably from the Klan. I hope, too, the conductors of that European tour will see to it that the youngsters come back more than ever convinced that we are the people. I am a little afraid that the managers are losing their heads, and letting their vaulting ambition o'erleap their excuse for existence.

But I must confess that on looking over the pictures of the officials and interested newspaper men as given in the *News*—level-headed "go-getters" they look—they seem very likely to do

whatever they undertake, whether we approve or not. If we persist in attempts to destroy the ancient American tradition of bombast, will not defenders, abler and more influential than we, rush to the rescue and raise it to new heights, and so develop a generation of Henry Clays to establish new records for altitude and endurance flights? Does not blah spring eternal in the human breast?

Perhaps a course wiser for us than scoffing would be to show cordial interest and to attempt to contribute to this distinctly going concern by sending in speakers who can talk good sense. Of course none but eloquent speakers need apply, but sometimes we find speakers who can talk good sense eloquently.

J. A. WINANS, *Dartmouth College.*

The Pronunciphone Course. A set of seven double-faced phonograph records with a Manual of Instruction called *good taste in speech.* Prepared by a group of educators, writers and speakers under the direction of Professor Edward Hall Gardner, A. M., for 18 years a member of the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, and E. Ray Skinner, Phonetician, Department of Speech, University of Wisconsin. The Pronunciphone Company, Chicago, Illinois.

The attitude of mind, and heart, necessary for complete enjoyment of and profit from the Pronunciphone course is about as follows: (1) one must have complete confidence in the conclusions arrived at by the group of educators, writers, and speakers under the direction of Professor Edward Hall Gardner, A. M., and E. Ray Skinner regarding the correct pronunciation of all of the almost two thousand words recorded; (2) one must have the same absolute confidence in Mr. Skinner's ability to pronounce each of these words exactly as the board has decided that it ought to be pronounced; (3) one must have a horror of the embarrassment of errors which would place him in any of the 6th, 5th, 4th, 3rd, or 2nd classes of people, as regards pronunciation, which are elaborately described in the accompanying broadside, and an ardent desire to belong to the 1st class; (4) one must be willing to follow the directions, perform the rites, whole-heartedly, obsequiously, and assiduously; (5) one must be absolutely free from all opin-

ions and prejudices, including open-mindedness, about pronunciation; (6) in watching the manual while listening to the records, as instructed, one must be willing to ignore the middle column on the page, wherein are given graphical representations of the pronunciations, lest he be confused; (7) and the right hand column, containing the definitions, lest he be amused.

There will probably be many purchasers for the Pronunciphone course and nearly as many satisfied users. For those who are afflicted with the third characteristic of the necessary mental attitude as noted above are like to accept the statement in the advertisement that "The course is absolutely authoritative," to have all the necessary faiths, to embrace the task eagerly, to be little bothered by the diacritical markings because they will not understand them, and to take the definitions seriously. It is apparently for such that the course was designed.

The reviewer, perhaps unfortunately, has very definite opinions about pronunciation. He does not believe that at present there exists in this country any standard of pronunciation sufficiently widely acceptable to justify the name. He does not believe that there exists any board of educators, writers, and speakers, under whosesoever guidance it may operate, possessed of the material information requisite to the formulation of such a standard. He does not believe that the method here used would be a proper method, even if it were possible to determine specific correct pronunciations.

"What is the correct standard in pronunciation?" says our manual. "Even dictionaries disagree. The Pronunciphone course did not hesitate to make a choice. The pronunciations of seven dictionaries were compared, and those selected which conformed, as the title of this book indicates, to current good taste in speech." Just how good taste was determined, we are not told; nor why it should have been limited by seven dictionaries. If the stamp of approval is put upon two or more pronunciations of a word by one dictionary, or by seven, the conclusion to be drawn from that evidence is that any one of those pronunciations, and not one only, conformed to current good taste at the time when the dictionary was compiled. As to whether or not it conforms to present good taste, that is another question, the resolution of which cannot be made to depend upon the consultation of seventy-seven old

volumes. We have to admire the course that "did not hesitate to make a choice," although we do not understand how it was done.

"In England, a committee of distinguished men has been appointed to declare what shall be the accepted radio pronunciation of certain words." Not so in America. If an association of radio announcers wishes to employ this board, or any other, to fix their pronunciations, very well; that would yet not justify the assumption that all cultured people must speak in that way. A man may even confess to some degree of culture without being certain that he is in the first class of pronouncers.

Nor is it to be taken for granted that "the only thoroughly practical way to teach pronunciation is to pronounce"—through a phonograph. The phonograph cannot talk back to the imitating student when he repeats inexactly, and the unreliability of one's own untrained ear in listening to one's own speech is well known.

The procedure is as follows: "Seat yourself comfortably before the instrument [an ordinary phonograph, equipped with a loud needle] and *take the manual in your hand.* Never attempt to listen to the records without simultaneously reading the manual of instruction.... Now start the machine, and allow it to run through the *first ten words.* Then *stop it* by raising the tone-arm. Run the needle back over the same ten words again. Now pronounce aloud, slowly and distinctly, the first ten words, reading them from the manual. Have you noted the accent correctly? Have you pronounced each vowel and consonant as it was pronounced in the record? Give each letter and syllable its full value; then pronounce them again more rapidly, as you would in conversation." (This last a salutary admonition.) "Ten words are enough for the average day's lesson. Indeed, they may be too much. For each day you should use these new words and practice a fluent mastery of them, making them a part of your living vocabularly." (Even if the ten happen to be: *Fascisti, fastidious, faucet, faux pas, felicitate, feline, femme de chambre, fête, fetid,* and *fetish,* or *brassière, bravo, breeches, Brest-Litovsk, brevet, breviary, Briand, bronchitis, Brontë* and *brougham.*) And so on through 75 pages of manual and seven double-faced records for approximately two hundred days.

One so far committed as the reviewer to the thesis that of

all reasonably reputable pronunciations of any word one is about as good as another, obviously cannot object to very many of Mr. Skinner's pronunciations as incorrect, and of course most of them are quite satisfactory. It is very difficult, however, to understand the basis of some preferences, especially the retention of French pronunciations for some words that have been long in the language, as *amateur, baton, cloture,* and *foyer,* and the Anglicization of such characteristically French words as *Demimondaine.* The half-French, half-English rendering of Cœur-de-Lion, not an Anglicization, would be hard to justify; and there are several cases in which the pronunciation is neither the one nor the other, as *reveille* with the *ll* mixing the two fashions and the vowels so distorted that the whole little resembles the word heard from those who use it. Anglicized *Don Quixote* following immediately on the heels of Spanish *Don Juan* betrays a lack of consistency. Without quarreling with Mr. Skinner because he prefers one way of pronouncing *banal, courtesan, encore, exemplary,* and a host of other words, one may properly resent the emphatic implication that his own way, where it differs from Mr. Skinner's, although there may be as much support from seven dictionaries on the one side as on the other, is altogether wrong. The "English" pronunciation of Latin words may be correct; it does not follow that the "Roman" is incorrect. One might object to the record's rendition of *sacrilegious* in the manner thus commented on in *Websters* "Often erroneously pronounced, even by educated speakers, as if spelt *sacreligious.*"

The pronunciation throughout the records seems much too elaborate, "every letter and syllable" being given its full value, and often something over. This difficulty is probably inherent in the system. It is especially conspicuous in the French words. Mr. Skinner seizes upon each of these tender morsels avidly and rolls it lovingly about on his tongue. We are reminded of Chaucer's Prioresse:

> And Frensh she spak ful faire and fetisly,
> After the scole of Stratford atte Bowe,
> For Frensh of Paris was to hir unknowe.

The French is worse than elaborately uttered, and for French there is something very like a right pronunciation such as we

cannot assume for English. The comment of a Frenchman who is a student of his language was at first: "Not so bad; not so good. You would know he was not a Frenchman." But immediately he began to point out noticeable errors of pronunciation, many ludicrous as in *bon soir* and *carte blanche*, many merely errors as in *Debussy, déjeuner, fleur-de-lis.* "It is unfortunate that the producers did not collect their French words into one group and get a Frenchman to pronounce them," was the conclusion with which several others who knew French agreed.

As is stated in the manual, Mr. Skinner faced a very difficult task when he undertook to pronounce all these words, in alphabetical order, without context. It is small wonder that he accomplished the undertaking no better than he did. Many of the pronunciations on the records fail by far to agree with the pronunciations indicated by the very bad system of diacritical markings employed in the manual. The same symbol is pronounced differently in two places, and two supposedly different symbols are pronounced alike. Frequently, as in *déjeuner* and *dénouement*, the accentuation is changed between page and record. Secondary accents are often introduced in the record which do not appear on the page. Not infrequently the spoken pronunciations improve upon the written, as where the final sound in *absolutory* is written a consonant, but properly sounded a vowel, and where the quality of the first vowel sound written for *hangar* is decidely changed and *r* added, although not written.

If Mr. Skinner had put out a set of records representing his own pronunciation or what he, assisted by as many educators, writers, and speakers as necessary, considered to be the speech of any particular group of people, such as the educated class of the Middle West, and had so labeled the product, a real contribution to the study of American pronunciation would have been made. But this course does not pretend to any limitations. And it seems to be something of a mixture in styles, some vowel sounds generally characteristic of New England and *r* sounds where they would never be heard east of the Hudson River, for example. It must be taken into consideration, however, that the number of persons who would appreciate such a more or less scientific contribution is not large, and that the great buying public which will

make this course a paying proposition consists of those who will be impressed by the horrible realization that "We see and understand the meaning of hundreds of words *(sic)* which we have only a faint notion how to pronounce," and all the rest of the splendid hokum of the advertisement. Those who, with the reviewer will not be writ down an ass for pronouncing it with a flat *a* may find these records almost as entertaining as those of the Two Black Crows, but will not labor at them ten words a day.

LEE S. HULTZÉN, *Dartmouth College.*

Voice Beautiful. By EARNEST G. WHITE. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, New York; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1927. Pp. viii, 166. (First edition appeared as *Science and Singing*, 1909, enlarged as *Voice Beautiful* in 1918, again enlarged in 1922, and once more presented in 1927.)

When I was asked to review this book I wanted to be generous, especially since it presents a theory of voice production—a subject on which careful investigators differ widely. At the same time I realized that as a profession we who are teachers of speech must protect ourselves against the dissemination of patently absurd doctrines. The author frequently insists that most great discoveries have made their authors the butts of ridicule even to the point of martyrdom. One wonders whether the author of this alleged discovery may not be a little presumptuous in placing himself beside Harvey, Darwin and Marconi. After all, if we accepted all alleged discoveries at the valuations of their authors this world of ours would be intellectually bankrupt in a fortnight.

The whole purpose of the author is "(a) To show . . . that the vocal cords . . . are not the seat of sound . . .; (b) To show that the whole compass of human voice is divided between four sets of sinuses." Mr. White sets forth the theory that *there are nerve endings in the sinuses capable of setting the air into vibration.* No attempt is made to explain this phenomenon. He claims that the sphenoid sinueses are used in ordinary speech, and are supplemented in singing by the other sinuses.

The writer has an adequate knowledge of anatomy. But throughout the entire book he does not even show a polite deference for the physics of sound. Neither does he show even a speak-

ing acquaintance with phonetics. He makes such an absurd mistake as to say that if the vocal cords produced tone we could sing the "sh" sound. He continues, "In 'sh' the breath is coming directly out of the mouth, but immediately we cease the 'sh' sound and get 'i', the breath alters its course from the mouth and goes to the head; that is to say, into the sinuses."

Far be it from me to condemn Mr. White as a teacher of voice. And I do not pretend to justify all that has been written or believed about the function of the vocal bands. There is yet a great discovery to be made. The one thing of which I am confident is that Mr. White has not made it.

DONALD HAYWORTH, *University of Wisconsin.*

Gray's Public Speaking Test. By J. STANLEY GRAY. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio Book Company, 1928.

A scientific test of public speaking, measuring accurately the effectiveness of a speech and furnishing a diagnosis of the speaker's weak points, is a highly desirable addition to the equipment of a teacher or student of public speaking. Such a test will aid greatly in determining the effectiveness of various kinds of speaking with various types of audiences, in measuring the progress of the student, and in determining the teaching methods which should be used.

> *Gray's Public Speaking Test* is designed to accomplish two ends—first, to scientifically measure the degree to which a speech is effective, and second, to diagnose his speaking process to determine the points of strength and the points of weakness. To do this the speaking process is analyzed into ten vital factors which are stated in the form of questions. Each factor, in turn, is subdivided into five gradations ranging from very good to very poor. The audience is then asked to check the gradation, under each question, which most nearly fits the speaker. These gradations are arranged out of order on the auditor's check blank so that his estimation of a speaker will not be warped by the consciousness that he is placing the speaker in a graded category.[1]

The results are summarized on a form for that purpose, a score for each factor is computed, and the arithmetical mean for the ten factors determined.

[1] Preface, *Gray's Public Speaking Test.*

Certain questions are bound to be raised as the test is examined. The "ten vital factors" are: communication, interestingness of content, importance of content, organization of content, adaption to the occasion, communicative activity, voice, articulation, skill in the use of spoken language, and the degree to which the purpose of the speech is accomplished. Each of these factors is given equal weight in computing the score. Are these all the factors of a successful speech? Does perfection in these factors mean a perfect speech? Are these factors discrete entities? Are they of equal value in effective speaking?—for instance, is the proper use of communicative activity of the same value as the accomplishment of the speaker's purpose? Certain other questions arise concerning the graduating of the individual factors: Is the goal of perfect communicativeness to impress the audience that the speaker has "tried very hard"? Is "Too much action, annoying" better than "No action at all"?

But, passing over these questions of particulars, several questions regarding the test as a whole need to be considered before its value can be estimated:

Does the test measure what it purports to measure?

Is it reliable?

Does it provide realiable norms?

The test provides no norms whatever. The possible scores run from five to one, by intervals of one-tenth, with five assigned a grade of 12.5 percent and one a grade of 100 percent. But no indication is given of the median or mean, or of the standard of achievement for any group of students. And no explanation is given for the percentage grades assigned. (The "grade table" lists scores from five to five and five-tenths, with percentage equivalents from ten down to zero, but if the directions on the tests are followed, no such scores are possible.)

The test purports to measure "the degree to which the speaker is effective." "The validity coefficient . . . was found to be .91 with a P. E. of .051."[2] This validity coefficient was found by correlating the scores given to college speakers by one hundred fifteen University of Oregon students with the rankings of the same speakers made by five faculty men acting as judges. (Three of

[2] *Ibid.*

the faculty men had formerly been college debaters.)[3] But the excuse for the test in the first place is the unreliability of judges: ". . .the marked disagreement of instructors in Public Speaking when asked to judge speaking contests. They not only disagree as to the effectiveness of a speaker but they even differ as to what constitutes effective speaking."[4] If a test of unknown validity is correlated with a criterion of known lack of validity, what is the result? In this particular case, the coefficient of correlation seems to show primarily the extent to which faculty men and students can agree.

"The reliability coefficient . . . was found to be .778 with a probable error (P. E.) of .084."[5] This reliability coefficient was secured by dividing the audience into two groups and correlating the scoring by one group with the scoring made by the other group.[6] How many cases were used in this computation? And what were the conditions under which it was secured? Judging by the method of securing the validity coefficient, the number of cases involved may not have been very large, and the audiences were probably college audiences. A large number of cases involving a wide variety of audiences would be necessary before an accurate reliability coefficient could be secured.

". . . any educational testing of a speech must test the audience rather than the speaker."[7] But a composite of the judgments of the audience concerning the speaker is not a test of the audience. A test of the audience should indicate the reactions of the audience to the speech. Moreover, such a test as this one is subject to a number of limitations: It is limited by the accuracy of the conception held by the audience of articulation of communicative activity, and the other factors involved. It is limited by the standards of the audience in grammar and logic. And, in asking the audience to estimate how hard the speaker tried to communicate, it loses all trace of objectivity whatever.

Perhaps tests can be devised which will show the extent to

[3] See GRAY, J. STANLEY. "Objective Measurements for Public Speaking." *The Journal of Expression*, March, 1928. pp. 25f.

[4] Preface, *Gray's Public Speaking Test.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *The Journal of Expression*, loc. cit.

[7] Preface, *Gray's Public Speaking Test.*

which an audience understands what is being said, comprehends the ideas involved, accepts them, and reacts to them as the speaker wishes. Perhaps accurate tests may be made of all the various factors which go to make up a speech. If the results of the tests analyzing the speech could then be accurately correlated with the results of the tests of audiences of various types, the result would be a fair scientific basis for judging effectiveness in speaking. Such a series of tests would have to allow for differences in audiences, would have to provide an adequate basis for classifying audiences, and would have to be widely applied before its validity and reliability could be computed.

The speaker may find that the Gray Test will help "to diagnose his speaking process to determine the points of strength and the points of weakness." Whether or not such a diagnosis will be more valuable than that made by his instructor is another matter.

MACK EASTON, *Swarthmore College.*

Speech Criticism Folder. By ARLEIGH B. WILLIAMSON and WILLIAM J. FARMA. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1928.

This folder is designed to simplify and to improve the task of getting to each student a more or less detailed criticism of his class-room speeches. Some twelve points upon which criticism is to be offered (with thirty sub-divisions) are listed; and space is left on each sheet of the folder for the written judgments of the teacher. By using carbon paper the teacher makes two copies of his criticism, one of which he takes and the other he leaves in the student's folder. In this way the student will have an opportunity to note his continuing weaknesses for his improvement. Not all teachers will agree with the exact bases of criticism offered by the compilers. However, there is ample white space upon which the critic can write whatever he pleases. The general idea has been used by some teachers for several years; this folder embodies the idea in a handy and inexpensive form.

H. H. H., *Princeton University.*

OLD BOOKS

[This department will discuss volumes of interest to students and collectors of old books in our field. Contributions and suggestions should be sent to Hoyt H. Hudson, Princeton University.]

The Orator's Assistant. By Alexander Thomas. Worcester, Mass.: Alexander Thomas, 1797.

The Pious Instructor. By Daniel Cooledge. Walpole, N. H.: Charter and Hale, 1806.

These two booys must be reviewed together because they are modeled on the same plan, follow the same theories, and in one place at least use identical language. In the last years of the eighteenth century the struggle between two schools of speech training was waxing bitter. John Walker, the lexicographer, had published in England his *Elements of Elocution* in which for the first time were classified the inflections and circumflexes of the voice with directions for their use. Shortly afterwards Thomas Sheridan in his *Lectures on Elocution* attacked Walker's system of inflections as highly artificial. Sheridan's work on elocution made no attempt at a philosophical analysis of the voice but was made up largely of general suggestions on emphasis, pausing, and the degree of pitch. The theories of Walker and his followers were bitterly attacked by many who went beyond Sheridan, and maintained that delivery could not be taught except in a very restricted sense. They assumed that the art of delivery was a gift of nature and could not be governed by a set of rules. Walker's works on elocution, however, became the accepted authorities on which most English texts were based until James Rush published his *Philosophy of the Human Voice* in 1827.

Works on elocution published in America naturally carried on this conflict in theories. Although there were several texts based on the theories of Walker, it is interesting to note that Sheridan's *Lectures* was the text used in some of the early colleges. The books which are the subject of this review are examples of the

extreme "follow nature" school. Both are composed largely of selections for practice prepared by suggestions and directions for reading and speaking. *The Orator's Assistant* as the title page states is a "selection of dialogues for schools and academies taken from the best dramatic writings in the English language to which are added a few highly esteemed pieces for declamation, intended for the youth of both sexes as an aid in forming an easy, ready, and graceful elocution." The following quotation taken from the Introduction expresses the author's whole theory of teaching delivery:

"The best and almost only guide to the attainment of a perfect elocution is to *follow nature*. To crowd upon the mind the observance of an infinite number of rules, must often defeat the purpose intended, and render the scholar incompetent to apply them.

"A complete understanding of the subject of which the scholar is declaiming is the first desideratum of oratory .... General rules may be of some service but the attainment of a handsome delivery is the consequence of practice and attention, and one day's instruction under the care of an able preceptor is of more service than a folio volume on the subject."

No principles or suggestions are given to make clear what this instruction is to be or what the student should aim for in his practice.

The design of *The Pious Instructor* was, as the title might suggest, "not only to instruct the young in reading, but to implant in the minds of all the importance of living a life conformable to the great design of Omnipotence." This book also is composed in great part of selections which are on "moral and religious subjects designed to warm and animate the zeal of all to piety and religion." As a preface to the selections the author give some general "directions for reading and speaking." The statement that "the best and almost only guide to the attainment of a perfect elocution is to follow nature" forms the basis of his theory. The author holds that rules are superfluous, but he goes on to give a few general suggestions. A few of these are the following:

The speaker should be clearly understood.

He should not speak too fast or too slow.

The speaker should pay attention to pauses.

The emphasis should be the same as in conversation.

The cadence must be varied according to the sense.

These are not in the words of the author but they give the substance of his advice. His whole aim seems to be to encourage a natural, conversational method of delivery.

As in the case of *The Orator's Assistant* there is here no contribution to the theory of the training of the voice in speech. The selections for practice were almost entirely on religious or ethical subjects. The purpose of the author through these was not only to give training in speech but to instill piety in those who should use them.

CHARLES A. FRITZ, *New York University*

Le Maître des Orateurs Populaires, Etude sur la prédication de Jésus. PAR AUGUSTE BOUVIER. Paris: Librarie Fischbacher, 1892: pp. 88.

For thirty years, beginning in 1862, Auguste Bouvier occupied the chair of homiletics in the University of Geneva. Near the close of his period of service he issued this little work upon Jesus as a preacher; a second edition appeared in 1895, after the author's death. The plan of the study is simple, and is carried out with Gallic clearness and orderliness. M. Bouvier considers first the preparation of Jesus for preaching; then his preaching, under four heads—general character, forms (aphorism, narrative, parable, and discussion), esthetic qualities, power and effects. A section of fourteen pages considers the applications, or lessons to be learned by the modern preacher from this consideration of "the master of popular orators." Finally, the author lists in an appendix all the terms used in the preaching of Jesus, the terms being classified as those drawn from nature, those drawn from human life, and under other such headings. This appendix serves at once as a concordance to the sermons of Jesus and as a revelation of the astounding variety and concreteness of the language found therein.

Apart from the interest deriving from its subject and its subject-matter, this book might well be commended to advanced students as a model to be followed in the composition of critical studies. It is written with precision, system, and a wealth of detail; yet these characteristics never interfere with the author's genuine enthusiasm for his subject. The following passage, allow-

ing for loss in translation, will show M. Bouvier's style. He is discussing the pictorial element in the preaching of Jesus, an element which he divides into two parts, design and coloring. After discussing design, he goes on:

> By coloring we mean the effects of light and shade, the blending of colors, the air about the figures, the imprint of feeling marked upon their faces, or that which one calls the expression. There is no one familiar with literature and with art but has observed these things in the parables of the Gospel, and has instinctively remarked: such a one has bright colors, such a one mild ones or sombre ones,—but all vivid. There, the brilliant: "I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven." "You will behold in that day angels ascending and descending upon the Son of Man." "There is here a greater than Solomon, a greater than Jonah." Elsewhere, the gentle: John the Baptist and the reed shaken by the wind; the lilies of the field arrayed more magnificently than Solomon in all his glory; the shepherd and the search for the lamb lost in the desert; the friends of the housewife rejoicing with her; the hen who gathers her chickens under her wings; the mother who after the pains of giving birth, smiles upon her new-born son. Sometimes, the dark: the evil rich man in hell, over against Lazarus; the weeping and gnashing of teeth outside the banquet; the signs of the approaching end.
>
> So far the painter; now as to the orator. If the painter appeals eminently to the imagination, the orator speaks to the spirit, the conscience, and the heart, or at once to all three. I have already remarked that the preaching of Jesus is not the classical oration. It therefore dispenses with certain important oratorical qualities, such as logical rigor, vigorous dialectic, fullness and force of reasoning. But all the qualities which are suited to the kinds of discourse employed it possesses in a measure quite extraordinary, etc.

HOYT H. HUDSON, *Princeton University*

Contemporary Speeches

[Contributions and suggestions for this department should be sent to V. E. Simrell, Dartmouth College.]

JUDGE BEN B. LINDSEY *vs.* RABBI STEPHEN S. WISE: *Debate on Companionate Marriage.* New York, January 28, 1928.

Calling each other "Ben" and "Steve," "Dear Ben" and "Dear Steve," "Dear Lindsey" and "Dear Dr. Wise," Judge Ben B. Lindsey of Denver and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise of New York debated last night the question of companionate marriage before a $16,000 house at Carnegie Hall.

The last of 3,300 seats were taken. Box seats were sold for $6.60 each and platform seats for $5.50 each. The audience was not much stirred by the debate, however, partly because of the tenderness of the two men with each other and partly because, on rebuttal, surrebuttal and rejoinder, it became clear that the views of the two speakers, if not identical, were very similar.

Excerpt from N. Y. *Times,* January 29, 1928.

The argument of the debate might be briefed as follows:

Definition: Companionate Marriage is marriage with birth-control and the possibility of divorce by mutual consent.

Judge Lindsey: Companionate Marriage should be legalized, for

1. Most marriage now involve birth-control and the possibility of easy divorce.
2. Ratification of the *status quo* would encourage such marriages.

Rabbi Wise: Companionate Marriage should not be legalized, for

1. Most marriages now involve birth-control and the possibility of easy divorce.
2. Ratification of the *status quo* would encourage such marriages.

Debate, you see, is not a matter of argument. It's all in the point of view. This form of entertainment, when given by men

like Judge Lindsey and Rabbi Wise, has become extremely popular in New York and Boston and a few lesser towns. College debaters do not share in the popularity because they have too much argument and no point of view.

Judge Lindsey revealed his judicial background by fastening his argument to two specific proposals: the scientific diffusion of information on birth-control and the establishment of a marriage commission to handle applications for divorce without any of the present legal exploitation, publicity, and general bad spirits. Rabbi Wise saved the evening from the boredom of legal argument by an eloquent panegyric on monogamy. Judge Lindsey reminded the audience that their emotions had been appealed to, and so restored their equanimity. Then he endorsel all of the panegyric except the inference that companionate marriage is opposed to monogamy. Rabbi Wise ultimately clinched his argument with the *mot:* "I call companionate marriage 'marriage without sportsmanship.'" Sportsmanship might be defined as the unnecessary incurrence of unprofitable hazards.

The debate was, nevertheless, comparatively free from the symbolic hokum which usually characterizes such discussions. Each speaker, especially Dr. Wise, tended throughout to grant the other's premises and then with an *ipse dixit* deny the conclusion. Either speaker, however, is a man entitled to speak as one having authority.

V. E. SIMRELL, *Dartmouth College*

PRESIDENT COOLIDGE: *Havana Address.* Havana, January 16, 1928.

The recent Pan-American Conference at Havana met under none-too-advantageous conditions for the United States. The preceding conference had shown a growing opposition to the policy of the United States in Central America and the Caribbean. Since that time, our military forces in Haiti and Nicaragua and our attitude in the Mexican landlaws dispute had caused further hostile feeling. The growing desire of Latin countries to reorganize the Pan-American Union in such a way as to give equal power to each nation had reached ominous proportions. And in addition there had arisen a determination to take definite action against intervention—at least five nations drew up resolutions against intervention preceding the conference, one of which made the nation

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intervening responsible to the nation occupied and to third parties as well, whether or not the consent of the occupied state had been given. Even nations outside our hemisphere had grown exceedingly critical of our Latin-America policy.

Such a condition called for tactful handling. Any speech by a representative of the United States had to be based on propositions to which the world pays lip-service. Its propositions must be acceptable to the Latin Americans. They must establish the good intentions of the United States, and yet they must be such as could be used to justify the past policy of the United States and to block any move to restrict our activities in the future.

President Coolidge's address began by pointing out the rapid advancement of the western hemisphere, using Cuba as an illustration. It is in this hemisphere that political freedom, peace, good-will, and mutual helpfulness have advanced furthest; the Pan-American Conference is for the purpose of "maintaining and extending these principles." All nations in the conference are equal and possess equal authority.

If the conference is to succeed, everyone must be open-minded, patient, tolerant, and charitable. Achievement is possible through building on the immediately attainable, not through attempting the spectacular. And if the conference is to mean anything, it must mean the bringing of all peoples more completely under law —law, the refuge of the weak and oppressed, the shield of small nations. But the process cannot be rapid, it must slowly broaden out from precedent to precedent, from the general acceptance of principle to principle. Every right of nation implies a corresponding duty, and "It is through the careful observance of those laws which define our rights and impose our duties that international co-operation is possible." But it is the spirit, not the letter, of the law which must prevail.

"With law and charity as our guides, with that ancient faith which is only strengthened when it requires sacrifices, we shall anchor at last in the harbor of justice and truth. The same Pilot which stood by the Great Discoverer, and the same Wisdom which instructed the founding fathers of our republics, will continue to abide with us."

Was it because of this speech that action regarding intervention was postponed, and reorganization of the Union confined to

the removal of the restriction limiting members of the Governing Board to members of the Diplomatic Corps in Washington? Or was the speech marked down as hokum!

There are those who attribute our results to the able delegates of the United States, to the failure of the Latins to agree among themselves, to the economic needs of our southern neighbors, and to the general effect of the eight warships which accompanied our President. They point out that certain of the representatives pulled up stakes and went home in a huff.

Why, then, the speech of Coolidge, and the later one of Hughes? Why, then, should statesmen continue to run around our little globe making impassioned and inspiring speeches?

MACK EASTON, *Swarthmore College*

GOVERNOR ALFRED E. SMITH: *Annual Message to the Legislature of New York State.* January 4, 1928.

"This is the eighth and last annual message I shall present to your Honorable Bodies." These are the first words of an address so lengthy that, by the Governor's request, only a small portion of it was read to each House of the Legislature and the rest printed and distributed to the members. It was the first time that Governor Smith failed to deliver his annual message in person. The reviewer can sympathize with the jaundiced assemblyman who, when asked for his opinion, replied that the message was "too voluminous to comment upon." At the same time, anyone who reads it through will appreciate it as a model of lucid and persuasive exposition.

The fancifully-minded and the politically-motivated like to construe the governor's *last* message to the Legislature of New York as meaning his first message to the people of the United States. The only justification for such a construction lies in the observation made by the Washington *Post* that "A message from Governor Smith at this particular time is a message to the people of the United States, whether he directs it to them or not." As a matter of fact, the message is distinctly addressed throughout to the body to which it was delivered, however much of interest and significance the rest of the country may find in it, and whether or not the Governor actually had in mind a larger audience.

It is a remarkably comprehensive description of the legal,

political, social, and economic progress of the State during the ten years since Governor Smith began his first term as Chief Executive. It is an executive report, not a political argument. Whatever argument there is in it is strictly subordinated to the narrative of events and policies and the delineation of a legislative program. Nor is there much of "the perplexity of ambiguous discourse" which, as Jeremy Bentham observed, "distracts and eludes the apprehension, stimulates and inflames the passions." Except for occasional infelicities of diction, which, like the mauve decade, remind one of pink trying to be purple, what emotional appeal there is is implicit in the matter recounted. Thus His Excellency describes a period of his administration which won him the regard of liberal-minded persons regardless of political interests:

> In the hectic days following the close of the war, under the false impression that we were protecting the ideals of our Government, some of them were trodden under foot. The expulsion from the Assembly of properly and duly elected representatives of the people was a grievous mistake and a denial of all the principles we so earnestly proclaim as being woven into the very fabric of our Government. They were returned to office by the same electorate when I called a special election in the districts they represented.
>
> Their second expulsion was but a faint gesture to try and establish the right, if it could be done, of a wrong principle and a wrong ideal of government. It was actually enacted by the Legislature, though vetoed by me, that the power be given to a single Appellate Division of the court system of our State to strike from the ballot the emblem and the candidate of a political party.
>
> In the mad rage for what was thought necessary for our protection we atempted to throttle freedom of speech. Freedom of expression was throttled when by law it was sought to have a single department of the Government place a test upon the loyalty of our great army of school teachers.
>
> The sanctity of the field of education was invaded by requiring private schools to be licensed by the State in order that we might censor the doctrines taught by them. A censorship over moving pictures was set up and permitted an agency of the State to condemn before the fact.

Even in his discussion of Prohibition, where he was most expected to indulge in campaign propaganda, the Governor limits himself to stating the business of his immediate audience. He explicitly condemns the practice of his State in ratifying any amend-

ment to the Federal Constitution by a mere majority vote of the Legislature, which usually means by "the cracking of the party whip and the rule of King Caucus," and recommends a change in the State Constitution to require that such ratification be by popular vote. Nevertheless, although ratified by a faulty legislative process, the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act are, as the Federal Constitution provides, "as much a part of the laws of this State as our own statutes and our own Constitution." Except as a problem of law enforcement Prohibition is not a State concern:

> Under our form of government and guided by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the question of the Eighteenth Amendment and the sustaining legislation is removed from the states and is focused upon the National Legislature at Washington. Gradually our people are beginning to realize that there and only there can any change in the present status be made.

As a problem of law enforcement, the Governor deals with it in a simple statement of fact:

> Aside from the limited number of policemen who patrol the sparsely settled sections of the State, the State's police power is delegated, and we find it exercised in the first instance by the village constable, the Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs, and the police officials of the cities. I speak only the truth when I say that the people of any locality get the degree of law enforcement upon which they insist and for which they are willing to pay.

The message concludes with a summary of twenty-nine specific recommendations to the State law-makers. These not only supply the logical application of the preceding historical review and general statement of policy, but also indicate the special nature of the address as the governor's *apologia* and advice to his associates in government. A larger audience may choose to consider the outline of the framer's record in one executive office as a recommendation for another. If Governor Smith had this in mind, as he probably did, the message stands as an unusually successful attempt at speaking to an audience within an audience. But in itself it is an admirably straightforward and complete report, a model of a difficult and too generally neglected form of public address.

V. E. Simrell, *Dartmouth College*

CLARENCE DARROW: *Summation to the Jury, People of the State of New York against Caligero Greco and Donato Carillo.* Bronx County Court, December 22, 1927.

Two Fascists, dressed in their black shirts and on their way to march with their contingent in New York's Decoration Day parade, were murdered. Two anti-Fascists, Greco and Carillo, were arrested some six weeks later and charged with the crime. Evidence that the charge was a "frame-up" by Fascists out for revenge caused the formation of a Defense Committee and enlisted the services of Arthur Garfield Hays and Clarence Darrow. After the prisoners had spent five months in jail the trial came to an end and sent them home just three days before Christmas.

Darrow spoke for two hours in his final appeal to the jury. Hays, whose summation preceded Darrow's, asked the jury not only to acquit the prisoners but also to adopt a resolution recommending an inquiry into the activities of the Fascist League of North America, which he accused of framing the charge against them. The judge reprimanded him and asked him to confine himself to the evidence in the case. Darrow, without rousing the ire of the Court by an overt proposal, devoted much of his time to giving Fascism what Lincoln would have called a thorough "skinning." Judge Cohn charged to jury, of course, that they were "not concerned as to whether an excellent government exists elsewhere, or a tyrannical government," and that the political aspects of the case should receive no consideration. As to whether all the jurymen complied with the Judge's charge, who shall say?

Darrow's technique of introducing little deliberative speeches in parenthetical paragraphs, sentences, or even clauses, of his forensic addresses deserves study by itself. Thus he brings into consideration his favorite aversion, capital punishment:

> You have the life or death of two men in your hands, which, in my opinion, is a responsibility greater than any jury should have.

And again, he discusses police methods of extorting statements from prisoners:

> If we had the civilization in this country that they have in England, there would be no statements. The first thing you would be told by the police would be that any statement you make might be used against you. In that respect we have the civilization of the Indian who once tied men to a stake and burned them.

These have nothing to do with the evidence of the case, but they are probably largely responsible for the fact that in Darrow's trials special police have to handle the crowds who come less for the case in hand than to hear Darrow speak. They also contain an element of ethical persuasion in the impression they give of a man whose thought is not confined to the letter of the law. And, of course, they have a great deal of indirect emotional persuasiveness.

Darrow's emotional appeal, even when most direct, has a concreteness which saves it from sentimentality and probably makes it much more effective with jurymen who harden themselves against the stereotyped emotions of ordinary trial lawyers:

> If you can take the lives of these men on this foolish thing that the State calls evidence; then human life is cheaper here than it is in Italy.

There is no tearful supplication in this, but it commands respect and helps make the jury critically disposed toward the prosecution. The personal impression that Darow makes gives such words more effect than they appear on paper to be capable of. A reporter at the trial said, "He spoke, at times, in an almost confidential tone of voice and again thundered his sentiments to the accompaniment of a pounding fist." The description also fits the common pulpit exhorter whose voice Robert Littell calls "a complicated and ingenious instrument, possessing all the stops save one—*vox humana.*" The difference is that *vox humana* is Darrow's mainstay, and when he pounds his fist he really has a fist to pound.

It is hard, after all, to estimate the effectiveness of a jury speech, for one can never tell how far the jurymen let the evidence in the case influence their judgment of rhetorical values. The District Attorney warned the jury against Darrow's "hypnotic power" but he couldn't warn them against the State's own evidence. When the jury retired, their first ballot, for all of Darrow's eloquence, stood only ten to two for acquittal. Then they had the record of the State's testimony read to them, and decided unanimously that the State had lost.

V. E. SIMRELL, *Dartmouth College*

Graduate Study and Research

[Contributions and suggestions for this department should be sent to Charles H. Woolbert, University of Iowa.]

Speech Training as a Factor in Dynamic Education. By WILLIAM J. FARMA. Abstract of a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Wisconsin, 1925.

The purpose of this thesis was; first, to find in what ways the psychological developments in the pedagogy of speech training coincide with the devolpments in educational psychology and; second, to interpret what significance such coincidence as exists bears to the field of speech and to education in general.

A survey was made of the general tendencies in educational psychology, and it was found that authorities agree that education has paid too much attention to the intellect and not enough to the emotions. As a means of correcting this weakness it is contended that the school must reorganize in such a way that a dynamic environment is set up in which the student must work his way through emotionally as well as intellectually. Such an environment must offer to the student a series of progressive experiences that will so condition his responses that he reaches maturity as a well-rounded personality.

The psychological tendencies in scientific Speech Education were then analyzed. The development of speech training was traced through five stages; (1) the rebellion from the illogicality of the elocution of display and artifice because it did not reach the inner causative factors of speech; (2) the application of behavioristic psychology to speech which resulted in the concept that speech is a total bodily response; (3) the application of genetic psychology to speech to explain functional speech disorders which had the effect of revealing that speech must always be considered in terms of the whole personality and all the psychological mechanisms of behavior which make up the personality; (4) the extension of

the above principle to the speech classroom; (5) the development of the concept that through speech comes the socialization of the individual.

Certain conclusions can be drawn from this natural development and expansion of the field of speech training:

That speech training because it is primarily concerned with communicative aspects of the personality is perhaps more than any other subject in the curriculum fitted to facilitate the aims of dynamic education, and

That the speech classroom can be considered as an environment for the conditioning of wholesome behavior habits, particularly those of a social nature.

Using this coincidence of the dynamics of speech training and of dynamic education in general as a premise the following points were developed:

1. Speech training must offer a dynamic social environment to education.

2. We must break down the popular concept that Speech is public speaking and elocution if that environment is to have any degree of social significance.

3. Speech teachers must increasingly understand the modern psychology of normal and abnormal behavior if they are to guide intelligently the student through the conditioning influences of the speech training environment.

4. Speech teachers, except experts in Speech Correction, should make no pretence to correcting abnormal behavior conditions; they can be of great assistance, however, to psychiatric workers in high schools and colleges.

5. Speech training, especially in secondary schools, if it is to go to any extent in socializing the personality, should extend through four years of school.

Incipient Motor Responses in Oral Interpretation of Literature. By ELSIE V. HANEY. Abstract of thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts, School of Speech, Northwestern University, 1927.

This investigation offers an approach to the study of motor responses in the speech situation. It was an experimental study of

incipient movements provoked in both reader and listener during oral interpretation.

Apparatus used in the experiments consisted of a planchette arrangement with a fountain-pen writing device suspended above the flat surface of a steadily moving ribbon of six-inch paper upon which was recorded any horizontal movement of the planchette.

Subjects were seated with the right arm resting comfortably on the planchette and instructed to relax to the greatest possible degree while reading or listening to the reading (Victrola speech records) of various types of poetry.

A few of the conclusions drawn from results of this series of experiments may be stated here briefly as follows:

1. Incipient motor responses are present in the speech situation in both speaker and audience. As they appear in the form of muscular movements, they are natural, spontaneous, universal, and for the most part unconscious.

2. Curves recorded varied greatly in contour, the variations being due to individual differences in the factors which influence incipient responses. Amplitudes measured from almost zero to 60 mm.

3. The reading of literature rich in kinaesthetic imagery is quite generally accompanied by a more lively incipent muscle response. This type of imagery, it may be suggested, is a more important consideration to the reader and speaker than is commonly supposed.

4. The transition states or feelings of relation which are experienced when reading conjunctions, prepositions, or adverbial phrases seem to be largely a matter of bodily adjustment. This motor expression of transition results in movements which are in many cases larger than those recorded during moments of more "substantive" impressions.

5. The bodily changes producing emotional response in a speech situation include incipient movements of the musculature which vary with the emotional response. In general, the more vivid the emotion experienced, the more vigorous is the bodily response.

6. The attitude of liking a piece of literature is an active positive attitude and under favorable conditions is accompanied

by motor response which varies in degree with the appreciation of the literature read. Enthusiasm is, after all, largely a matter of muscular activity.

7. Familiarity with the selection read produces a more active bodily response. Thorough preparation and practice, then, insures more freedom of muscular response.

8. Bodily response in incipient movements varies directly in proportion to the intensity of concentration.

9. A certain degree of general bodily relaxation is necessary for the greatest degree of muscular response, but on the other hand, relaxation may be so deep that the organism fails to respond and even incipient response is considerably lessened. The best speaking cannot be done with the body too tense or too relaxed.

10. Readers who in their style of interpretation are primarily subtle or delicate respond with very tiny incipient muscle movements as compared with the larger ones of those who excell in a broader type of work. This factor is the greatest determining influence in the gross amplitude of the curves.

These conclusions suggest an added emphasis upon the importance of considering speech from the point of view of the entire organism functioning as a unit, and upon the necessity of adhering to this fundamental principle in building courses in speech training. Speech, it seems, may be considered a product of a multitude of delicate conscious and unconscious adjustments and this thesis presents, at least, a new approach to the study of this most complex of all human processes.

A History of the Theory of Direction in the Theatre. By ANITA LOUISE KRANTZ. Abstract of a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts, at Cornell University, 1927.

The leader of coryphaeus who trained the festive chorus of early Greek productions was usually the poet himself. With the gradual introduction of actors and dialogue, the professional director arose. In the selection of actors he insisted on the possession of a good speaking and singing voice, since he believed loud, distinct and clear utterance to be most essential. The acting was statuesque from the use of flowing, padded costumes. Unlike the three permanent Greek actors, a whole company was required for plays at the Roman theatre. In Greek plays musical declama-

tion and ordinary speech were mixed together and used by the same actor. However, in Roman performances the lyric part was rendered by professional singers, while the part of the actor tended to be reduced to the making of appropriate gestures. Pantomimes were popular.

During the twelfth to sixteenth centuries some of the long mystery cycles called for two or three hundred characters. Parts were extremely long and plays were worked on for months. Bombastic delivery was favored by directors. In the Italian *Commedia dell' Arte* the director wrote out the scenario for those professional actors, leaving the dialogue, characters, jokes, soliloquies to the actors; often companies were rigorously drilled, and actors rehearsed till improvisations became stock characters. Shakespeare and Molière wrote for and directed their respective companies. Both called for naturalness of expression and simplicity and sincerity of acting. In Molière's ensemble both voice and movement were minutely regulated. Shakespeare's skill in direction seems to have been equally great.

In England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was a tendency toward the introduction of pageantry, dancing, song, and the pantomime in plays. Thomas Betterton started the trend toward a heavy and bombastic type of acting; David Garrick later brought in a familiar but forcible style. With the Kembles in the nineteenth century a new school of classicism was ushered in, and an effort made toward historical exactness of setting and costume. A school of natural acting was founded under the direction of Thomas Betterton in the last part of the century. Under Macready unity consisted in playing all parts as Macready played them. Under Henry Irving the whole production was controlled by one mind.

In Germany the main idea of Goethe in dramatic art was that of a harmony of ensemble—good grenadiers would do if properly drilled. Individual talent was lost sight of except as a part of an artistic whole. To Richard Wagner word-tone drama was a harmonious blending of music drama, representative and pictorial art. Adolphe Appia in the latter nineteenth century, in attempting to carry out Wagner's ideas for the presentation of "word-tone drama" contributed to the theatre some of its most significant modern theories.

The twentieth century shows two tendencies in dramatic production. The first, or realistic trend, is shown in the Moscow Art Theatre and is perfected in the Belasco Theatre. The second, opposed to the former, tends toward an appeal to the senses, toward convention, impressionism and expressionism, rather than the photographic or realistic. Gordon Craig today asks for the artist-manager who by means of all the arts will give at last a very worthy production; Reinhardt is the popularizer of those theories of the "art of the theatre" of which Craig has been the uncompromising prophet.

A Study in the Rhetorical Methods of Thomas Erskine. By WILLIAM E. YOUNG. Abstract of a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Iowa, 1927.

The problem of the paper was to find the rhetorical methods of Erskine. The field of inquiry was nine courtroom addresses. The procedure was an analysis based upon the concept of the rhetorical pattern and the principles of argumntation taken from recognized texts. The conclusions growing out of the study are two-fold: (1) as to Erskine's rhetorical methods; and (2) as to available methodology.

I. Conclusions as to Erskine's Rhetorical Methods

(A) Exposition comprises one-fifth of Erskine's speeches. It is largely centered in the discussion.

(B) Erskine used the construction pattern less than any other. His favorite method of construction was generalization. Erskine was interested not in individual particulars but in their union into a whole.

(C) Erskine devoted more time to refutation than to any other method. His customary way was to test the inferences; and of the various tests he applied those of generalization the most. This tendency to deal with the part through the whole is evidenced again in Erskine's special devices of refutation. He did not employ the method of residues once; he used the dilemma sparingly. These means are analytic. Erskine preferred to point out that if the particular were true, then a certain general law of which the particular was a mere part must also be true; and this general law to which he subordinated the particular was always

an absurdity, or a dangerous and undesirable principle, or a law that, seen in its true meaning, supported Erskine's case rather than his opponents'.

(D) Erskine was not content with the implicit means of action, voice, and diction as methods of establishing an emotional connection between audience and end sought; he introduced the persuasion pattern,—the open, explicit rhetorical appeal. And he used this persuasion pattern more than any other of the entire four (exposition, construction, refutation, and persuasion).

II. Conclusions as to Methodology

(A) The following additions to the theory of refutation are suggested:

(1) Under the tests of inference in the tests of effect to cause: Does the alleged cause constitute the *simplest* practicable explanation of the known effect? — This is plainly borrowed from the Law of Parsimony of Causes, but it receives no mention in the texts of today.

(2) The method of residues and the method of dilemma do not make simple refutation patterns. The dilemma, when fully expanded, is composed of an exposition pattern and two refutation patterns; the method of residues, of an exposition pattern, of one, two, or more refutation patterns, and then usually of one construction pattern.

(B) In regard to persuasion the following is submitted:

(1) The implicit factors (action, voice, diction, etc.) of providing emotional stimuli should be separated (for analysis) from the explicit method (the rhetorical pattern of persuasion).

(2) Any classification of the sources of persuasion which includes *audience as one of several* is faulty, since the audience is involved in every source as the common denominator.

A Study of the Technique of Argumentative Analysis as Treated by Ancient and Modern Writers. By EARL W. WELLS. Abstract of a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Wisconsin, 1927.

PROBLEM

The problem undertaken in this thesis was threefold: (1) to ascertain what of importance had been written on the subject of

argumentative analysis, (2) to make a comparative and evaluating study of the data obtained, and (3) to reach some conclusions on the technique of argumentative analysis based upon the survey and study made.

Procedure

The sources of material were carefully selected, with a view to making the survey as exhausitve as possible. To the same end, a very broad conception of analysis was adopted as a measure of the latitude of the research. Works on rhetoric and oratory were first examined, those of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian from among the ancient writings; and from among the modern, those of Adams, Bascom, Blair, Campbell, Day, Genung, Hill, and Whately. Fifteen texts on argumentation and debate—all that could lay any claim to distinction—written since 1895, the date of Baker's pioneer work, were next surveyed. A third type of material was obtained from Stephen's volume on legal pleading.

In the body of the thesis, the data collected from the writers on rhetoric and oratory is set forth in compact form, followed by a critical comment, in which various views are compared and evaluated under the following heads: (1) parts of the speech, (2) classification of questions, (3) types of oratory, (4) topics for argument, (5) kinds of proof, (6) motives for action, (7) basis of the cause (or state of the controversy), (8) proposition for discussion, (9) partition of the subject and (10) determination of the arguments. The data secured from the books on argumentation and debate is similarly catalogued. In regard to this material, the general conceptions of argumentative analysis held by the different authors are compared and criticized in respect to (1) the importance of analysis, (2) the definition of analysis, (3) the requirements of analysis, (4) the major steps in analysis and (5) the issues derived from analysis; and then what the same writers say relative to the specific problems of (1) formulating the proposition, (2) surveying the background of the proposition, (3) defining the terms of the proposition, and (4) discovering the issues in the proposition, is reviewed and commented upon. The material on legal pleading is presented in a like manner and discussed under the following headings: (1) the nature of pleading, (2) the steps in the process of pleading, and (3) the requirements of the issue derived by pleading.

Results

Referring back to the purpose of the thesis, it may be said that it does reveal an exhaustive survey of what has been written on the subject of argumentative analysis. Furthermore, the viewpoints of all authors and the positions taken by them are given full and equal consideration and a very detailed study. Among other things, the thesis shows that the ancient writers and most of the modern writers on rhetoric and oratory employed no generic term comparable to the term "analysis" as used by all the writers on argumentation and debate ("invention" being the closest approach to such); and that the books on argumentation and debate present a wide variety of views as to the meaning, scope, and technique of argumentative analysis. In conclusion, the thesis presents, in outline form, a conception of the process of argumentative analysis including a procedural technique, derived from the survey and study made. Argumentative analysis is interpreted as a process involving both the analysis *for* the proposition and the analysis *of* the proposition. A further well-defined distinction is made between the analysis of the proposition for the issues and the analysis of the proposition for the affirmative and the negative contentions. Also, an attempt is made at a more satisfying definition of both issues and contentions; and a parallel is drawn between analysis in general argumentation and analysis in legal pleading.

The Effect of Bodily Action on Voice Intensity. By Alan H. Monroe. Abstract of a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in the School of Speech at Northwestern University, 1927.

Although the general effect of bodily activity on vocal activity had long been inferred, no specific investigation had been made of the effect of gestures on syllabic intensity. The problem, therefore, was to find by experimental means whether the use of a simple downward right-arm gesture had any effect on the intensity of the vocalized syllable produced at the same time. This problem was attacked in two ways: by an audience-reaction test, and by a breath-pressure test carried on in the laboratory. In both of these tests 42 subjects of various degrees of speech training were used.

In the audience-reaction tests, the subjects produced vocal sounds in pairs, sometimes with and sometimes without action. They stood within the hearing but out of the sight of the audience. The auditors (who had previously been limited by the Seashore "Intensity Test" to those whose sense of intensity-discrimination was normal or above) judged which of the paired sounds so produced was the louder. These judgments were tabulated to discover whether a shift of the action from the first to the second of the paired sounds was accompanied by a corresponding shift in the intensity of the sound as determined by the auditors. A total of 4716 judgments made by 131 auditors on the sounds produced by the 42 subjects showed that, although the effect was not uniform nor universal, nevertheless *the tendency of action was to increase the intensity of the sound in connection with which it was used.* The following is a graphical summary of the tabulated judgments:



In the breath-pressure tests, the same subjects used in the preceding experiment produced continuous vowel sounds, during which they pulled a light weight at various intervals. The pressure of the breath used in vocalizing was recorded by the use of the breath-pressure apparatus constructed in 1926 by Sherrod and Keller*; and the action was recorded by a lever system connected to the weight which the subject pulled. These two records were taken simultaneously on the same kymograph. These records were collected, measured, and tabulated. A measurement was made of the height of the breath-pressure line, in each case, one second

* Described in QUARTERLY JOURNAL, XIII, No. 2, 1927, p. 135 ff.

before the subject had pulled the weight, at the time of the pull, and one second after the pull. As each subject pulled the weight 12 times, the number of triple measurements was 504. The average for the 504 pulls showed that the stylus of the breath-pressure tambour went up .748 mm., when action was used, above where it was preceding the action; and that it returned to a point .144 mm. above the norm one second after the action. A graphical summary of the twelve pulls by the 42 subjects follows:



a—measurement taken one second before action.
b—measurement taken during action.
c—measurement taken one second after action.

This experiment showed that, while the effect was not uniform nor universal, nevertheless the *tendency of action was to increase the breath-pressure used in vocalizing at the precise time the action was used.*

In these tests, the 42 subjects varied in the consistency and degree of their reactions, but the dominant tendency prevailed throughout. The conclusion was therefore reached that, although action does not always result in added intensity or breath-pressure, the prevailing tendency is for it to do so.

Representative Critics and Actors on Oral Expression. By VERA JANE KEPPEL. Abstract of a thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts at Cornell University, 1926.

A comparison of the ideals of oral expression in all ages reveals astonishingly similar conceptions. In antiquity there was a clash of ideas among actors and critics whether the best formal speech was "declaimed in a loud and sonorous clang" or spoken in a natural and unassuming manner. In comedy, expression seemed to imitate ordinary conversation more closely than in tragedy. However, the writings of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Cicero, Quintilian, and other authorities indicate that effective oral expression depended chiefly on complete comprehension of the thought expressed and upon extensive vocal training.

Of the art of the actor in the *Commedia dell' Arte* and in the Elizabethan theatres little is known. Comments on the speech of a few models signify an ideal of naturalness and simplicity. In the Elizabethan period England was a battlefield over the methods of Edward Allen, who, according to legend, roared and shouted, and Shakespeare, who hated bombast. Molière in the Seventeenth Century introduced a delivery in tragedy which was as unassuming as that used in comedy in the earlier periods. Oral expression on the stage of the Eighteenth Century was represented by Betterton, who demanded regular declamation, plastic methods of speech and action, and chanting; by Cibber, whose tragedy was artificially rhetorical in manner and whose comedy abounded in sentimentality; and by Garrick, who replaced over-stressed declamation with varied and finished ensemble.

The Classical Revival of the early Nineteenth Century was characterized by ultra-theatrical effects, stilted declamation, conventional unity, and rhythmic delivery. The closely-following romantic school was free, unconventional, emotional. While there was still an over-emphasis on pantomime and posture and a straining for startling contrasts, the stage from 1800 to 1865 was vigorously in process of development. There was vitality in every branch of stagecraft and a special interest in the theory and technique of vocal expression; this development became the unifying principle of Realism. The realistic stage protested against theatricality, against false pathos, against declamation. As romanticism grew out of decadent classicism, and realism out of dying romanticism, so the last flicker of realism is giving birth to the "new movement." This modernism is exemplified in impressionism and expressionism; its prophet and chief exponent was Gordon Craig.

When we compare ideals of speech, we find them strikingly similar. As a theory, the standard oral expression is merely ordinary conversation idealized or enlarged. Recent pedagogical research in the field have concluded that good speaking demands, with motivation by inner feeling, complete comprehension of the words expressed, speech correct by habit and conformed persuasively and aesthetically to character, situation, and form of literary type involved. This modern theory of oral expression is distinctive chiefly in its emphasis and its statement; the basic principle having changed little since ancient times.

The Motivation of Speech Education for Children. By ALPHA W. ROTH. Abstract of thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts, University of Wisconsin, 1927.

From practical experience in the field of speech correction, the author felt the need of having definite material compiled for the purpose of motivating the correction of every consonantal sound in the English language. A basis for the problem was found in the numerous instances in which motivation has been used in science, in law, in reconstruction, in business, in commercialized recreation, as well as in education.

It is obvious that the same material could not be used for kindergarten children as for high-school pupils. Therefore, three groups of children were considered: those of kindergarten and primary age, those in the grades from two to six, and those in high school. In each division, a considerable number of authors was consulted in order to determine what were the main interests of children of this particular age, and material was selected which contained these elements. In almost every instance only poems, games, or stories which had previously been tested in actual classwork were incorporated. Mother Goose rhymes largely were used for the first age, with the addition of a few of Milne's and Stevenson's poems. Numerous writers, both of modern and older groups, were used in the second and third divisions.

The material incorporated in the first two groups was included under the particular consonant sound which it might be used to motivate. For instance, for the sound p, such verses were used as Pease Porridge Hot, Poor Pussy Cat, I Like Little Pussy, Pat-A-Cake, The Five Little Pigs, and others. Verses were chosen which contained a great number of the particular sounds which were to be corrected. In the high-school group, it was less necessary to correct particular sounds than to correct speech in general; therefore material was selected which would appeal to children of this age.

The theoretical portion of the manuscript established the legitimacy of a problem of this nature; the practical exercises in the form of games, stories, and especially poems were arranged to be of use both to the parent and to the teacher of children whose speech needs education.

NEWS AND NOTES

[Items intended for this department—news of changes in departments, dramatic and forensic activities, state and local meetings, personals, etc.—should be sent to Miss Lousene Rousseau, 30 Clinton Street, Brooklyn, New York.]

In view of the increased interest of members of the National Association of Teachers of Speech in the activities of the national honorary forensic society, Pi Kappa Delta, the account of the recent national convention of that body is here printed in detail. This meeting, the seventh biennial gathering of the fraternity, was held in Ohio, from April second to sixth. There were so many delegates in attendance that it was necessary to divide them for the first day, the women reporting at Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, for their preliminaries, while the men reported either at Otterbein College, Westerville, or at Heidelberg College, Tiffin. On April third all delegates were brought to Heidelberg College which was convention headquarters where all the contests were concluded.

Five hundred delegates from more than one hundred colleges and universities in thirty states were present. They participated in national contests for both men and women in debating, oratory, and extemporaneous speaking. Forty-six teams entered the women's debate tournament, and twenty-two orators and twenty-two speakers began the competition in the oratorical and extemporaneous speaking contests. At Otterbein the men had twenty-eight debate teams, eleven orators, and thirteen extemporaneous speakers; while at Heidelberg there were fifty-six debate teams, thirty-five orators, and twenty-eight extemporaneous speakers.

In the debate contests, each team had to be defeated twice to be eliminated, and in the other contests the three highest in each preliminary group advanced to the next contest. The program for the first day included five rounds of debates and one round of preliminaries in the other contests. The finals were held in Tiffin on the following days.

Although it is the policy of the QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH not to print the names of winners in contests of any kind, it will probably be of interest to readers to know the names of winning orations, which were as follows: "The Cost of War," "The Age of Confusion," "Certainties in our World of Freedom," "Beneath American Roofs," "Wings of Youth," and "The New Pioneer." In the final contest in extemporaneous speaking, the women spoke on the general subject of the American home and the men on the modern newspaper. An hour before the contest each speaker drew some topic under this general subject upon which he was to speak. A unique feature of the finals was the question and answer method employed: after each speaker had had ten minutes to develop the subject he had drawn, he was required to take the platform again, while the chairman directed one of the other contestants to ask him a question concerning the topic he had first spoken on, allowing him two minutes for his answer.

During the four days of the convention there were two hundred fifty-two debates, twenty-two oratorical, and twenty-one extemporaneous speaking contests.

The convention closed Thursday evening with a banquet at which Dr. Charles H. Woolbert of the University of Iowa was the chief speaker. The program also included talks by Helen Staver, Heidelberg College; L. K. Lord, Colby College; Frank Watson, University of Redlands; Josephine Carroll, Transylvania College, George McCarty, South Dakota State College; J. D. Coon of the National Council, Sioux Falls; and Stanley B. Houck, National President of Delta Sigma Rho. Alfred Westfall of Colorado Agricultural College, National President of Pi Kappa Delta, presided.

From fourteen petitions for new chapters, charters were granted to Shurtleff College, Alton, Illinois; Simmons College, Abeline, Texas; West Virginia Wesleyan College, Buckhannon, West Viriginia; State Teachers College, Oshkosh, Wisconsin; and the State Normal School for Women, Farmville, Virginia.

Officers for the ensuing year are as follows: President, W. H. Veatch, Washington State College, Pullman, Washington; First Vice-President, I. D. Menchofer, Michigan State College, East Lansing Michigan; Second Vice-President, George R. R. Pflaum, Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia; Third Vice-President, Roy M. Smith, Western Union College, Le Mars, Iowa; Fourth Vice-

President, H. D. Hopkins, Heidelberg College, Tiffin, Ohio; Historian, Alfred Westfall, Colorado Agricultural College, Fort Collins, Colorado; student representatives, L. V. Ginger, Kentucky Wesleyan College, and Anne Marie Bennett, Trinity University, Waxahachie, Texas.

The nineteenth annual meeting of the Eastern Public Speaking Conference was held under the auspices of Yale University April 13 and 14. The general sessions were addressed by Professors Jack Crawford, John C. Adams, George Pierce Baker and Alexander Dean of Yale. Edith Wynne Matthison presented a program of poetry-reading, and Dr. William H. Burnham of Clark University read a paper on Personality and Voice. Professor Cary Jacob of Smith College gave a demonstration of the autophonoscope. A representative of the Westinghouse Co. demonstrated the Osiso Phonoscope. Marné Lauritsen of Smith College told of an educational experiment with a young deaf child. Professor Robert H. Gault of Northwestern University spoke on the extension of the application of touch and vibration to the training of the deaf. Dean Frances Dinsmore of the Oklahoma College for Women discussed the place of speech training in the general educative process. Opportunity was given for an inspection of the Yale School of the Drama. Herbert A. Wichelns of Cornell presided over the public speaking section. Papers were presented by E. L. Hunt of Swarthmore, S. L. Garrison of Amherst, and Hoyt Hudson of Princeton. W. M. Parrish of Pittsburgh was chairman of the section on interpretative reading. Papers were read by Helen Field of the Montclair Normal School, Harriet Sleight of Sarah Lawrence College, Sara Stinchfield of Mt. Holyoke, and Lee S. Hultzén of Dartmouth. In the section on speech problems papers were read by R. C. Borden of New York University, John C. Kenyon of Hiram College, L. Adele Carll, Columbia University, and Windsor Dagget, of New York City. James A. Winans of Dartmouth was toastmaster at the dinner. Hoyt H. Hudson, of Princeton, was elected President and Mrs. Mary Thornton Harvey, of Hunter College, Secretary-Treasurer.

The Michigan Association of Teachers of Speech held its annual meeting at Ann Arbor, Friday, April 27, the date being so

arranged that the State Championship Debate of the High School League held on the same date was included as part of the program. The programs given during the day were as follows: Morning Session: "The Program of Speech Correction in Grand Rapids," Miss Eudora Estabrook, Grand Rapids Junior College; "Recent Developments in the Little Theatre," Daniel Quirk Jr., Ypsilanti; "Making Poetry Live," Marion Stowe, Michigan State Normal College. Afternoon Session: "Modern Tendencies in Debate," James M. O'Neill, University of Michigan; Reading of "Tristram," Ralph Dennis, Northwestern University School of Speech.

In the realm of high school debating, many states have now organized state leagues, in which the member schools engage in a series of elimination debates to determine a state champion. One of the first states to organize such a system was Michigan, which has just completed its eleventh year with the state championship debate referred to above. It is interesting to note the growth of the system in this state.

The Michigan High School Debating League is administered directly by the Extension Division of the University of Michigan, the director being G. E. Densmore of the Department of Speech. Unlike many states, every member of the League is expected to debate four times, win or lose, and the elimination series includes those schools which amass the greatest number of points during the four debates. The state debate is held at Ann Arbor, both teams and coaches being guests of the University.

This state debate creates more interest each year, and it is now the custom of a large number of high schools to send their debating teams to Ann Arbor to hear the final debate—in fact, so many schools that reduced railroad fares are now promised. The number of member schools has also grown rapidly—from 66 in 1917 to 244 in 1927. During the current year more than 1200 debaters competed in something over 600 debates under the banner of the League.

The system of awards has been growing more elaborate and this year awards began with the 64 teams which entered the elimination series, each team receiving the University of Michigan Wall Plaque Trophy through the cooperation of the *Detroit Free Press*, which carried the pictures of the members of the 64 teams in a

Rotogravure Supplement of the Sunday Free Press. In addition to the bronze trophy cups presented to the two schools participating in the State Debate, each of the six debaters was this year presented with a gold watch by the *Detroit Free Press.*

The fifth state meeting of the Texas Speech Arts Association was held at Houston during the winter. On the programs were Miss Douglas MacCorquodale of *The Houston Press,* H. W. Harris of the Houston Junior College, Mrs. Minnie Mitchell of the Houston High Schools, Mrs. Gladys De S. Bates of Texas Christian University, Mrs. J. Yancey Fincher of the Dallas Highland Park High School, and Pauline Jordan of the Texas Women's College. Sectional meetings were devoted to Studios, High Schools, and Colleges. As part of the entertainment the Houston Recreation Department, under the direction of Frances Fox, presented puppet performances of *Old King Cole, Alice in Wonderland,* and *The Merchant of Venice;* the Rice Dramatic Club presented Frederick Lonsdale's *Aren't We All?* and the Little Theatre of Houston, under the direction of Frederick Leon Webster, presented Lulu Vollmer's *Sun-up.*

The Texas Speech Arts Association, only four years in existence, has established a unique undertaking. It publishes a small magazine, called *Texas Speech Arts Magazine,* which gives the news of teachers of speech and their activities throughout the state.

Officers of the Association are Mary E. Latimer, Baylor College, President; Mrs. Gladys De Silva Bates, Texas Christian University, Vice-President; Mrs. M. M. Mitchell, San Jacinto High School, Houston, Recording Secretary; Miss Maude Swink, Temple, Corresponding Secretary; Miss Mabel Bonner, Corsicana, Treasurer; and Miss Jeston Dickey, San Antonio, Historian and Editor.

Forty-five high schools in twenty-five different counties are this year members of the Extempore Speaking Association of Michigan High Schools. This is a substantial increase over the number enrolled last year, when the Association was organized by the Department of Speech of Western State Teachers College, Kalamazoo, under the direction of Carroll P. Lahman. District contests were

held in April, and the students awarded first and second place in each of the six districts competed in the final contest at Kalamazoo, May 5. Schedules for these contests are arranged in cooperation with the Michigan High School Debating League, thus obviating any conflict in dates.

Practically the entire regular staff of the Department of Speech at the University of Michigan will be in attendance during the Summer Session, and an elaborate program of courses is offered, including, in addition to the regular courses in Public Speaking, Debate, Interpretation, and Dramatic Production, courses in the Psychology of Speech, Theory of Oral Reading, Stage Craft, Phonetics, Voice Science, Rhetorical Theory, The Teaching of Speech, and graduate courses in Reading and Dramatics, the Anatomy and Function of the Vocal Organs, and Seminary in Rhetoric and Oratory.

Many teachers of Speech are interested in the Bread Loaf School of English which is held at Bread Loaf Inn, in Vermont, as a section of the Summer Session of Middlebury College. The session this summer will continue from July 2 to August 17. Among its faculty members are listed Maurice Gnesis, Director of the Little Theatre of Duluth, and Katharine Clugston and H. Frederick Stover of the Yale School of Drama. Courses will be offered in Play Production and Costume Design, as well as a Laboratory in Play Production.

The Curry School of Expression is offering Summer Terms in four different cities outside of Boston—Decatur, Georgia, Fort Worth, Texas, Asheville, North Carolina, and Denver, Colorado.

The recently organized Kansas Debate Coaches Association held a joint meeting with the Missouri Debate Coaches Association at Kansas City not long ago, with the following papers on the program: "The Part of the Coach in Preparation for Debates," Clifford Cornwell, Kirksville State Teachers College; "The Oxford Plan and American Debating," H. B. Summers, Kansas State Agricultural College; "The Importance of Rhetoric in Debate," Mil-

dred McGhee, Culver-Stockton College; "Relative Importance of Conviction and Persuasion," Franc L. McCluer, Westminister College; "New Types of Intercollegiate Debating," George R. R. Pflaum, Emporia Teachers College; "Debate Judging," P. Casper Harvey, William Jewell College; "The Financing of Debate," Dean Leroy Allen, Southwestern College.

Great variety is evident in the questions which have been most popular among college debaters this year. The Mid-West Debate Conference, comprising members in Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois, chose the proposition: "Resolved: That the United States should cease to protect by armed force capital invested in foreign lands except after formal declaration of war." The Indiana Intercollegiate Debate League debated: "Resolved: That the direct primary for the selection of national officials should be abolished," while the Michigan Intercollegiate League debated our present Latin American policy. The women's teams of the Michigan League argued the advisability of putting the Democrats in power in the next election. The Southern California Public Speaking Conference also debated the question of armed intervention in Latin America, while their women's teams debated about the influence of advertising on public welfare. The Pacific Coast League, comprising the larger universities of the western states, debated the advisability of American protection of investors and investments in foreign countries.

The debate program of the University of Redlands (California) this year has been unusually ambitious. About thirty-six debates were scheduled, involving five different questions. Three coaches and three managers were kept busy during the season.

The Bates College (Maine) debaters, backed by a seven-thousand-dollar fund raised by popular subscription through the cooperation of the Portland newspapers, have started on a trip around the world. They plan to visit Hawaii, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and England.

In addition to members of the regular staff, the School of Speech of Northwestern University will have several additional

faculty members during the Summer Session: John Barnes of the University of Wisconsin; Mildred Harter, Director of Auditoriums in the Gary Public Schools; and Belle Kennedy, Speech Defects, Evanston Grade Schools.

DRAMATICS

Several performances of *Sunt Lacrimae Rerum,* an adaptation of the love story of Dido and Aeneas, were given recently by students at Hunter College. The play was adapted from the first and fourth books of Virgil's *Aeneid* by Dr. Pearl Wilson, Professor of Greek and Latin at Hunter College.

Toward the end of April was held the third annual dramatic contest for secondary schools at New York University, in which eight high schools from five states presented one-act plays in competition for the silver trophy awarded by the Washington Square Players of the University. The judges were Dr. Edwin Van B. Knickerbocker of George Washington High School, John Stanley Morris of New York University, and Leon Edward Joseph, editor of the Little Theatre Department of the New York Herald Tribune. The plays presented were as follows: *The High Heart,* by Adelaide C. Rowell, directed by Viola Gaylord, Port Washington High School; *The Maker of Dreams,* by Oliphant Downs, directed by Emerson Burke, Searles High School, Great Barrington, Massachusetts; *The Old Lady Shows her Medals,* by J. M. Barrie, directed by Harold Augustine, Montclair High School, New Jersey; *The Goal,* by Henry Arthur Jones, directed by Florence Esseltyn, Schenectady High School; *Thank You, Doctor,* by Gilbert Emery, directed by Madeleine Carroll, Commercial High School, New Haven, Connecticut; *The Valiant,* by Holworthy Hall, directed by Flora Curtis, Pawtucket High School, Rhode Island; *The Philosopher of Butter Biggens,* by Malcom La Prade, directed by Laura MacDonald, Mount Vernon High School; and *The Robbery,* by Clare Kummer, directed by Maud Marceau, Freeport High School.

The University of Wichita Players presented during the winter their sixth Shakespearean performance in the last five years, when they staged *Hamlet.*

Dramatic performances at the University of Oregon during the year included Capek's *R. U. R.* and Oscar Wilde's *Lady Windermere's Fan.*

Among the performances at Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts, were Maeterlinck's *Interior, Op-O-Me-Thumb,* by Fenn and Pryce, Granville Barker's *Rococo,* Lulu Vollmer's *Sun-up,* a Christmas Nativity play adapted from an old English miracle play cycle, and Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale.*

Recent performances at Ohio Wesleyan University were *Polly With a Past* and *Erstwhile Susan.*

The Missouri Workshop, under the direction of Professor Donovan Rhynsburger, presented *The Patsy, In a Garden, Anna Christie,* and *Facing the Music,* as its major productions of the season.

Plans have been approved for the addition of a new wing to Lincoln Hall at the University of Illinois. A complete little theatre is planned as one feature of the building. Construction will start this spring.

The Players of Western State Teachers College, Kalamazoo, Michigan, this year presented as the annual mid-winter play Shaw's *You Never Can Tell,* and other productions included, twice before out-of-town audiences, Housum's *The Eligible Mr. Bangs,* Percival Wilde's *Gatsby,* and Elmer Rice's *The Passing of Chow Chow.*

An interesting performance of *The Beggar's Opera* by John Gay was given not long ago by students of Smith College under the direction of Mr. Larkin and Mr. Donovan.

A performance in German of *Weinachtsmann* was given this winter at Randolph-Macon College under the direction of Mary Beth Reynolds.

The Players of the North Carolina College for Women produced, as part of their dramatic program for the year, Shaw's *Candida* and Rostand's *Chantecler*. W. R. Taylor directed the performances.

Students of Hunter College, New York, revived the play *Rip Van Winkle* recently with considerable success.

Five major productions were given during the year by students of the University of Pennsylvania State College: *Oedipus Rex, Beyond the Horizon, A Midsummer Night's Dream, The Enemy,* and *The Hidden Guest.* Arthur Cloetingh and David D. Mason shared the responsibility of directing the plays.

At Manhattan, Kansas, where the Kansas State Agricultural College and the people of Manhattan cooperate in the work of the Manhattan Theatre, the performances this year were *Romance,* by Edward Sheldon, *The Poor Nut,* by J. C. and Elliott Nugent, *Sun-up,* by Lulu Vollmer, *Two Girls Wanted,* by Gladys Unger, and Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice.*

Students of Adelphi College, Brooklyn, recently presented an elaborate performance of *Prunella.*

In the Little Theatre of Williams College performances this winter included *A Door Ought to be Open or Shut,* by De Musset, *Love of One's Neighbor,* by Andreyev, *Green Chartreuse,* by Chester Heywood, and *Jabberwocky.*

Mt. Holyoke College has also recently witnessed a Shakespearean performance, *Romeo and Juliet* being presented there by the Dramatic Club.

The Garrick Players of Lake Forest College, Illinois, have presented an elaborate program of plays this year, including *Pals First,* by Lee Wilson Dodd, *Seventh Heaven,* by Austin Strong, Shaw's *Candida, Square Crooks,* by James Judge, *In Love with Love, One of the Family, The Butter and Egg Man, The Fool.*

The University of Southern California performances of *Prunella,* by Housman and Barker, *To the Ladies,* by Kaufman and Connelly, and *Adam and Eva* have been given during the year under the direction of Ray MacDonald.

The Players of the University of Nebraska have presented during the year Molnar's *Liliom,* Shaw's *Candida,* Janney's *The Black Flamingo, Tommy,* by Lindsay and Robinson, and *Alias the Deacon.*

The annual play of Pontiac, Michigan, High School was *The Poor Nut,* by J. C. and Elliott Nugent, this group being the first amateur group to receive permission to use the play. The performance was directed by W. N. Viola.

Among the varied activities of this group of students, an interesting report has been received of a parents' reception sponsored by the Playcrafters of Pontiac High School. Many phases of stagecraft made by students of the dramatics classes were on display, such as model sets for various plays, model stages equipped with lights, model costumes of different periods, marionettes and Punch and Judy characters made by the students.

PERSONALS

Harry B. Gough of De Pauw University will be a member of the Speech faculty at West Virginia University this coming summer.

Carroll P. Lahmann, of the Western State Teachers College, Kalamazoo, Michigan, will enjoy a sabbatical leave next year, and plans to spend the year studying at the University of Wisconsin.

Miss Gladys Borchers of the University of Wisconsin will teach this summer at the University of Minnesota.

Lawrence Mendenhall, who is studying for a higher degree at the University of Wisconsin, has spent the year studying the theatre in New York, where he was with the Reinhardt productions in December. At present he is playing in "Marco Millions," one